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ABSTRACT 
EVENT STRUCTURE IN VISION AND LANGUAGE 
 
Alon Hafri 
John C. Trueswell 
Russell A. Epstein 
 
Our visual experience is surprisingly rich: We do not only see low-level properties 
such as colors or contours; we also see events, or what is happening. Within linguistics, 
the examination of how we talk about events suggests that relatively abstract elements 
exist in the mind which pertain to the relational structure of events, including general 
thematic roles (e.g., Agent), Causation, Motion, and Transfer. For example, “Alex gave 
Jesse flowers” and “Jesse gave Alex flowers” both refer to an event of transfer, with the 
directionality of the transfer having different social consequences. The goal of the 
present research is to examine the extent to which abstract event information of this sort 
(event structure) is generated in visual perceptual processing. Do we perceive this 
information, just as we do with more ‘traditional’ visual properties like color and shape? 
In the first study (Chapter 2), I used a novel behavioral paradigm to show that event 
roles – who is acting on whom – are rapidly and automatically extracted from visual 
scenes, even when participants are engaged in an orthogonal task, such as color or 
gender identification. In the second study (Chapter 3), I provided functional magnetic 
resonance (fMRI) evidence for commonality in content between neural representations 
elicited by static snapshots of actions and by full, dynamic action sequences. These two 
studies suggest that relatively abstract representations of events are spontaneously 
extracted from sparse visual information. In the final study (Chapter 4), I return to 
language, the initial inspiration for my investigations of events in vision. Here I test the 
hypothesis that the human brain represents verbs in part via their associated event 
structures. Using a model of verbs based on event-structure semantic features (e.g., 
Cause, Motion, Transfer), it was possible to successfully predict fMRI responses in 
language-selective brain regions as people engaged in real-time comprehension of 
naturalistic speech. Taken together, my research reveals that in both perception and 
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language, the mind rapidly constructs a representation of the world that includes events 
with relational structure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our visual experience is surprisingly rich: We see 
not only colors or contours, objects or scenes, but also 
what’s happening. And, indeed, it seems we cannot 
help but do so. For example, Figure 1.1 could in 
principle be described as “Some people on a field”, but 
instead you would likely remark, “The red player 
savagely bit the blue player’s arm!”. Recognizing what is 
happening “out there” is central to our everyday experience in a physical and social 
world, yet the nature of this recognition process is unclear. 
Decades of empirical work has had success in addressing one aspect of the problem: 
the visual processes and neural systems involved in recognizing categories of movement 
patterns, such as walking or running (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Lange & Lappe, 2006), or of 
hand-object interactions, such as grasping (Fleischer, Caggiano, Thier, & Giese, 2013; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Yet consider again the soccer star biting his opponent. 
From this it is clear that we do not merely recognize patterns of motion (in fact, Figure 
1.1 is devoid of explicit motion signals). Instead we recognize events, with a rich internal 
structure: the player in red bit the player in blue. 
Event structure specifies the kinds of relationships between entities and the 
environment, and the roles that each entity plays in the event. In Figure 1.1, the red 
player is an Agent (the entity who acts) and the blue player is a Patient (the entity who is 
acted on or undergoes a change of state). Recognizing this structure allows us to make 
rich inferences about the dispositions of the individuals (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 
2007), or who might deserve blame (De Freitas & Alvarez, 2018) — all of which are 
fundamental for interacting with individuals and for reasoning about the world. Work in 
linguistics offers a rich set of theoretical predictions about what the components of event 
structure might be. Strikingly, however, there has not been systematic investigation of 
the perceptual processing of event structure in its own right. 
What is the nature of event representations in the mind? Do they merely arise in our 
explicit, effortful judgments about our environment, perhaps based on reasoning about 
the relative locations and poses of entities? Or might they have a basis in more primitive 
What's happening? How do we 
know? 
Figure 1.1 
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and foundational mental processes, such as the rapid, automatic processes of visual 
perception and attention? This latter possibility is in line with growing evidence that the 
visual system itself traffics in high-level properties like causality (Rolfs, Dambacher, & 
Cavanagh, 2013), animacy (van Buren, Uddenberg, & Scholl, 2015), and balance 
(Firestone & Keil, 2016). 
The representation of event structure elicited by visual and linguistic input is the 
central topic of this thesis. In the following chapters, we employ techniques to predict 
behavior and brain activity as people engage in tasks involving event perception and 
language comprehension. Across three studies, we explore the automaticity of event 
structure elicited by these two modalities. In each study, we test the content and 
generality of these representations. Taken together, this research program lends support 
to the hypothesis that the perceptual system traffics in high-level representations of 
events that have internal structure of a very particular sort. In particular, the elements of 
this event structure correspond to those made explicit by theories about the relationship 
between the structure of language and the structure of events. 
Below, we briefly review relevant linguistic and developmental literature that 
indicates the kinds of representations we might expect to be afforded by the visual 
system. We then discuss approaches taken thus far to investigate the representations of 
events afforded by high-level vision. Finally, we preview the studies conducted in this 
thesis. 
1.1. Approaches to event structure in the mind: Linguistic and 
developmental evidence 
What is an event category? As with the correspondence between nouns and object 
categories, the verbs and verb phrases used in a language can give us a preliminary idea 
of the kinds of event categories that humans conceptualize. For example, we conceive of 
biting and hugging, kissing and kicking. Delving deeper, a moment’s thought reveals 
that each category involves a particular kind of spatiotemporal occurrence: for biting, a 
person or animal’s teeth must enclose something. Simply reaching one’s mouth toward 
something does not suffice. This demonstrates the intuition that a single verb can refer 
to a combination of several components; but what are these components? 
Before contemporary cognitive science traditions, philosophers recognized the 
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centrality of certain conceptual components of events to our understanding of the world 
(e.g., causality; Hume, 1739). More recently, the efforts of cognitive psychologists to 
account for patterns of linguistic structure within and across languages has become a 
fruitful source for theories about what components of events the mind represents. For a 
simple example, consider the following sentences, where the noun phrases before and 
after the verb are underlined: 
 
1) The red player ran. 
2) The red player bit his opponent. 
3) The referee gave the red player a penalty. 
 
Contrast the previous examples with the following, which are odd (??) or ungrammatical 
(*): 
 
4) ?? The red player ran his opponent a penalty. 
5) ?? The red player bit. 
6) * The referee gave the red player. 
 
Notice that the number of noun phrases is dictated by the nature of the events 
referred to: running requires one entity, biting two, and giving three. It turns out that 
these patterns are quite consistent, holding across verbs that refer to events that differ 
drastically in content (Fisher, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1991; Jackendoff, 1990; Talmy, 
2000). Take the below for example, where 7-9 correspond to 1-3, respectively: 
 
7) The TIE fighter flew. 
8) Obi-Wan swung his sword. 
9) Luke told Leia the news. 
 
More sophisticated analyses of the patterns of linguistic structure within and across 
languages have uncovered elements of event structure that are quite general in nature. 
These elements include, among others, Causation, Motion, and Change of State (detailed 
further in Chapter 4), as well as sets of event roles (detailed further in Chapter 2). Event 
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roles (also called thematic roles) describe the specific relationship between entities in an 
event. For example, in The girl pushes the boy, girl is the Agent (or one who acts), and 
boy is the Patient (or one who is acted upon or changes state). Role information is often 
(but not always) indicated by the relative positioning of noun phrases in an utterance (or 
in some languages, by distinct case markings):   
 
10) Luke killed Darth Vader. 
11) Darth Vader killed Luke. 
 
There is a wealth of literature suggesting that these event structure elements are not 
purely linguistic in nature, but rather are fundamental properties of the mind. Both 
causation and event roles arrive early in development and organize infants’ inferences of 
the physical and social world (Baillargeon et al., 2012). Pre-linguistic infants as young as 
6 months are sensitive to the spatiotemporal properties of causation in simple 
Michottean launching events (Leslie & Keeble, 1987). Furthermore, infants categorize 
the entities in such events as distinct roles (Causer and Causee). Compelling evidence 
that roles are a fundamental conceptual component in the mind comes from deaf 
children’s homesign (Feldman, Goldin-Meadow, & Gleitman, 1978; Goldin-Meadow & 
Feldman, 1977). These children have no exposure to a natural human language, oral or 
signed, yet in the signs that they spontaneously produce, the positions of different roles 
(such as Agent and Patient) within their sequences are consistent within and across 
individuals. This suggests that language does not externally impose structure on the 
world that humans experience, but rather that the mind is predisposed to categorize 
entities in different events into common relational categories (e.g., there is a 
commonality among the properties of the Agent across kicking and pushing events). 
There is additional evidence that the perceptual system itself is engaged in extracting 
certain event components such as causation: retinotopic adaptation to simple causal 
collisions has been observed in adults (Rolfs et al., 2013). Together, these infant and 
adult studies suggest that that humans parse the visual world into events, starting from 
early in development. 
However, apart from studies on perceptual causality, the extent and role of the visual 
system in extracting event information is not known. Recognizing specific instances of 
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event components – including causation, event roles, and changes of state, among others 
– must be mediated through perceptual input. Below we briefly review literature on what 
is known about how perceptual and neural systems extract information relevant for 
identifying events. 
1.2. Approaches to events in vision: Motion patterns and object 
interactions 
There are two main lines of work in vision that are relevant for our interest in event 
recognition.1 The first is work on perception of patterns of body movements and the 
stages of visual processing leading to their extraction. This work generally recognizes 
distinct contributions of body form and motion to the recognition process, which is well 
captured by the two-stream form/motion model of Giese & Poggio (2003). The form 
pathway, whose neural locii are regions in lateral and ventral occipitotemporal cortex, 
contains shape representations of the human body (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & 
Kanwisher, 2001; Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 2007) that are integrated over short 
timespans of about 200 ms (“snapshots” of an action; (Singer & Sheinberg, 2010; 
Vangeneugden et al., 2011)). For motion extraction, it is established that the necessary 
computations are performed in area hMT+ (the human middle temporal complex; Rust, 
Mante, Simoncelli, & Movshon, 2006; Salzman, Britten, & Newsome, 1990; Simoncelli, 
Heegert, & Heeger, 1998). Finally, evidence from both non-human primate 
electrophysiology and human fMRI work suggests that form and motion information 
converge in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; Grossman & Blake, 2002; 
Oram & Perrett, 1994). Such motion pattern representations start out as view-
dependent, with greater viewpoint-tolerance achieved at later stages (Jellema & Perrett, 
2006; Oram & Perrett, 1994). This latter point is important, because to represent a 
particular motion pattern (e.g., running), the neural population must encode this 
information similarly across viewpoints. Although such work has been influential in our 
understanding of the complex visual computations involved in high-level motion 
                                                        
 
1 In much of the visual perception literature, recognition of events has been called, variously, action 
observation and biological motion recognition. Here I use the term event as it reflects the diverse set of 
spatial, temporal, and state changes characterized in language. But of course, actions can be considered 
a subset of events. 
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processing, it has thus far not engaged with the larger question of how we recognize 
categories of relationships between entities. 
The second relevant line of work gets closer to this question, by focusing on 
recognition of interacting objects as distinct perceptual units, and the neural systems 
that support such representations. Green and Hummel (2006) provided behavioral 
evidence that identification of individual objects from briefly presented scenes is 
facilitated when those objects are in interactive spatial orientations (e.g., a tea kettle 
facing a cup), suggesting that there is an interactive effect for processing objects in 
canonical interactive orientations. Human fMRI and neuropsychological evidence 
suggests that human lateral occipital complex (LOC) supports representations of 
interacting objects as distinct from their components (Kim & Biederman, 2011; Kim, 
Biederman, & Juan, 2011; Roberts & Humphreys, 2010). Perceptually grouping familiar 
objects for recognition has important implications for how vision encodes familiar 
scenes. However, it is not clear whether such representations are “event-like”. Events are 
composed of sets of individuals interacting in specific ways, but importantly, we can 
recognize them “from scratch”: we know biting when we see it, even if we observe an 
unfamiliar individual biting an unfortunate object (or person!) in an unfamiliar setting. 
1.3. The current approach: Event structure as the target of 
perceptual processes (Chapters 2 and 3) 
Although the aforementioned work suggests that the visual system processes rich 
information about human movements and object interactions, and does so in a 
surprisingly general manner, neither of these approaches gets at the richness of event 
structure. In our initial investigations of event structure in the visual domain (Chapters 2 
and 3), we focus our efforts on event roles (e.g., Agent and Patient, Chapter 2) and event 
categories (e.g., kicking, Chapter 3). Finding evidence for such representations elicited 
spontaneously by visual input is proof-of-concept that such structure lies within the 
domain of perception. 
First, we devote our efforts to finding evidence that the visual system itself traffics in 
the structure of events. Here we take inspiration from decades of work in scene and 
object perception showing rapid and bottom-up activation of object and scene categories 
from input lasting less than the span of a fixation (Biederman, Blickle, Teitelbaum, & 
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Klatsky, 1988; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Oliva & Torralba, 2001; 
Potter, 1976; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). In previous work (Hafri, Papafragou, & 
Trueswell, 2013), we used such paradigms to investigate the recognition of event 
information under brief display. However, all tasks in previous studies on events, 
including our own, cannot answer questions about the rapidity, automaticity, or 
generality of representations extracted, as participants gave their responses several 
seconds after the image was masked. 
In Chapter 2, we overcome these issues. We developed a novel scene priming 
paradigm to ask whether the human visual system rapidly and spontaneously encodes 
who acted on whom, or the event roles (e.g., boy hitting girl is different from girl hitting 
boy). Participants observed a continuous sequence of two-person scenes and simply had 
to identify the male or female (or red or blue-shirted person in another version) in each 
image. Critically, although role was never explicitly mentioned and was irrelevant for the 
task, we observed a response switching cost: participants responded more slowly when 
the target’s role switched from trial to trial (e.g., the male went from being the Patient to 
the Agent, or vice-versa). The experiments in this chapter demonstrate that extraction of 
event structure from visual scenes is rapid and spontaneous. They further demonstrate 
the generality of event role representations extracted: the effect was observable across 
many event types (e.g., Agent of kicking and Agent of pushing). This is predicted by a 
theory of event structure whose components generalize across a wide range of events. 
In Chapter 3, we investigate the neural systems that are associated with action 
recognition, testing a prediction about the kind of visual input necessary to elicit action 
representations in such regions. If the target of the recognition process is the 
relationship between entities in a scene rather than the movement patterns associated 
with an action, we should observe commonality in content between neural 
representations elicited by full, dynamic action sequences and by static snapshots of 
actions (of the kind in Figure 1.1). We test this possibility in Chapter 3. Human 
participants were scanned with fMRI while viewing categories of interactions (e.g., 
pulling) depicted in two visual formats: (1) controlled videos of two interacting actors; 
and (2) visually varied photographs selected from the internet involving different actors, 
objects, and settings. Action category was decodable across visual formats in brain areas 
previously observed to respond to observed actions, including bilateral inferior parietal, 
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bilateral occipitotemporal, and left premotor cortex. These results suggest that 
surprisingly abstract representations of actions are elicited from sparse visual 
information. 
1.4. Modeling event structure in the brain (Chapter 4) 
In Chapter 4, we circle back to language: The goal of this chapter is to provide 
evidence that the semantic system in the brain is sensitive to components of event 
structure during real-time comprehension of language. Although there is a wealth of 
research in linguistics and development suggesting the existence of such representations 
(see section 1.1. above), there is surprisingly little neuroscientific evidence for such 
distinctions. The work that does exist is limited to studies presenting isolate words to 
individuals (Kemmerer & Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010). The single-word method is one way 
to isolate the elements of interest (i.e. the semantic components of verbs), which is 
especially useful since the elements co-vary in verbs (e.g., kicking involves both Cause 
and Motion). However, such an approach may not reflect the richness of semantic 
experience when hearing language “in the wild”, i.e. from naturalistic input. To overcome 
this limitation, we chose to use a voxel-wise encoding model approach. Encoding models 
were first implemented in fMRI to study low- and high-level vision (Kay, Naselaris, 
Prenger, & Gallant, 2008; Naselaris, Prenger, Kay, Oliver, & Gallant, 2009; Nishimoto et 
al., 2011) and were then extended to test models of semantics in natural language (Huth, 
Heer, Griffiths, Theunissen, & Gallant, 2016). Using this approach allows us to achieve a 
quantitative description of how simultaneously active event features (e.g., Cause and 
Motion) are encoded in the brain. 
Here we use fMRI to test the hypothesis that the human brain represents verbs in 
natural language in part via the event structures to which they refer. We scanned 
participants with fMRI as they listened to audiobook excerpts. Using the encoding model 
approach, we were able to successfully predict fMRI responses to verbs in language-
selective regions using a model based on event structure features (e.g., Cause, Motion, 
State). In additional comparisons with other linguistic models, we confirmed one 
prediction of lexical semantic theory: that there is a high correspondence between the 
linguistic structures that a verb takes and its semantic interpretation. These results 
suggest that properties of semantic structure (e.g. Cause) are encoded spontaneously by 
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people as they comprehend naturalistic speech. More generally, this modeling approach 
provides the technical foundation for future tests of hypotheses about the physiological 
basis of event representation from other modalities of input, including vision. 
1.5. Summary of approach 
Taken together, this thesis establishes correspondences between the targets of event 
recognition and the perceptual and neural systems that contribute to the recognition 
process. We provide evidence for the hypothesis that that the visual system 
spontaneously extracts abstract representations of events that includes their internal 
structure. Similar structure is also elicited by linguistic input and is predicted by the 
linguistic structural patterns therein. 
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II. ENCODING OF EVENT ROLES FROM VISUAL SCENES 
IS RAPID, SPONTANEOUS, AND INTERACTS WITH 
HIGHER-LEVEL VISUAL PROCESSING 
1. Introduction 
In order to successfully navigate a perceptually chaotic world and share our 
understanding of it with others, we must not only extract the identity of people and 
objects, but also the roles that they play in events: Boy-hitting-girl is very different from 
girl-hitting-boy even though the event category (i.e. hitting) and actors involved are the 
same. In the former, the boy is the Agent (the actor) and the girl the Patient (the one 
acted upon), while in the latter, their roles are reversed. The fundamental importance of 
such “thematic roles” has long been emphasized in linguistics: Theories of thematic roles 
were initially developed to account for the consistent semantic properties of grammatical 
arguments (e.g., Subjects and Objects) across linguistic descriptions of events (Croft, 
2012; Dowty, 1991; Fillmore, 1968; Gruber, 1965; Kako, 2006; Levin & Rappaport-
Hovav, 2005) but now they are also a component of some theories of conceptual 
representation (Jackendoff, 1990; Langacker, 1987; Talmy, 2000), development 
(Baillargeon et al., 2012; Leslie, 1995; Muentener & Carey, 2010; Yin & Csibra, 2015), 
and perception (Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Strickland, 2016) more generally. 
1.1. Event role extraction 
While there is ongoing debate within linguistics about the precise number and nature 
of thematic roles in language, here we are interested in whether the mind, independently 
from explicit language production and comprehension tasks, rapidly and spontaneously 
extracts role information from perceptual input. Our work takes inspiration from a 
wealth of previous literature that has demonstrated rapid and bottom-up encoding of 
semantic content from visual scenes. These studies have revealed that categories of both 
objects (Biederman et al., 1988, 1982; Thorpe et al., 1996) and places (Oliva & Torralba, 
2001; Potter, 1976) can be recognized from brief displays (sometimes as little as 13 ms); 
that the computation itself is rapid – occurring within 100-200 ms (VanRullen & 
Thorpe, 2001); and that the computation is relatively automatic (Greene & Fei-Fei, 
2014). 
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In previous work we have shown that, just as with object and place categories, event 
category and event role information is in principle available in a bottom-up fashion from 
very brief displays (Hafri, Papafragou, & Trueswell, 2013; see also Dobel, Diesendruck, & 
Bölte, 2007; Glanemann, Zwitserlood, Bölte, & Dobel, 2016; Wilson, Papafragou, 
Bunger, & Trueswell, 2011). However, it is not yet known whether encoding of event 
information is rapid: all tasks in previous studies (to our knowledge) explicitly required 
participants to make a post-stimulus judgment about what was happening in the scene. 
Thus, the computation itself (although based on a briefly presented visual stimulus) 
could conceivably have continued for several seconds, up until response to the post-
stimulus probe. Additionally, the computation might have occurred only because of the 
explicit demands of the task, rather than being spontaneous. 
1.2. Spontaneity and generality of role encoding 
Here, we define a spontaneous process as any process that is executed independently 
of an explicit goal. Such a process could be automatic, in the sense that it is mandatory 
given certain input characteristics (Fodor, 1983), but it could also be spontaneous but 
not automatic in the sense that, under some conditions and with some cognitive effort, 
the process could be prevented from being executed (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In the 
present work, we test for spontaneity of event role encoding. 
Given the particular importance of event roles to event understanding, the 
spontaneity of such a process would be beneficial as we engage the social world, since at 
any given moment we may be performing other perceptual tasks, e.g., identifying objects 
or spatial properties of the scene. It would also prove useful to the young language 
learner tasked with mapping utterances to the events that they refer to (Gleitman, 1990; 
Pinker, 1989). 
In both of these situations (social and linguistic), the utility of role information arises 
from its relative generality, i.e., the identification of commonality between the actors 
engaged in different events, such as kicking and pushing (Dowty, 1991; Jackendoff, 
1990; Pinker, 1989; Talmy, 2000; White, Reisinger, Rudinger, Rawlins, & Durme, 2017). 
However, research on action recognition using psychophysical and neuroscientific 
methods has largely focused on how the perceptual system differentiates between 
different action categories (e.g., kicking, pushing, opening) and generalizes within action 
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category (Hafri, Trueswell, & Epstein, 2017; Jastorff, Begliomini, Fabbri-Destro, 
Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2010b; Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 2012a; Tucciarelli, Turella, 
Oosterhof, Weisz, & Lingnau, 2015; M. F. Wurm & Lingnau, 2015). This research has not 
yet addressed how we come to recognize the distinct roles that multiple actors play in 
visual scenes, or how (and whether) our perceptual system generalizes across the agents 
of different actions. 
Investigating the perception of events in visual scenes provides an ideal avenue to 
test hypotheses about the generality of event roles. One hypothesis is that awareness of 
event-general properties of event roles (e.g., volition or cause) arise through explicit and 
deliberate observation of commonalities among event-specific roles (e.g., kicker, kickee) 
outside of the domain of perception (Tomasello, 2000). However, to the degree that we 
can find evidence that perception itself rapidly and spontaneously furnishes such event-
general role information, the notion of event-specific roles as drivers of event 
understanding from scenes becomes less plausible. We hypothesize that in initial scene 
viewing, the perceptual system rapidly categorizes event participants into two broad 
categories – “Agent-like” and “Patient-like” (denoted Agent and Patient from here on for 
simplicity; Dowty, 1991; Strickland, 2016) – even if these assignments are later revised 
or refined in continued perceptual or cognitive processing of the event (see section 6.1 
for elaboration on these issues). 
1.3. The current study: an event role switch cost? 
The goal of the current work is to establish the degree to which the visual system 
gives the observer event roles “for free”, as part of routine observation of the world. We 
aim to show the following: (1) that the visual system encodes event roles spontaneously 
from visual input, even when attention is otherwise occupied (i.e. even when the 
observer is not explicitly asked to recognize events but rather is engaged in some 
orthogonal task); (2) that the computation of role itself is rapid; (3) that this encoding of 
event roles is at least partly event-general; and (4) that any evidence we find for encoding 
of event roles cannot be fully accounted for by simple visual correlates of event roles 
alone, such as posture. 
To achieve this goal, we employed a “switch cost” paradigm (Oosterwijk et al., 2012; 
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003; Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). In several 
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experiments, participants observed a continuous sequence of two-person scenes and had 
to rapidly identify the side of a target actor in each (Experiments 1a and 1b: male or 
female actor; Experiments 2 and 3: blue- or red-shirted actor). With our design, event 
role identities provide no meaningful information for the primary task of gender or color 
identification, so observers need not attend to such irrelevant information. Nevertheless, 
we hypothesized that when people attend to the target actor to plan a response, then if 
event roles are spontaneously encoded, they should “come along for the ride.” Thus, we 
should be able to observe an influence of this role encoding on responses even though 
event roles are irrelevant to the primary task. 
More specifically, we reasoned that if role assignment is spontaneously engaged, then 
when the role of the target actor switched from trial to trial, it would result in a cost, i.e., 
a relative lag in reaction time, even though subjects were tasked with identifying a 
property orthogonal to roles (here, gender or shirt color). If such a pattern were 
observed, it would provide compelling evidence that analysis of event structure from 
visual scenes is a rapid, spontaneous process that is engaged even when we are attending 
to other perceptual information. Furthermore, by using simple tasks based on visual 
information known to be rapidly available (including gender; Mouchetant-Rostaing, 
Giard, Bentin, Aguera, & Pernier, 2000), we expected that observers would respond 
quickly, allowing us to test the rapidity of extraction of event role information. 
2. Experiment 1a 
Participants observed a series of simple still images displaying an interaction 
between a male and a female, and were simply asked to say whether the male/female was 
on the left or right of the screen. We predicted that although the task fails to actively 
encourage role encoding (and may even discourage it), participants would nevertheless 
be slower on trials in which the event role of the target actor differed from his or her role 
in the previous trial, i.e., a “role switch cost”.2 
 
                                                        
 
2 We cannot differentiate between switch costs vs. repetition benefits (priming) because there is no baseline 
for comparison, but in keeping with the terminology in previous investigations using this paradigm (e.g., 
Pecher et al., 2003), we use the term switch costs. Whether the effects are a benefit or cost does not 
qualitatively change our conclusions. 
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2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four members of the University of Pennsylvania community participated and 
received either class credit or $10. Because we were collecting a large number of trials 
within-participant (see section 2.1.3 below), we predicted that this number of 
participants would be sufficient to observe the role switch cost, if it were to exist. All 
participants in this experiment and in the other experiments reported below gave 
informed consent, following procedures approved by the University’s institutional review 
board.  
 
Figure 2.1 
Example stimuli. All experiments featured 10 event categories. In Experiments 1a and 1b, these were 
depicted by several different pairs of actors, and Agent gender (male or female) and Agent side (left or right) 
were fully crossed within event category. In Experiments 2 and 3, events were depicted by a pair of identical 
twin actors. Agent shirt color (blue or red) and Agent side (left or right) were fully crossed within event 
category. In Experiment 3, the images from Experiment 2 were manipulated such that the two actors were 
always facing opposite one another; thus, their interactive relationship was almost entirely eliminated. See 
Appendix A for more example images. 
2.1.2. Materials 
The stimuli were 40 color photographic images depicting 10 two-participant event 
categories taken from a previous study that investigated extraction of event categories 
and roles from briefly displayed and masked images (Hafri et al., 2013). The event 
categories used were brushing, chasing, feeding, filming, kicking, looking, punching, 
pushing, scratching, tapping. These categories were chosen because they showed the 
highest agreement among subjects for role assignment from brief display (i.e., male as 
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Agent or Patient). All stimuli were normed for event category and role agreement in the 
previous study. 
Six different male-female actor pairs appeared in the images, with each actor pair 
appearing in front of a different indoor or outdoor scene background. Each event 
category was associated with only one of the actor pairs (e.g., brushing and chasing was 
always performed by Pair 1, feeding by Pair 2, etc.). For each event category, the gender 
of the Agent (male or female) and the side of the Agent (left or right) were fully crossed, 
such that there were four stimuli for each event category. Each event depicted the actors 
in profile view. Example images appear in Figure 2.1, and examples for each event 
category appear in Appendix A. 
For all experiments, images were 640 × 480 pixels and subtended 19° × 15° at 
approximately 54 cm distance from the screen. Stimuli were displayed on a 19" Dell 
1908FP LCD monitor at a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Responses were collected using a PST E-
Prime button box (mean latency 17.2 ms, SD 0.92 ms, measured in-lab). The experiment 
was run in Matlab using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
2.1.3. List design 
Given that detecting switch costs depends on measuring the influence of one 
stimulus on another, we implemented “continuous carryover” sequences, which are 
similar to randomized block and Latin square designs, with the added benefit of 
controlling for first-order carryover effects, i.e. each stimulus precedes and follows every 
other stimulus (Aguirre, 2007; Nonyane & Theobald, 2007). This design resulted in 1601 
trials split among 40 blocks. Unique lists were generated for every participant. An 
additional reason we used this list design was that it naturally provided a large number 
of trials with which to precisely measure effects of all factors manipulated in the 
experiment, across both subjects and items. This was important: given that participants 
were actively required to attend to stimulus features orthogonal to the property of 
interest (event roles), there was potential for the role switch cost to be quite subtle. 
To maximize our chances of finding a switch cost if it were to exist, a small number of 
catch trials (Event Test trials) were randomly dispersed among the standard image trials. 
On these catch trials, participants were given a 2AFC test on what action just appeared in 
the previous trial (e.g., kicking or pushing). One label was correct, and the other was a 
foil randomly selected from the set of nine other categories. There were 58 catch trials in 
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total, with 1 to 3 per 40-trial block. 
2.1.4. Procedure 
Subjects were instructed that as each image appeared, they would have to press one 
of two buttons (left or right) to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible, which side 
of the screen that the target actor appeared on (left button for left, right button for right). 
For half of the subjects, the target was the male actor, and for the other half, the female 
actor (i.e. male or female search was between-subject, counterbalanced across 
participants). There were 40 blocks of trials, each of which was a continuous sequence of 
all 40 image trials and the interspersed catch trials, followed by a quick break before the 
next block. The purpose of the catch trials was to focus participants’ attention on the 
events they were observing without explicitly testing them on event roles (see section 
2.1.3 above). Subjects were told that they would be intermittently tested on what action 
just appeared in the previous trial. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the trial and block sequence. Each trial consisted of the 
following: A “Ready?” screen for 350 ms, a central fixation crosshair for 250 ms, a blank 
screen for 150 ms, and the test image, which remained on the screen until the subject 
responded. Catch trials involved a similar sequence, but in place of the test image was a 
slide with the text “What action did you just see?” and two event category labels on either 
side of the screen (e.g., “biting” and “pushing”). Subjects selected their answer by 
pressing either the left or right button. Image trials timed out if no response was given 
within 2000 ms, and catch trials within 3500 ms.  Twelve practice image trials and two 
catch trials preceded the main experimental sequence. Practice image trials depicted 
joint or symmetrical actions (e.g., crying, shaking hands). Average duration of the 
experiment was 41 min (which was similar across all additional experiments reported 
below). 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
17 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 
Block structure for all experiments. On each image trial, subjects pressed a button to indicate the position of 
the target actor as fast as possible (left or right). In Experiments 1a and 1b, the target actor was the male or 
female (between-subject). In Experiments 2 and 3, the target actor was the blue- or red-shirted actor 
(between-subject). Only Experiment 1a contained catch trials, which asked about the action that appeared in 
the previous trial. 
2.1.5. Data analysis 
Trial exclusion criteria were decided in advance of analysis and were the following: 
trials with an incorrect response and those following an incorrect trial, RTs faster than 
200 ms, timeouts, trials after breaks, and trials after catch trials. An additional 63 trials 
in total across all subjects were also excluded due to an error in list creation. For the 
remaining data, trials with RTs 2.5 standard deviations above or below each subject’s 
mean were also excluded, following accepted data trimming procedures (e.g., Balota, 
Aschenbrenner, & Yap, 2013). A mean of 17% (SD 4.0%) of trials in total were excluded 
per subject, which meant there were an average of 269 trials included per subject. 
Average accuracy was 95.6% (SD 2.2%), and average RT on image trials for the included 
data was 383 ms (SD 34 ms). 
Individual trial reaction times from the primary task (i.e., judging gender side) were 
analyzed with linear mixed effects modeling using the lme4 R package (Bates et al., 
2016), with centered (sum-coded) predictors. The analyses used the maximal subject and 
item random effects structure that converged for all tested models (Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).3 RTs were first transformed into inverse RTs (-1000/RT) to 
                                                        
 
3 When more complex random effects structures failed to converge, we successively dropped random slope 
terms with the smallest variance, until the model converged (Barr et al., 2013). The random effects structures 
used for each experiment and cross-experiment comparison were the following (in R model syntax): 
Experiment 1a: (1+Actors+Side|subjNum)+(1+propertyAgent*sideAgent|event) 
Experiment 1b: (1+Actors*Role+Actors*Side|subjNum)+(1+propertyAgent*sideAgent| eventCategory) 
Comparison of Experiments 1a and 1b: (1+Role|subjNum)+(1+propertyAgent*sideAgent| eventCategory) 
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improve normality for model fitting. Additionally, all models included nuisance 
regressors for trial number and preceding trial inverse RT to account for general 
temporal dependencies (Baayen & Milin, 2010).  
The following factors were included in models: Actors (repeated vs. switched), i.e., 
whether the actor pair was the same or different from the previous trial; Side (repeated 
vs. switched), i.e., whether the side of the target actor (e.g., male) was the same or 
different as the previous trial; and the effect of primary interest, Role (repeated vs. 
switched), i.e., whether the role of the target actor was the same or different (e.g., 
whether the male remained the Agent or switched to being Patient). Significance of these 
factors was tested by comparing likelihood-ratio values for nested models that included 
main effects and interactions of factors to models without them.4 
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Role switch cost 
An event role switch cost was observed. As shown in Table 2.1, participants were on 
average 6 ms slower when the role of the target character changed from one trial to the 
next. This effect, though quite small, was significant: The best-fitting mixed effects 
model included a main effect of Role (the role switch cost) and main effects and 
interactions of Actors and Side. The fit of this model was significantly better than a 
model without the main effect of Role, χ2(1) = 52.9, p < .001. Models with additional 
interaction terms were not a significantly better fit, either for Actors × Role (χ2(1) = 1.71, 
p = .19), or Side × Role (χ2(1) = 0.09, p = .76). See Table 2.1 for a summary of the effects 
from the best-fitting model. 
2.2.2. Absolute vs. relative magnitude of role switch cost 
                                                        
 
Experiment 2: (1+Role*Side|subjNum)+ (1+propertyAgent*sideAgent|eventCategory) 
Experiment 3: (1+Role|subjNum)+(1+propertyAgent*sideAgent|event) 
Comparison of Experiments 2 and 3: (1+Role|subjNum)+(1+propertyAgent*sideAgent| eventCategory) 
Abbreviations (consistent for all experiments): subjNum = subject identity; propertyAgent = Agent gender 
(Male or Female, Experiments 1a and 1b only), or Agent Color (Blue or Red, Experiments 2 and 3 only); 
sideAgent = Agent side (Left or Right); eventCategory = event category (e.g., kicking). 
4 Here and in Experiment 1b, repeated event always entailed repeated actors, due to the nature of the stimuli 
employed (see section 2.1.2). However, similar results were obtained with Event as a factor instead of Actors. 
Likewise, since actors and scene backgrounds co-varied, Actor switch entails a Background switch (and vice-
versa), but for simplicity, we will refer to this factor as same/different Actors. 
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Before continuing, we believe that the empirical robustness and theoretical import of 
the role switch cost must be separated from the absolute size of the effect observed. 
Although the absolute magnitude of the role switch cost was small (about 6 ms), the 
standardized effect sizes were quite large: Cohen’s d of 1.07 and 2.24, for subjects and 
items, respectively (see Figure 2.3). As another indication of its robustness, 21/24 
participants and all 10 event categories showed a numerical difference in line with the 
role switch cost. And while it may be surprising that such a small effect would be 
statistically significant, each observer provided on average 1329 data points, resulting in 
very stable performance estimates per subject and per item (e.g., note the tight 95% 
confidence intervals across subjects in Table 2.1). Furthermore, it is within the same 
order of magnitude of previously observed switch costs, relative to mean RTs for task: for 
example, Pecher et al. (2003) obtained a cost of 29 ms relative to mean RTs of 1139 ms (a 
ratio of 2.5%), and Oosterwijk et al. (2012) obtained a cost of 22 ms relative to mean RTs 
of 1683 (a ratio of 1.3%), compared with our 6 ms vs. 383 ms mean RTs (a ratio of 1.6%). 
Similar arguments hold regarding the absolute vs. relative magnitude of the role switch 
cost observed in the other experiments reported in this manuscript, and we return to this 
issue in section 6.6.  
2.2.3. Other observed effects 
Besides the effect of primary interest (event roles), the best fitting model revealed 
several additional effects. First, people were slower when Actors switched. This is not 
surprising: when actor pair switched, it likely took longer to ascertain which character 
was the male or female. There was also an interaction of Side × Actors: On trials where 
the actor pair was different, participants were faster when the target side switched. 
Though speculative, it may be that with a significant visual change such as a switch in the 
actors, subjects may have expected a side switch, resulting in a switch benefit, or faster 
RTs. Whatever the reason for these additional effects, the role switch cost was invariant 
to these other factors (Side and Actors). 
2.2.4. Event catch task 
Average RT on catch trials was 1177 ms (SD 215 ms), and accuracy on catch trials was 
significantly above chance across participants (mean = 85%, SD = 10%, t(23) = 40.0, p < 
.001, d = 3.37, 95% CI = [81%, 89%]). This indicates that participants were monitoring 
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the events in the images sufficiently to distinguish which of two event categories they 
observed in the previous trial. 
One important question is whether event category extraction is related to event role 
extraction. Although in our previous work we found that role recognition was not 
significantly correlated with event category extraction on an item-by-item basis (Hafri et 
al., 2013), we can also address this in the current study, in two ways. First, if there is a 
relationship between event category and event role extraction, we might find that the 
magnitude of the role switch cost is correlated on a subject-by-subject basis with 
performance on catch trials (event identification). However, we found no significant 
correlation between individual participants’ role switch cost magnitude (based on the 
mean inverse RT difference between repeated and switch role trials for each subject), 
and either their overall accuracy on catch trials, r = -0.11, t(22) = -0.52, p = .61, or their 
mean inverse RT on catch trials (accurate trials only), r = 0.00, t(22) = -0.01, p = .99. 
Another way to investigate the relationship between event category and event role 
extraction is by asking whether catch trial (event identification) performance would be 
worse when the catch trial probe is about an image in which event role switched. To 
assess this, we split catch trials by whether the previous trial was a Repeated or Switched 
Role image trial (an average of 27.8 trials in each condition per subject, range 20-36). 
We ran multilevel models to predict performance (either accuracy or inverse RT) on 
catch trials across subjects. Specifically, we tested whether adding a main effect of 
Previous Role (Repeated vs. Switched) to the models would improve model fit, over a 
null model without the Previous Role main effect (both models included a random 
intercept and random slope for Previous Role for each subject). However, adding 
Previous Role did not significantly improve fit either for catch trial accuracy (logistic 
regression, χ2(1) = 0.64, p = .42) or for catch trial inverse RT (χ2(1) = 3.09, p = .08); and 
even though improvement for the inverse RT model was marginal, it went in the 
opposite direction of the prediction, i.e. faster RTs on catch trials when the previous trial 
role switched. 
Although these tests are post-hoc and we should interpret the null results with 
caution, they at least imply that at the individual subject or trial level, event category 
identification is robust to changes in role information. Nevertheless, a more definitive 
test of the relationship between event role and category extraction would require further 
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experimentation. 
Table 2.1 
 Mean RTs across subjects for Experiment 1a, separately for all factors that were significant in model fitting 
(significant interaction terms split by each factor level). 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. * p < .05 in 
best-fitting mixed effects model (calculated using R lmerTest package). See section 2.2.1 for details on model 
comparisons. 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
 
Reaction time (ms) Switch cost 
(ms) 
t value for parameter in best-
fitting model Condition Repeated Different 
Role 380 (14.2) 386 (14.8) 6 (2.00) 7.27* 
Actors 371 (12.8) 385 (14.9) 14 (3.68) 3.99* 
Side 390 (16.0) 377 (13.7) -13 (6.26) -3.95* 
Side, Repeated 
Actors 
371 (12.9) 371 (13.5) 0 (6.39) 0.47 
Side, Switched 
Actors 
393 (16.5) 378 (13.9) -15 (6.55) -3.95* 
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Figure 2.3 
Individual (a) subject and (b) item (event category) means for the role switch cost, across all experiments. 
These plots show the consistency of the role switch cost for both subjects and items: the majority of means 
are above zero in each case. Orange boxes indicate the mean and standard error across subjects and items, 
for each experiment. 
2.3. Discussion 
Although a role switch cost was observed in Experiment 1a, the Event Test catch 
trials may have inadvertently focused attention on event roles. Experiment 1b was 
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identical to the previous experiment, except that there was no catch task and no mention 
of events or actions. If this effect is really a result of the default in visual perception of 
scenes, then we expected to observe it even under these conditions.5 
3. Experiment 1b 
The Event Test catch trials in Experiment 1a may have inadvertently focused 
attention on event roles. The current experiment was identical to Experiment 1a, except 
that there was no catch task and no mention of events or actions. 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Participants 
An additional 24 members from the University of Pennsylvania community 
participated and received class credit. Given the stability of the role switch effect in 
Experiment 1a, we believed this number to be sufficient. 
3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
All materials, apparatus, and procedure were identical to Experiment 1a, except that 
no catch (Event Test) trials were included, and instructions were modified to omit 
mention of the catch task or actions and events. 
3.1.3. Data analysis 
Data coding, trial exclusion criteria, and analysis were the same as in Experiment 1a. 
An additional 216 trials across all subjects were excluded due to an error in list creation. 
A mean of 13% (SD 4.9%) of trials (214 on average) per subject were excluded, average 
accuracy was 96.0% (SD 2.6%), and average RT for the included data was 387 ms (SD 48 
ms). Individual trial RTs were analyzed using linear mixed effects modeling. 
3.2. Results 
As in Experiment 1a, a role switch cost was observed. In Table 2.2, we see that 
participants were on average 3 ms slower when the role of the target character changed 
from one trial to the next. This effect was once again robust: 17/24 subjects and 7/10 
                                                        
 
5 Preliminary analyses of Experiments 1a and 1b originally appeared in conference proceedings (Hafri, 
Trueswell, & Strickland, 2016). 
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event categories went in the direction of the effect (Cohen’s d of 0.55 and 0.58, 
respectively; see Figure 2.3). And although small, it was significant: The best-fitting 
mixed effects model included main effects and interactions of Role and Actors, as well as 
a main effect of Side and the interaction of Side × Actors. The fit of the model was 
significantly better than the same model without the additional interaction of Role × 
Actors, χ2(1) = 4.89, p = .03, and significantly better than a model that did not include 
Role at all, χ2(2) = 15.5, p < .001. A model with an additional interaction of Role × Side 
was not a significantly better fit, χ2(1) = .004, p = .95. 
Interestingly, the role switch cost was greater when the actor pair repeated than 
when it did not, although importantly, the role switch cost was significant even when the 
actor pair differed. And as in Experiment 1a, on trials where the actor pair was different, 
participants were slower when the side repeated. See Table 2.2 for details. 
Table 2.2 
 Mean RTs across subjects for Experiment 1b, separately for all factors that were significant in model fitting 
(significant interaction terms split by each factor level). 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. * p < .05 in 
best-fitting mixed effects model (calculated using R lmerTest package). See section 3.2 for details on model 
comparisons. 
3.2.1. Comparison of Experiments 1a and 1b 
Not surprisingly, more participants and items showed the numerical difference in 
Experiment 1a (with the catch task) than in Experiment 1b (without the catch task; 21/24 
vs. 17/24 participants, and 10/10 vs. 7/10 items, respectively; see Figure 2.3). To 
formally compare the two experiments, we ran new mixed effects models with the data 
from both experiments combined, starting with a base model whose main effects and 
interactions were identical to the best-fitting model of Experiment 1b. The best-fitting 
model in this combined analysis had main effects of Actors, Side, Role, and Experiment, 
 
Reaction time (ms) 
Switch cost (ms) 
t value for parameter in 
best-fitting model Condition Repeated Different 
Role 385 (19.9) 388 (20.3) 3 (1.59) 2.62* 
Actors 371 (16.8) 390 (20.8) 19 (5.55) 2.08* 
Side 394 (19.5) 380 (21.2) -14 (7.55) -5.09* 
Role, Repeated Actors 368 (16.8) 374 (17.2) 6 (5.65) 3.60* 
Role, Switched Actors 388 (20.5) 391 (21.0) 3 (1.84) 2.62* 
Side, Repeated Actors 368 (14.0) 374 (20.2) 6 (11.6) 0.92 
Side, Switched Actors 398 (20.6) 382 (21.5) -16 (7.26) -5.09* 
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and interactions of Actors × Side, Role × Actors, Role × Experiment, and Actors × 
Experiment. The fit of the model was significantly better than a model without the 
additional interaction of Role × Experiment, χ2(1) = 3.88, p = .05. The greater role switch 
cost for repeated actors vs. switched actors observed in Experiment 1b appears to be 
consistent across both Experiments 1 and 1b: adding the triple interaction of Role × 
Actors × Experiment to the best-fitting model in the current analysis did not significantly 
improve the fit, χ2(1) = 0.74, p = .39. This analysis confirms that the role switch cost was 
indeed greater in Experiment 1a than in Experiment 1b. 
Additionally, items drove the role switch cost consistently across experiments: the 
role switch costs for individual image stimuli were correlated across experiment, r = 
0.37, t(38) = 2.43, p = .02. This correlation further attests to the stability of the measures 
of central tendency (i.e., subject and item means) – likely due to the large number of 
observations per image. 
4. Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we tested the generalizability of the role switch cost. We ran the 
same paradigm of Experiment 1b, with two changes: (1) we used new event categories 
and stimuli, in which events were depicted by a pair of red- and blue-shirted identical 
twin actors; and (2) the main task was to identify the side of the blue or red-shirted 
actor. As in Experiment 1b, there was no catch task and no mention of events or actions. 
If spontaneous role assignment is really the default in scene perception, then we 
expected to observe the role switch cost even with these changes. 
4.1. Methods 
4.1.1. Participants 
An additional 24 members from the University of Pennsylvania community 
participated and received class credit. Given the stability of the role switch effect in 
Experiments 1a and 1b, we believed this number to be sufficient. Data from an additional 
three participants were excluded: one for a high number of sub-200 ms RTs (145 trials), 
one for non-completion, and one for falling asleep. 
4.1.2. Materials 
Stimuli were 40 color photographic images depicting 10 two-participant event 
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categories, taken from a previous study (Hafri et al., 2013): bandaging, kicking, kissing, 
poking, pulling, scratching, slapping, stabbing, strangling, tickling. All categories 
except kicking and scratching differed from those used in Experiments 1a and 1b, 
providing a test of the generalizability of the role switch cost to new event categories. All 
stimuli were normed for event category and role agreement in the previous study, and 
showed high agreement for event role extraction from brief display. Events were 
depicted by a single pair of identical-twin actors (male, age 29) who dressed the same 
except for a difference in shirt color (blue vs. red). As in Experiments 1a and 1b, for each 
event category, the shirt color of the Agent (blue or red) and the side of the Agent (left or 
right) were fully crossed, such that there were four stimuli for each category. Example 
images appear in Figure 2.1, and examples for each event category appear in Appendix A. 
4.1.3. Procedure 
Apparatus, list design, and procedure were identical to Experiment 1b, except that 
that the words “male” and “female” were replaced by “blue” and “red” in the 
instructions.6 Task (blue or red search) was between-subject, counterbalanced across 
participants. Sixteen practice trials using additional stimuli (e.g., brushing) preceded the 
main experiment. To make the color task comparable in difficulty to the gender task, 
images were desaturated using Photoshop software to a level of 3% (a level of saturation 
which made the color task more difficult but kept the actors distinguishable). 
4.1.4. Data analysis 
Data coding procedures and trial exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiments 
1a and 1b. A mean of 14% (SD 4.9%) of trials (237 on average) per subject were excluded 
based on the previous exclusion criteria. Average accuracy was 96.2% (SD 2.7%), and 
average RT for the included data was 347 ms (SD 38 ms). Individual trial RTs were 
analyzed using linear mixed effects modeling with Event (repeated vs. switched), Side 
(repeated vs. switched), and Role (repeated vs. switched) as factors. 
4.2. Results 
                                                        
 
6 For Experiments 2 and 3, one extra repetition for each image stimulus (e.g., kick-blue-left → kick-blue-
left) was included in case we found a need to examine exact image repetitions, but these were discarded a 
priori before analyses. 
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As in Experiments 1a and 1b, a role switch cost was observed. In Table 2.3, we see 
that participants were on average 6 ms slower when the role of the target character 
changed from one trial to the next. This effect was again robust: 22/24 subjects and all 
10 items went in the direction of the effect (Cohen’s d of 1.42 and 1.40, respectively; see 
Figure 2.3). And although small, this effect was significant: The best-fitting mixed effects 
model included main effects of Role, Side, and Event, and interactions of Role × Side and 
Event × Side. The fit of the model was significantly better than the same model without 
the additional interaction of Role × Side, χ2(1) = 4.03, p =.04; and significantly better 
than a model that did not include Role at all, χ2(2) = 31.9, p < .001. Additionally, a model 
that also included an interaction of Role × Event was not a significantly better fit, χ2(1) = 
1.22, p = .27. 
Interestingly, the role switch cost interacted with repeated side, such that the role 
switch cost was greater when the side repeated than when it did not; importantly, 
however, the role switch cost remained even when the side was different. Like the 
additional effects observed in Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were faster when the 
side repeated, but only when the event category repeated. See Table 2.3 for a summary of 
the effects from the best-fitting model. 
To summarize, a role switch cost was once again observed, even when the stimuli, 
event categories, and task were different. In fact, several participants reported that they 
explicitly tried to ignore the action as part of their strategy in performing the color task, 
but nevertheless, nearly all participants demonstrated the role switch cost. The results 
from this experiment suggest that the role switch cost is a general and robust 
phenomenon. 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
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Table 2.3 
Mean RTs across subjects for Experiment 2, separately for all factors that were significant in model fitting 
(significant interaction terms split by each factor level). 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. * p < .05 in 
best-fitting mixed effects model (calculated using R lmerTest package). See section 4.2 for details on model 
comparisons. 
 
4.2.1. Does Agent saliency drive the role switch cost? 
Although the findings thus far provide evidence for a role switch cost, such a cost 
could be driven solely by a switch from Agent to Patient or vice-versa (i.e. it could be 
asymmetrical). Indeed, Agent primacy and saliency effects have been observed in both 
the linguistics and vision literature: Agents tend to precede Patients in linguistic 
utterances (Dryer, 2013; Goldin-Meadow, So, Ozyürek, & Mylander, 2008), and in 
continuous event perception, Agents attract attention, likely because they initiate 
movement before Patients (Abrams & Christ, 2003; Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2014; 
Verfaillie & Daems, 1996) or because active body postures direct spatial attention (Freyd, 
1983; Gervais, Reed, Beall, & Roberts, 2010; Shirai & Imura, 2016). 
If Agent saliency is driving the role switch cost, we should observe two additional 
effects in our data across experiments: (1) different average RTs on trials in which the 
target was the Agent (Agent judgment trials) as compared to trials in which the target 
was the Patient (Patient judgment trials); and (2) an asymmetry in the role switch cost, 
such that the cost for an Agent→Patient switch should be different from the cost for a 
Patient→Agent switch. Note that the directionality of the predictions (i.e. whether Agent 
trials should be faster or slower) depends on different theories about the interaction 
 
Reaction time (ms) 
Switch cost (ms) 
t value for parameter in 
best-fitting model Condition Repeated Different 
Role 344 (16.2) 350 (16.4) 6 (1.75) 4.69* 
Event 350 (16.6) 347 (16.2) -3 (2.10) -2.76* 
Side 346 (16.1) 348 (16.9) 2 (6.00) 0.08 
Role, Repeated 
Side 
343 (16.0) 349 (16.3) 6 (2.41) 7.04* 
Role, Switched 
Side 
346 (16.9) 351 (17.0) 5 (1.89) 4.69* 
Side, Repeated 
Event 
344 (15.9) 353 (17.5) 9 (7.38) 2.60* 
Side, Switched 
Event 
346 (16.1) 348 (16.9) 2 (6.05) 0.08 
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between event perception and the building of event structure. Under the view that 
Agents attract attention because of their active posture or movement initiation (e.g., 
Gervais et al., 2010; Verfaillie & Daems, 1996), one would predict faster RTs to Agent 
trials relative to Patient trials, since the primary task of participants was to locate the 
target actor. Under the view that observing Agents triggers the building of an event 
structure (Cohn & Paczynski, 2013; Cohn, Paczynski, & Kutas, 2017), attending to Agents 
(i.e. Agent judgment trials) might result in an additional cost due to initiation of event 
structure building, and therefore slower RTs. The crucial point here is that for Agent 
saliency (whether faster or slower) to explain the role switch cost, an asymmetry should 
also be observed between Agent→Patient and Patient→Agent switch trials, not only a 
difference between Agent and Patient judgment trials. 
To formally test for these effects, we ran new mixed effects model comparisons in 
which we added Trial Judgment (Agent or Patient judgment trials) to the best-fitting 
models described in the above Results sections, separately for each experiment. 
Differences between Agent and Patient trials would manifest as a main effect of Trial 
Judgment, and an asymmetry in the role switch cost would manifest as an interaction of 
Role × Trial Judgment. 
For Experiments 1a and 1b, adding a main effect of Trial Judgment or a Role × Trial 
Judgment interaction to the previously best-fitting models did not offer a significant 
improvement (all p’s > .11). For Experiment 2, adding a main effect of Trial Judgment 
did significantly improve the fit over the previous best-fitting model (χ2(1) = 55.5, p < 
.001): Agent trial RTs were slower than Patient trial RTs (349 ms vs. 345 ms in subject 
means; see Table 2.4). The slower Agent RTs in Experiment 2 are in line with the 
hypothesis that Agents may trigger the process of “event building” (Cohn & Paczynski, 
2013; Cohn et al., 2017). However, adding an additional interaction of Role × Trial 
Judgment to this model was not a significant improvement (p > .66). Given that 
differences between Agent and Patient trials was not consistent across experiments and 
that an asymmetry was not observed, these analyses suggest that Agent saliency cannot 
account for the role switch cost observed in the previous experiments. 
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Table 2.4 
Mean RTs across subjects for each experiment, split by Trial Judgment type (Agent and Patient judgment 
trials, i.e. whether the target actor was the Agent or the Patient on each trial). 95% confidence intervals in 
parentheses. * p < .05 in best-fitting mixed effects model (calculated using R lmerTest package). See section 
4.2.1 for details on model comparisons. 
4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicates and extends the findings from Experiments 1a and 1b by 
showing that role switch costs can be observed in explicit tasks other than those 
involving judgments about gender. Thus, these effects seem to be quite general. 
5. Experiment 3 
In a final experiment, we probed the level of representation at which the role switch 
cost operates, testing two non-mutually exclusive possibilities. The first possibility, and 
the one of central theoretical interest to our investigation of event roles, is that the cost 
operates at the relational level: Agent and Patient roles are fundamentally relational (an 
Agent acts on a Patient), so perhaps it is the roles that scene entities take in an 
interactive relationship that results in the role switch cost. An alternative possibility, 
however, is that the role switch cost operates at the pose level: active body postures are 
probabilistically associated with Agents and not Patients (Hafri et al., 2013), so perhaps 
observed switch costs merely reflect salient changes in posture of the actors. Note that 
effects of posture, if they contribute to the switch cost, should have an equal effect 
whether the actors in the scene are interacting or not. 
To test these two possibilities (pose and relational levels), we ran the same paradigm 
of Experiment 2, with one change: images were edited such that the actors always faced 
opposite directions (“mirror-flipped”). With this manipulation, the actors’ poses were 
preserved but their interaction was substantially reduced or eliminated (see also 
 Reaction time (ms) Agent trial 
advantage 
(ms) 
t value for 
parameter in best-
fitting model 
Experiment Agent trials Patient trials 
Exp 1a (Gender Search, 
Catch Task) 
383 (15.3) 383 (13.7) 0 (2.59) 0.58 
Exp 1b (Gender Search) 387 (20.6) 387 (19.6) 0 (2.27) 1.58 
Exp 2 (Color Search) 349 (16.3) 345 (16.2) -4 (1.77) -7.45* 
Exp 3 (Color Search, 
Mirror-Flipped) 
353 (24.7) 362 (23.1) 9 (2.91) 15.9* 
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Glanemann et al., 2016). Thus, any switch costs observed in the current experiment 
(with non-interactive actors) can only be attributed to switches at the pose level. 
The image manipulation in the current experiment will allow us to assess the specific 
contribution that two levels (pose and relational levels) make to the switch costs 
observed in our previous experiments. If the previously observed role switch costs were 
due only to informational conflict at the relational level, we should observe a complete 
elimination of the switch cost here, since any interaction between actors is now 
minimally present. If the switch costs were due only to the pose level, then there should 
be no consequence of the image manipulation: all and only the previous role effects 
should obtain. However, if the role switch cost in previous experiments was due to 
conflict at both levels (relational and pose), the switch cost should still obtain here, but 
its magnitude should be significantly lower than that of the switch cost in this 
experiment’s closest counterpart (Experiment 2). 
5.1. Methods 
5.1.1. Participants 
An additional 24 members from the University of Pennsylvania community 
participated and received class credit. Given the stability of the role switch effect across 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2, we believed this number to be sufficient. Data from an 
additional four participants were excluded: two for not completing the experiment and 
two for low accuracy (<86%). This accuracy threshold was based on performance of 
participants in the previous experiments (all >89%), although inclusion of these 
excluded participants did not qualitatively change the results. 
5.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Stimuli from Experiment 2 were edited in Photoshop such that actors always faced 
away from one another. This was achieved by flipping each actor (or both) horizontally 
about his own center axis. Since actors sometimes partially occluded one another (e.g., in 
slapping, the Agent’s hand and Patient’s face), this procedure occasionally resulted in 
missing body or face parts in the images. The missing regions were replaced with parts 
from other images using various Photoshop tools. This was successful: no subject noticed 
the image manipulation even when questioned during debriefing. Example images 
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appear in Figure 2.1, and examples for each event category appear in Appendix A. 
Apparatus and procedure were identical to Experiment 2. 
5.1.3. Data analysis 
Data coding procedures and trial exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiments 
1a, 1b, and 2. A mean of 12% (SD 3.2%) of trials (190 on average) per subject were 
excluded based on the previous exclusion criteria. Average accuracy was 97.7% (SD 
1.6%), and average RT for the included data was 358 ms (SD 56 ms). Main analysis 
procedures were the same as in Experiment 2. Although in principle the actors were no 
longer Agents and Patients due to the mirror-flip manipulation, we coded Role (repeated 
vs. switched) based on each actor’s corresponding role in the unedited stimuli. 
5.2. Results 
A role switch cost was once again observed. In Table 2.5, we see that participants 
were on average 3 ms slower when the role of the target character changed from one trial 
to the next. This effect was robust here as well: 20/24 subjects and 8/10 items went in 
the direction of the effect (Cohen’s d of 0.86 and 0.97, respectively; see Figure 2.3). And 
although small, it was significant: The best-fitting mixed effects model included main 
effects of Role and Side. The fit of the model was significantly better than the same 
model that did not include Role at all, χ2(1) = 13.8, p < .001. Additionally, a model that 
also included an interaction of Role × Side was not a significantly better fit, χ2(1) = 0.10, 
p = .75, nor was a model that also included a main effect of Event, χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .92. 
As in the previous experiments, participants were slower when side repeated. See Table 
2.5 for details. 
Table 2.5 
Mean RTs across subjects for Experiment 3, separately for all factors that were significant in model fitting. 
95% confidence intervals in parentheses. * p < .05 in best-fitting mixed effects model (calculated using R 
lmerTest package). See section 5.2 for details on model comparisons. 
 
 
 
Reaction time (ms) 
Switch cost (ms) 
t value for parameter in best-
fitting model Condition Repeated Different 
Role 356 (23.5) 359 (24.2) 3 (1.59) 3.86* 
Side 363 (26.1) 353 (22.0) -10 (6.81) -15.8* 
33 
 
 
5.2.1. Comparison of Experiments 2 and 3 
Given that Experiments 2 and 3 are a minimal pair, they present an ideal opportunity 
for additional assessment of the contributions of the pose and relational levels to the 
role switch cost. Because of the mirror-flip manipulation in the current experiment, the 
role switch cost here can only be attributed to the pose level (since the interaction 
between actors was minimal or non-existent), while in Experiment 2 it can be attributed 
to both pose and relational levels. Indeed, the size of the standardized effect in 
Experiment 3 was about two-thirds of that observed in Experiment 2 (see Tables 2.3 and 
2.5). To formally compare the role switch cost across experiments, we ran new mixed 
effects models with the data from both experiments, with a base model whose random 
effects structure, main effects, and interactions were identical to the best-fitting model of 
Experiment 3. Adding a main effect of Experiment and interaction of Role × Experiment 
to the base model significantly improved the fit as compared to a model with only a main 
effect of Experiment, χ2(1) = 10.6, p = .001. This comparison yields credence to the idea 
that a combination of levels (pose and relational) led to the switch costs observed in 
Experiment 2.7 
5.2.2. Does Agent saliency mediate the role switch cost in this experiment? 
Here, unlike in previous experiments, there was a reliable Agent trial advantage: 
participants were on average 9 ms faster to respond on Agent judgment than Patient 
judgment trials. This was confirmed in mixed effects models: adding Trial Judgment 
(Agent vs. Patient judgment trial) as a factor to the best-fitting model from above 
significantly improved the fit, χ2(1) = 252, p < .001. Furthermore, this Agent advantage 
was greater than in any other experiment (independent samples t tests over subjects: all 
t’s > 6.40, p’s < .001; paired samples [Experiment 2] and independent samples 
[Experiments 1a and 1b] t tests over items: all t’s > 3.31, p’s < .01; see Table 2.4 for the 
                                                        
 
7 In the mirror-flip manipulation, it could be argued that the interactive nature of the actors is not completely 
eliminated; for example, a kicker facing away from a would-be kickee may appear instead to be marching away 
from the other actor – a kind of social interaction. If this is the case, the reduced effect here could be due to a 
reduction (but not full elimination) of the interaction between actors, rather than a combination of the 
relational and pose level information. However, based on responses to questions during debriefing, the 
majority of participants considered the actors non-interacting. Thus, although the role switch cost in this 
experiment should perhaps be called a “posture switch cost”, we use the term “role switch cost” for consistency 
with the previous experiments. 
34 
 
 
magnitude of Agent advantage in each experiment). As discussed in section 4.2.1, for 
Agent saliency to account for the results here, we would also expect an asymmetry in the 
role switch cost, i.e. a differential cost for Patient-switch than Agent-switch trials. 
However, this additional effect was not observed: adding an interaction of Role × Trial 
Judgment did not improve model fit over a model with only a main effect of Trial 
Judgment, χ2(1) = 2.02, p = .16. Thus, we can conclude that Agent saliency (or more 
properly here, “active posture” saliency) did not mediate the role switch cost in the 
current experiment. 
The contrast in directionality of the Agent saliency effects between Experiments 2 
and 3 is further evidence that these stimuli were analyzed at different levels (pose vs. 
relational) by the participants in each experiment. In Experiment 2, Agent trials were 
slower than Patient trials, consistent with the hypothesis of Agents triggering event-
building in visually analyzed event scenes due to Cohn et al. (2013; 2017). In the current 
experiment (Experiment 3), we speculate that a different process may be at work: the 
actors were analyzed at the postural level, with no event building initiated (given that 
actors in the scene were not interacting with one another). The robust effect of Trial 
Judgment (faster Agent judgment, or “active posture” trials) in this experiment is 
consistent with previous work that argues that active postures independently guide 
attention in scenes (Freyd, 1983; Gervais et al., 2010), even for infants (Shirai & Imura, 
2016). 
5.3. Discussion 
We again observed a reliable role switch cost, but this differed substantially from our 
previous experiments. First, the effect size here was roughly two-thirds that of 
Experiment 2. Second, unlike in previous experiments, an Agent (active posture) 
advantage also obtained. Thus, the pose level alone (i.e., active and passive posture 
differences associated with certain roles) cannot account for the entirety of the role 
effects across studies. Instead, the role switch cost observed in previous experiments was 
likely operating at both the pose and relational levels. 
Given the differences observed between Experiments 2 and 3, we propose that the 
perceptual system may be differentially attuned to interacting and non-interacting 
individuals. On the one hand, the perceptual system is likely tuned to active postures 
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generally, in line with evidence that active body postures direct spatial attention (Freyd, 
1983; Gervais et al., 2010; Shirai & Imura, 2016). But for interactive events (Experiments 
1a, 1b, and 2), we hypothesize that attention naturally spreads to both actors (the Agent 
and Patient). Indeed, recent work has shown a facilitatory effect on recognition of two-
person interactions (relative to non-interacting dyads) akin to the well-known face-
inversion effect, such that inversion effects are found for stimuli in which two people are 
facing each other but not when they are facing away (Papeo, Stein, & Soto-Faraco, 2017). 
Although our experiment was not explicitly designed to test for a general attentional 
advantage for interacting vs. non-interacting actors, we did find some evidence that such 
an advantage may exist. RTs were approximately 11 ms lower in Experiment 2 (in which 
actors were in interactive relationships, mean RT 347 ms) than in Experiment 3 (in 
which actors were mirror-flipped, i.e. not interacting, mean RT 358 ms). This was 
confirmed in a paired t test comparing RTs for individual image stimuli across the two 
experiments, collapsing over all cross-trial switch factors (e.g., the mean inverse RT for 
the image of blue-kicking-red-from-the-left in Experiment 2 compared to its mirror-
flipped equivalent in Experiment 3), t(39) = 11.5, p < .001, d = 1.83. 
Given that accuracy on the main task (color search) was actually numerically higher 
in Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 2 (97.7% vs. 96.2%, respectively), we do not believe the 
overall RT difference between the two experiments is due to general confusion on 
account of the mirror-flip manipulation; instead, the RT difference supports the 
hypothesis that there is an attentional advantage specific to interacting human figures, as 
if the perceptual system treats the interacting figures as an attentional unit. 
5.3.1. Can the role switch cost be attributed to order effects or to the large 
number of trials used? 
One general concern across experiments is that – although the large number of trials 
per subject (about 1600) resulted in robust estimates of central tendency – we might be 
capturing an effect that is due to the peculiarities of the task. This could surface as order 
effects: perhaps the role switch cost is due to effects of getting acquainted with the task 
(gender or color search), or perhaps it is an effect that emerges from overlearning the 
response to each stimulus, or to fatigue. We tested these possibilities directly, by adding 
additional interaction terms for Role (the switch cost) and either Trial Number (1 to 
approx. 1600) or Block Number (1 to 40) to the best-fitting model for each experiment. 
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Adding the Role × Trial Number interaction term did not improve any of the model fits, 
all χ2(1) < 1.64, p’s > 0.20, nor did adding the Role × Block Number interaction term 
(with an additional main effect of Block Number), all χ2(1) < 1.47, p > 0.23. Thus, it 
seems unlikely that the role switch cost is driven by any peculiarities attributable to 
order effects, such as gradual accommodation to the task, overlearning, or fatigue. 
Additionally, given that we obtained such a large number of observations per subject 
(about 1600), we wanted to ask whether we would have observed the role switch cost 
with fewer observations than were obtained in each experiment. To test this, we 
performed a power analysis that tested at which point in the experiment, if we had 
stopped collecting data, we would have found a significant role switch cost (at a standard 
significance level of α = .05). Specifically, separately for each experiment, we performed 
identical mixed model comparisons to those reported in each experiment above, using 
the same best-fitting models (i.e., comparing the likelihood ratio values for models with 
and without Role as a factor). This was performed on data from each block, cumulatively 
(e.g., for Cumulative Block 1, this only included data from block 1; for Cumulative Block 
2, data from both block 1 and 2; for Cumulative Block 3, data from blocks 1-3; etc., all the 
way up to block 40, which included data from the entire experiment). We simply asked at 
which block significance (p < .05) was reached and maintained for subsequent blocks in 
model comparisons. This is depicted in Figure 2.4. We find that for Experiments 1a and 
2, as little as one-tenth of the data was sufficient to reach and maintain significance, and 
for Experiments 1b and 3, about half to two-thirds. Thus, we can be confident that in 
general, our estimate of the amount of data required was conservative, and we likely 
would have detected the role switch cost even with many fewer observations per subject 
and item.8 
                                                        
 
8 We should note that the experiments reported in this manuscript were the first that we conducted using 
this switch cost paradigm, and the first (to our knowledge) to use this method in scene perception research in 
general. Therefore, given our initial uncertainty in how strong of an effect we should observe in such a 
paradigm, we used a large number of trials per subject to maximize our chances of observing an effect of event 
role if it were to exist. Since we found that only a subset of the trials was needed to detect the role switch cost 
in our experiments, we hope that the reported power analysis proves useful to other researchers interested in 
using a similar paradigm for asking questions about encoding of event information in visual scenes. 
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Figure 2.4 
Analysis of the amount of data required to obtain a significant role switch cost effect in each experiment. 
Mixed effects model comparisons (for models with and without Role as a factor) that were identical to those 
reported for each experiment were calculated on data from each block, cumulatively (i.e., for cumulative 
block number on the x-axis, each block number also includes data from all previous blocks, e.g., the data 
point for block number 30 represents a statistic calculated using models with data from blocks 1-30). The 
dotted line in each plot indicates the chi-square value required for a level of significance of p < .05 for that 
experiment’s model comparison. Blue points indicate significant chi-square values. (Points for some data 
subsets do not appear because models using those subsets did not converge). These plots indicate that fewer 
blocks of trials would have been sufficient for detecting the role switch cost in each experiment (in some 
cases, such as in Experiments 1a and 2, we would have detected the switch cost with as little as one-tenth of 
the data).  
5.3.2. Can linguistic encoding of our stimuli explain the role cost? 
Given that there is evidence of rapid interplay between event apprehension and 
utterance formulation (Gleitman, January, Nappa, & Trueswell, 2007), it is conceivably 
possible that linguistic encoding of the stimuli was happening, even within this short 
time frame (<400 ms). If the switch cost we observed is due to purely grammatical 
categories (Subject, Object), then our experiments cannot adjudicate the generality of 
event roles (i.e., Agent and Patient, or related cluster-concepts; Dowty, 1991; White et al., 
2017). In other words, kicker and tickler may not be conceptually related, but when they 
are situated in utterances, the kicker and tickler become similar by virtue of their both 
being grammatical Subjects (the same reasoning applies to kickee and ticklee). 
However, linguistic encoding is unlikely to explain the role switch costs observed in 
our experiments for several reasons. First, explicit linguistic encoding was rare: in post-
experiment questioning, only nine subjects across all experiments reported linguistically 
encoding the stimuli at any point in terms of who did what to whom (2 in Experiment 1a, 
5 in Experiment 1b, 2 in Experiment 2, and 0 in Experiment 3). Second, any linguistic 
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encoding that occurred appears to have had little influence on the role switch cost: the 
cost was not statistically different between participants that reported encoding the 
events linguistically and those that did not, for any experiment (all p’s > 0.20, unpaired 
t-tests). In fact, only two of the nine participants that reported linguistic encoding, both 
in Experiment 1b, appeared in the top 50th percentile of switch cost magnitude among 
the other participants in their experiment. 
It is also unlikely that participants were linguistically encoding the events implicitly. 
If they were, then we might expect a grammatical Subject advantage: Subjects appear 
first in utterances in English (a Subject-Verb-Object language), so trials on which the 
target actor was the Agent (the grammatical Subject in canonical active-voice utterances) 
might show faster RTs than when the target actor was the Patient (the grammatical 
Object). However, this was not the case: Agent (Subject) trials were actually significantly 
slower than Patient (Object) trials in Experiment 2, and there was no significant Agent 
(Subject) advantage in Experiments 1a and 1b (see Table 2.4). 
Taken together, these analyses suggest that – although some participants did report 
encoding the stimuli linguistically – it had little if any influence on the role switch effects 
observed in our studies. Future work could further probe the influence of language on 
performance in a task such as ours by testing participants from different language 
groups, or those without access to fully formed natural language (e.g., deaf homesigners; 
Feldman et al., 1978; Zheng & Goldin-Meadow, 2002). 
5.3.3. How general is the role switch cost over transitions between 
particular event categories? 
In previous analyses, we found some evidence that the role switch cost is at least 
partly event-general (i.e. not tied to the specific preceding event category): in 
Experiments 1a and 1b, the role switch cost still held when Actor Pair (and therefore 
Event Category in that stimulus set) switched (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and section 3.2.1); 
and in Experiment 3, there was not a significant interaction of the role switch cost with 
repeated/switched event category. However, it still could be the case that the cost is 
dependent on which particular event categories precede others (i.e. that the role switch 
cost is driven by a small subset of preceding event categories). For example, in the 
extreme, it could be that the role switch cost for each event category is obtained only 
when preceded by the category kicking. 
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To address this, we simply calculated the average role switch cost (using inverse RTs) 
across subjects for each event category to every other event category, collapsing over 
Agent side. This yielded a 10 × 10 matrix of values for each experiment, where each cell 
of a matrix represents the average role switch cost for a transition from one particular 
event category to another, illustrated in Figure 2.5A (using raw RTs). We then tested 
whether these event-to-event role switch costs were significantly above zero for each 
experiment. Indeed as illustrated in Figure 2.5B, this was the case (all t(99) > 2.39, p < 
0.02), even when excluding transitions between the same event categories, i.e. the 
diagonals of the matrices (all t(89) > 2.03, p < 0.05).9 These analyses suggest that, at 
least for the event category exemplars used in our experiments, there is some 
commonality across the roles of the participants in different event categories that is 
driving the role cost. Implications for event role representations more broadly appear in 
section 6.1. 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
                                                        
 
9 The same analyses can be conducted using mixed effects models, testing whether the effect of Repeated 
Role no longer significantly improves model fit once event-to-event transitions are taken into account 
(operationalized here as separate random intercepts for Previous Event and the Previous Event × Current 
Event interaction, with random slopes for Repeated Role for each random intercept). These analyses support 
the same conclusion as the t-test analyses in the main text, namely that the role switch cost is not driven by a 
small set of event category transitions. 
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Figure 2.5 
(a) Mean role switch cost over subjects (in milliseconds) calculated between each Event Category and every 
other Event Category, collapsing across Actor Side, separately for each experiment. Color shading indicates 
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t-test values for the switch cost across subjects (|t(23)| > 2.07 is significant at p < .05 uncorrected), with red 
indicating a role switch cost, and blue a role switch benefit. Gray boxes around cells in Experiment 1a and 1b 
matrices indicate transitions between different Event Categories that feature the same Actors (see section 
2.1.2), which was found in analyses to result in higher switch costs (see section 3.2.1); this is not indicated in 
Experiments 2 and 3 since there was always only one set of actors. Note that diagonals in each matrix 
represent the switch cost for the same Event Category, so always reflected the same set of actors, in all 
experiments. (b) Violin plots of all cells from the four matrices in (a). Violin plot outlines indicate the kernel 
probability density, i.e. the width of each plot indicates the proportion of event-to-event transition values at 
each role cost magnitude. Orange boxes indicate the mean and standard error across transition values, for 
each experiment. Analyses showed that the role switch cost was not driven by a small subset of event-to-
event transitions: as can be seen, the majority of values were above zero. 
6. General Discussion 
Our experiments demonstrate that the structure of an event, i.e. who acted on whom, 
is spontaneously encoded in visual processing, even when attention is directed toward 
other visual features (here, gender or color). This process manifested as a role switch 
cost, i.e., a relative lag in reaction time when the role of the target actor switched from 
trial to trial. The effect was robust across stimuli, event categories, and task 
(Experiments 1a and 1b: gender search; Experiment 2: color search). In Experiment 3, 
we determined that the role switch cost observed in the previous experiments cannot be 
fully explained by body posture differences associated with Agents and Patients. 
Furthermore, we found that the cost was not driven by a subset of the possible 
transitions from one event category to another, suggesting that the role information 
computed is quite general. Taken together, our experiments demonstrate (for the first 
time, to our knowledge) both the rapidity and generality of the event role computation 
itself. 
6.1. Implications for event role representations 
Although we have shown that assignment of Agent and Patient to entities in visual 
scenes is rapid and spontaneous, it may be that in continued processing, this coarse role 
assignment can be reversed or refined, in at least three ways. The first is additional visual 
input, in the form of successive fixations: for example, upon further observation, perhaps 
one recognizes that the initially identified Patient is holding a weapon, making him an 
Agent (a shooter); or that an Agent is holding an object to transfer, making the Patient a 
Recipient. Indeed, a recent gist-extraction study of event scenes revealed that observers 
need substantially longer viewing times to identify the coherence of spatially local event 
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properties such as the category of instrument objects vs. global event properties such as 
posture/orientation (Glanemann et al., 2016). The study of Glanemann et al.(2016) 
highlights the advantage afforded by initial commitment to a coarse role assignment: it 
can help guide scene fixations in a targeted manner (see also Castelhano & Henderson, 
2007).  
A second way that role assignment can be reversed or refined is via flexible event 
construal: Despite how an event plays out in the world, people can construe it in an 
innumerable number of ways (sometimes for comedic effect: “Yeah, I’m fine. I snapped 
my chin down onto some guy’s fist and hit another one in the knee with my nose”; Ross, 
1972). We speculate that in general, flexibility in event construal reflects a top-down, 
cognitive re-interpretation of an initial commitment provided rapidly by the visual 
system.  
Finally, the context in which an event occurs likely allows for later assignment of 
more event-specific roles like helper or hinderer that incorporate this contextual 
information. Indeed, there is developmental evidence for both event-general and event-
specific role distinctions: young infants readily distinguish Agents and Patients in social 
events like helping and hindering, but they also themselves prefer positively valenced 
Agents (i.e., helper; Hamlin et al., 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003). 
Given that in our experiments, we found the role switch cost to be somewhat event-
general, an important theoretical question is whether there are systematic differences in 
the role switch cost in terms of hypothesized properties of roles in different event 
categories. In particular, some theories of event roles hypothesize that certain 
components of events (e.g., contact, causation, and change of state or motion) are 
conceptual primitives, posited as such because they are relevant for grammar (Levin, 
1993; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005; Pinker, 1989; Talmy, 2000) or because they are 
available early on in development (Strickland, 2016). Notably, these event components 
are similar to features proposed in cluster-concept notions of event roles (Dowty, 1991; 
Kako, 2006; White et al., 2017). 
Although the consistency we observed in the role cost across events is broadly 
suggestive of generality (see Figure 2.5, and section 5.3.3), we do not believe we have a 
convincing way to address the precise characteristics of this generality with the current 
data, for the following reasons. First, the event categories we used did not independently 
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vary in theoretically relevant event components such as cause, contact, state-change, and 
motion. Second, we had essentially only one exemplar (i.e. one postural “tableau”) per 
event category (see Figure 2.1 for examples). Thus, to address the generality and 
granularity of event roles extracted from visual scenes, future work will need to include 
many more event categories and to systematically manipulate hypothesized event 
components within event category. 
Whatever theoretical distinctions end up accounting for the complexities of an 
observer’s event conceptualization, we assert that there is a rapid and spontaneous 
assignment of Agent-like and Patient-like roles to interactive event participants, possibly 
before more refined role distinctions (e.g., Recipient) or social contingencies (as in the 
helping/hindering case) have been computed, and in some cases before event-specific 
role identification occurs (e.g., kicker, kickee). 
Consequently, now that we have established the robustness and generality of the 
basic phenomenon of spontaneous role extraction with Agent-like and Patient-like event 
participants, there is a large set of theoretically interesting questions about how the 
visual system parses the roles in events with different numbers of participants and 
different relationships among them. For example, in single-participant events where the 
participant undergoes a change of state or location (e.g., melting, falling), is the 
participant assigned a Patient-like rather than Agent-like status? In a joint interaction 
such as dancing, are participants may be assigned similar roles (e.g. both Agents) rather 
than Agent and Patient? What is the role status of participants in complex events such as 
transfer events (e.g., giving, serving)? 
6.2. Implications for the relationship between perceptual and 
linguistic encoding of event roles 
The early stages of event perception as examined in the current studies have the 
potential to inform theories of argument selection in linguistic descriptions of events 
(i.e., whether event participants belong in sentential subject, object, or oblique 
positions). Our general theoretical viewpoint consists of the following notions: (1) in 
early perceptual processing, scene entities are categorized as Agent-like and Patient-like, 
often before the event category itself is determined; and as such, (2) initial role 
categorization is not dictated primarily by the event category itself (along with the 
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corresponding verb-specific roles such as Stimulus Experiencer, and Instrument), but 
rather by the perceptual particulars of the scene, i.e. the particular token of the event 
category. Our studies provide support for these notions: we found role switch costs even 
across exemplars of event categories that would not be considered in the literature to be 
canonical Agent-Patient relationships: events with a mediating instrument (stab, film, 
and bandage); events without caused motion or state-change (look at, call after, and 
film); and an event of transfer (feed), where the Patient might more traditionally be 
considered a Recipient.10 Our viewpoint provides a possible perceptual explanation for at 
least two issues in linguistic argument selection: (1) the optionality and argument status 
of some event participants, such as Instruments; and (2) the cross-linguistic variability 
in grammatical status of certain event roles, such as Stimulus and Experiencer. 
First, let us consider the optionality and argument status of event participants. It is 
debated whether instruments should be considered arguments of verbs: to describe a 
stabbing event, for example, one may say John stabbed the man or John stabbed the 
man with a knife. Rissman and colleagues (2015) account for these inconsistencies at the 
level of event construal: argumenthood depends on construal of a particular token of an 
event as indicated by a verb and its sentential context, rather than an absolutist notion of 
arguments that depends solely on the verb itself. Our work provides a perceptual 
complement to this notion: we argue that early available perceptual cues to role 
assignment have a strong influence on initial event construal. Hence, the degree of 
perceptual salience of objects involved in a particular token of an event should partially 
determine the degree to which an argument of a verbally encoded event will be optional, 
or should be considered an argument at all in the case of Instruments (see also Brown & 
Dell, 1987, on the pragmatics of inclusion of event participants in discourse). 
The rapid and spontaneous encoding of event participants as Agent-like and Patient-
like might also account for the fact that linguistic argument selection for certain event 
categories is more consistent cross-linguistically than for others. For example, the Agent- 
                                                        
 
10 Of course, the scene exemplars (the images used for look at, feed, etc.) were selected precisely because 
there was general agreement in our previous study (Hafri et al., 2013) about the roles of the scene participants 
(who was performing the action vs. being acted upon). However, the fact that we found the role cost even for 
these items suggests that it is in principle possible to find Agent and Patient-like role effects even for categories 
of events without canonical Agent-Patient relationships. This provides evidence that the category of event does 
not exert a strong influence on early role assignment. 
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and Patient-like status of the subject and object in a description of a hitting event is fairly 
straightforward. In contrast, the statuses of subject and object in a description of a 
frightening or fearing event are much less clear (e.g., John frightens Mary and Mary 
fears John can describe the same event; Dowty, 1991), with some hypothesizing thematic 
roles distinct from Agent and Patient for these event participants (i.e., Stimulus or 
Experiencer, dependent on which participant is seen as the implicit cause of the event; 
Hartshorne, 2014; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005). We hypothesize that from instance 
to instance of a given event category, the Agent- and Patient-like perceptual properties of 
the participants may on average be less variable (e.g., hitting, kicking) or more variable 
(e.g., fearing, frightening, looking). Thus, it is not surprising that event categories 
involving Stimulus/Experiencer-like roles (e.g., fearing) are the ones for which there is 
high cross-linguistic variability in terms of which participant must appear in subject 
position. Indeed, we have previously argued that the high degree of cross-linguistic 
correspondence between Agents/Patients and subjects/objects is probably not a 
coincidence, but rather reflects a fundamental relationship between “core” cognition and 
perception (Strickland, 2016). 
This brings us to the question of the degree to which language dictates conceptual 
event role assignment. It has certainly been shown that the linguistic framing of an event 
may influence attention to and memory for certain event participants or event 
components (e.g., Fausey, Long, Inamori, & Boroditsky, 2010; Kline, Muentener, & 
Schulz, 2013; Papafragou, Hulbert, & Trueswell, 2008; J. C. Trueswell & Papafragou, 
2010). Notice here, however, that these phenomena reflect how language production 
alters attention in scenes (“looking for speaking”), or how language comprehension 
affects event construal (serving as a marker of the scene entities considered relevant by 
the speaker). We predict that cross-linguistic differences should be minimal in the first 
moments of event perception, and only afterward might language-specific effects be 
observed, if at all (e.g., language-specific conventions in terms of assignment of Stimulus 
and Experiencer to certain grammatical positions). Such a prediction could be tested by 
running our experimental paradigm with speakers of different languages, or with 
populations with no exposure to fully formed natural language, e.g. deaf homesigners 
(Feldman et al., 1978; Zheng & Goldin-Meadow, 2002). A second prediction is that an 
observer’s event construal will be more susceptible to linguistic modulation when the 
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ambiguity of the initial role information available in the scene is higher, such as with 
Stimulus-Experiencer events, e.g. frightening, where the relative Agent-like or Patient-
like cues between event participants may not significantly differ. In other words, 
speakers certainly use specific verbs and frames in an event description to convey the 
importance of the various event participants to their event construal (e.g., frighten vs. 
fear), but an observer’s construal depends heavily on the perceptual parameters of the 
interaction in the first place. 
To summarize this section, we believe that our results help to address some puzzles 
in the linguistic encoding of events, such as the argument status of event roles like 
Instruments and the cross-linguistic variability in grammatical status of certain roles like 
Stimulus and Experiencer. We speculate that in the first moments of event perception, 
how Agent-like and Patient-like scene participants are, as well as their perceptual 
salience, matters more for event construal and subsequent linguistic encoding than the 
logical relationship between event participants (such as Stimulus/Experiencer) in the 
depicted event category. 
6.3. Implications for high-level visual perception 
Our work is consistent with a wealth of previous literature that has demonstrated 
rapid, bottom-up encoding of semantic content from visual scenes (Biederman et al., 
1982; Castelhano & Henderson, 2007; Greene & Fei-Fei, 2014; Greene & Oliva, 2009; 
Potter, 1976; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Crucially, we find that not only are the 
perceptual features that are correlated with event role (i.e., body posture) extracted by 
the visual system rapidly, but the computation of the abstract role information itself is 
rapid. Observers in our studies viewed the scenes for less than 400 ms (based on mean 
response times), so for us to have obtained the role switch cost, the computation of role 
information must have taken place within this time frame. 
Our findings fit within a broader literature in visual perception which shows that 
spontaneous and possibly automatic perceptual processes are not limited to low-level 
properties (e.g., lines and edges), but also extend to “high-level” representations that 
include objects (Scholl, 2001), event types (Strickland & Scholl, 2015), causality 
(Kominsky et al., 2017; Rolfs et al., 2013), and animacy (van Buren et al., 2015). Like our 
event role results, these other processes often map neatly onto representations from the 
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literature on infant “core cognition” and potentially conflict or diverge from higher-level, 
explicit judgments (Cheries, Wynn, & Scholl, 2006; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; see 
Strickland, 2016, for a discussion of the relationship between elements of “core” 
cognition and cross-linguistic grammatical patterns). Additionally, the differences in the 
role switch cost for interactive actors (Experiment 2) and non-interactive actors 
(Experiment 3) supports the hypothesis that another element of core cognition that is 
reflected in perception are the social interactions of others, including their roles (Spelke 
& Kinzler, 2007). This is in line with other recent work suggesting that the perceptual 
system treats interacting figures as an attentional unit (Papeo et al., 2017) and that there 
is a region in the human brain selective for observed social interactions (Isik, Koldewyn, 
Beeler, & Kanwisher, 2017). 
An open question is the extent to which the role switch cost is specific to human 
interactions, or is a reflection of more general processing of the interactive relationships 
between scene entities, both animate and inanimate. That is, in event scenes that involve 
interactions with or among inanimate objects (e.g., a woman opening a door or a ball 
hitting a rock), are roles assigned using similar visual processes? Given our assertion that 
early in visual processing, scene entities are assigned coarse Agent-like and Patient-like 
roles, it follows that, if an inanimate object is salient enough in the visual representation, 
it should also be rapidly assigned an Agent-like or Patient-like role. However, there is 
evidence that visual processing of animate and inanimate entities is quite distinct, both 
in terms of differential attention (van Buren et al., 2015) and underlying cortical 
pathways (Connolly et al., 2012; Scholl & Gao, 2013). It will require further investigation 
to determine whether the visual system assigns roles similarly to animate and inanimate 
scene entities. 
6.4. Implications for action and event perception 
Researchers studying action perception and its neural substrates have tended to 
focus on single-actor actions (e.g., walking; Giese & Poggio, 2003; Lange & Lappe, 
2006) or actor-object interactions (e.g., grasping, opening; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; 
M. F. Wurm & Lingnau, 2015 and many others). Our work suggests that to gain a 
complete picture of action perception and the neural substrates supporting it, 
researchers must also study the event structure of actions and interactions (Hafri et al., 
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2017). Additionally, our results have implications for theories of event perception from 
ongoing activity, particularly Event Segmentation Theory (EST; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, 
Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). EST holds that during continuous perception, people 
construct an “event model” that includes relevant causes, characters, goals, and objects 
(Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009). Importantly, EST implies that this process does not 
require conscious attention. Our results directly support this core implication: people 
rapidly and spontaneously encode the structure of observed events, even when attention 
is guided to other properties of observed scenes. Our results further suggest that event 
roles should be considered key components of event models themselves, an intuitive 
notion: if event roles change, then so does the currently observed event.  
6.5. Spontaneity vs. automaticity of role encoding 
In the introduction to this paper, we defined a spontaneous process as any process 
that is executed independently of an explicit goal. Such a process could be automatic, in 
the sense that it is mandatory given certain input characteristics, but it could also be 
spontaneous but not automatic in the sense that, under some conditions and with some 
cognitive effort, the process could be prevented from being executed. Our results at 
minimum demonstrate the spontaneity of role encoding. However, what can we say 
about the potential automaticity of event role encoding? 
One criterion for automaticity is the notion of “ballistic” engagement, i.e. that given 
certain types of perceptual input, a particular process is necessarily engaged and runs to 
completion (e.g., an English speaker cannot help but process the sounds of English as 
such; Fodor, 1983). Additional criteria are due to Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), who 
studied target item search among distractor items: they assert that automatic processing 
is quick, is not hindered by capacity limitations of short-term memory, and requires only 
limited attention. One difficulty in assessing the degree of automaticity using these 
criteria is that there is not a straightforward mapping between Shiffrin and Schneider’s 
definitions of target and distractor and our definitions in the present study. In Shiffrin 
and Schneider (1977), targets and distractors are different objects (e.g., letters and 
numbers) on screen. In contrast, in our paradigm, the “target” (gender/color 
information) and “distractor” (role information) are two levels of description of the same 
entity (the target actor). Thus, if attention to different levels of the same stimulus and to 
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different stimuli should be considered analogous under the Shiffrin and Schneider 
criteria, then our results are consistent with automaticity: even when attention is 
directed to one level of the target actor (gender/color), we find that subjects also encode 
the same entity at another level (role). 
However, since gender and color in our stimulus set were not in direct conflict with 
role information, only orthogonal to it, answering whether role extraction is automatic 
rather than simply spontaneous requires further research. Notably, such a distinction 
between spontaneity and automaticity is relevant not only within the domain of the 
current study, but applies to many fields investigating processes that have the potential 
to be considered automatic (e.g., theory of mind; Leslie, 1994; Scholl & Leslie, 1999). 
6.6. Practical vs. theoretical significance of the role switch cost 
Before we close, we believe that a separation of the empirical robustness, practical 
consequences, and theoretical import of the role switch cost is warranted. The empirical 
evidence is clear. We have reported a highly replicable effect, with each experiment 
showing a consistently large standardized effect size (minimum Cohen’s d 0.55), and 
with a majority of subjects and items showing the effect in all cases. We also 
demonstrated that the large number of observations per subject were not necessary to 
obtain the effect (see Figure 2.4 and section 5.3.1). 
For practical purposes, we are not surprised at the small absolute magnitude of the 
effect (about 5 milliseconds), since our experiments were explicitly designed to dis-
incentivize people from making role categorizations. Remarkably, even under these fairly 
extreme conditions, participants exhibited a trace of tracking event roles. Nevertheless, 
we would expect whatever mental mechanisms that produce the tiny absolute effect sizes 
here to matter much more in everyday situations where Agency and Patiency are task-
relevant (e.g. for the purposes of producing language or judging the behavior of 
conspecifics). 
We assert that the theoretical importance of the effect is not measured by its absolute 
size, but rather by the theoretical distinctions made over the course of the experimental 
investigation. Indeed, despite its size, the stimulus manipulation of Experiment 3 
provided evidence that the role switch cost is attributable not only to differences at the 
pose level (i.e., switches in body posture), but also to a more abstract relational level 
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(i.e., switches in event roles). 
6.7. Conclusions 
To close, over the course of four experiments, we have provided empirical evidence 
that the human visual system is spontaneously engaged in extracting the structure of 
what is happening in the world – including the interactive relationships between people. 
The rapidity of the extraction and its generality over a wide range of events suggests that 
this information may have a strong influence on how we describe the world and 
understand what we observe more generally. 
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III. NEURAL REPRESENTATIONS OF OBSERVED 
ACTIONS GENERALIZE ACROSS STATIC AND DYNAMIC 
VISUAL INPUT 
1. Introduction 
The ability to recognize actions performed by others is crucial for guiding intelligent 
behavior. To perceive categories of actions, one must have representations that 
distinguish between them (e.g., biting is different from pushing) yet show invariance to 
different instantiations of the same action. Although previous work has described a 
network of regions involved in coding observed actions (the “Action Observation 
Network”, or AON; Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010; Kilner, 2011; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010; Urgesi, Candidi, & Avenanti, 2014), the extent to which these regions 
abstract across differences between action exemplars is not well understood.  
Previous research has addressed the question of abstraction (i.e. invariance) in two 
ways. First, many neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies have explored 
generalization between observed and executed actions, in an effort to resolve a debate 
over motor system involvement in action understanding (Chong et al., 2008; Dinstein et 
al., 2008; Kilner et al., 2009; Oosterhof et al., 2012a, 2012b; Tarhan et al., 2015; 
Tucciarelli et al., 2015; for review, see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010; Oosterhof et al., 
2013; Caramazza et al., 2014). Second, other studies have examined invariance to 
different perceptual instantiations of observed actions (Kable & Chatterjee, 2006; 
Oosterhof et al., 2012a; Tucciarelli et al., 2015; C. E. Watson, Cardillo, Bromberger, & 
Chatterjee, 2014). In an especially direct test of such invariance, Wurm and Lingnau 
(2015) found that representations in several AON regions distinguished between 
opening and closing in a manner that generalized across different kinematic 
manipulations and acted-upon objects (i.e., across bottles and boxes; see also M. F. 
Wurm, Ariani, Greenlee, & Lingnau, 2015). These findings and others suggest that at 
least a subset of AON regions support abstract codes for actions that could conceivably 
facilitate perceptual recognition. 
However, we posited that an action recognition system should display two additional 
kinds of perceptual generalization. First, it should support representations of action 
category that are invariant not only to the acted-on object or kinematics, but also to 
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other incidental perceptual features, such as the identities of entities involved, and 
location. Whether a girl pushes a boy or a boy pushes a button, and whether it takes 
place in a classroom or a playground, it is still pushing. Second, these representations 
should be elicited both by dynamic visual sequences, in which the entire action is 
observed, and static snapshots, from which the causal sequence must be inferred (Hafri 
et al., 2013). Several studies have found action-specific representations using static 
images (Ogawa & Inui, 2011; C. E. Watson et al., 2014), but crucially, none have 
demonstrated common representations across dynamic and static input. Beyond testing 
these invariances, we also wished to examine actions performed with a wide variety of 
effectors (e.g., foot, mouth), not just hand/arm actions that are commonly investigated 
in the literature (Jastorff, Begliomini, Fabbri-Destro, Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2010a; Kable & 
Chatterjee, 2006; C. E. Watson et al., 2014).  
To these ends, we used multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) of fMRI data to identify 
regions supporting abstract action representations. We scanned subjects while they 
viewed eight action categories, in two visual formats (Figure 3.1): (1) controlled videos of 
two interacting actors; and (2) still photographs involving a variety of actors, objects, and 
scene contexts. We then attempted to decode action category by comparing multivoxel 
patterns across the formats, which should be possible in regions that support action 
category representations not tied to low-level visual features correlated with actions. To 
anticipate, we were able to decode action category across visual formats in bilateral 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), bilateral occipitotemporal cortex (OTC), left premotor 
cortex, and left middle frontal gyrus (mFG). We then conducted further analyses in these 
regions to probe the stability of their representations across perceptual features and 
subjects. Finally, we tested for action decoding in independently localized functional 
OTC regions to determine their involvement in action representation (Kanwisher, 2010). 
Taken together, our results support the hypothesis that AON regions contain neural 
populations that can mediate action recognition regardless of the dynamicity of visual 
input, and the perceptual details of the observed action. 
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Figure 3.1 
Examples of stimuli. Subjects viewed dynamic videos and still images of eight categories of interactions. For 
each action category, one still frame for the video format and three photographs for the image format are 
shown. In the video format, actor role (Agent/Patient), action direction (left/right), and scene background 
(four indoor backgrounds) were fully crossed within each action category. For example, in the brushing still 
frame depicted here, the blue-shirted actor is the Agent, the action direction is towards the left, and the 
background is the red wall, while in other brushing videos, this combination of factors was different (e.g., 
action direction towards the right instead of left). In the still image format, photographs from the internet 
were chosen to maximize variation in actors, objects, viewpoint, and scene context within each category. 
Image format examples shown here are photographs which we have license to publish and closely resemble 
actual stimuli used. 
2. Materials & Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Fifteen healthy adults (8 female; mean age 22.1 ± sd 4.6 years; range 18-35 years) 
were recruited from the Penn community. All participants were healthy, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and provided written informed consent in compliance with 
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procedures approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. All 
were right-handed, except one who was ambidextrous. All were native English speakers, 
and one was bilingual. Data from an additional participant was discarded before analysis 
for an inability to complete the entire experiment. 
For selection of video stimuli, a group of 16 additional individuals (Penn 
undergraduates) participated in an online norming survey for psychology course credit. 
For selection of still image stimuli, 647 individuals on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) participated in a separate online norming survey. All MTurk workers were 
located in the US and had 90% to 95% worker approval rate on previous tasks. 
For the eyetracking control experiment, a group of 16 additional individuals (Penn 
undergraduates) participated for psychology course credit. 
2.2. Stimuli 
To identify neural representations of action categories that were invariant to 
incidental perceptual features, we scanned subjects while they viewed eight different 
categories of two-person interactions: biting, brushing, kicking, massaging, pulling, 
shoving, slapping, tapping. 
The action categories were viewed in two formats: controlled video clips created in 
the lab, and visually varied photographic images taken from the internet. The use of 
videos allowed us to examine action representations elicited by dynamic stimuli, thus 
mimicking action perception in the natural world. This approach is the standard in 
previous literature investigating action recognition (e.g., E. D. Grossman & Blake, 2002; 
Vangeneugden, Peelen, Tadin, & Battelli, 2014; M. F. Wurm & Lingnau, 2015). The use 
of images allowed us to determine whether the same action representations were elicited 
even when actions are perceived from a static snapshot, which has been shown in 
previous behavioral studies to be sufficient for recognition even from brief displays 
(Hafri et al., 2013). 
In addition, by using one format that was more visually controlled (the videos), and 
another that was more visually varied (the images), we decreased the possibility of 
potential confounding factors present in either format alone. The videos always 
contained the same set of actors and scene contexts, so the different body movement 
patterns were the only aspect of the stimuli that allowed categories to be discriminated 
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(apart from brushing, which contained a unique object). Although this had the merit that 
distinctions between categories within the videos could not be attributed to differences 
in actors or scene context, it had the disadvantage that category was inevitably 
confounded with lower-level motion properties that covaried with the actions. In the still 
images, on the other hand, distinctions between categories could not be attributed to 
low-level motion patterns; however, because the stimuli were less visually constrained, it 
remained possible that action category could have covaried with the presence of 
particular types of actors, objects, scene contexts, or even implied motion (Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2000; Senior et al., 2000). By comparing patterns of fMRI responses to the 
videos with those to the still images when identifying category representations, we 
reduce these concerns, because the most likely confounds in one stimulus set are either 
absent or controlled for in the other. 
2.2.1. Video stimuli 
128 video clips (2.5 s each) were filmed, divided equally into eight action categories. 
A pair of male actors of similar height performed all interactions. Video clips were filmed 
in front of four different indoor backgrounds; one actor appeared as the Agent (i.e., the 
entity that performs an action on another entity) and the other as the Patient (i.e., the 
entity on which an action is performed); and the action was directed either towards the 
left or to the right. These three factors were crossed to make 16 video clips for each 
category: 4 backgrounds × 2 actor roles (A as Agent or B as Agent) × 2 action directions 
(leftward or rightward). For example, for biting, there were four video clips (with 
different backgrounds) of actor A on the left biting actor B on the right, four of A on the 
right biting B on the left, four of B on the left biting A on the right, and four of B on the 
right biting A on the left. 
The two actors were centered in the video frame in full-body profile view and started 
each clip at rest with arms at their sides. For half of the action categories (biting, pulling, 
shoving, slapping), the actors faced one another, and for the other half (brushing, 
kicking, massaging, tapping), they both faced the same direction. For brushing, both 
actors always held a brush. Actors kept neutral faces throughout the duration of the 
videos. Example still frames for each action category appear in Figure 3.1. 
To ensure that our videos could be easily interpreted as depicting the intended action 
categories, we obtained descriptions of our videos from a separate group of raters. These 
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participants viewed a random selection of 100 videos, one at a time, and provided a 
verbal label that in their opinion best described each action depicted (total 15 labels per 
video clip, sd 0.45, range 14-16). These verbal labels confirmed that our video clips 
depicted the intended action categories: all were described with the intended verbal label 
or close synonym >95% of the time. Synonyms included: for biting: chomping, gnawing; 
for brushing: combing; for kicking: none; for massaging: rubbing; for pulling: 
yanking, tugging, grabbing, dragging; for shoving: pushing; for slapping: hitting, 
smacking; and for tapping: patting. 
2.2.2. Still image stimuli 
For each action category, we used 16 still images (128 total), which were selected to 
maximize the within-category variety of actors, objects, and scene contexts (e.g., only one 
biting image included a person biting an apple). Stimuli included both animate and 
inanimate Patients (the entity on which an action is performed).  
To create this stimulus set, an initial set of candidate stimuli were obtained from 
Google Images using search terms that included the target verbal label, close synonyms, 
and short phrases (e.g., patting or patting on the back for tapping, combing for 
brushing, pushing for shoving, smacking in the face for slapping). This search 
procedure yielded 809 images (87-118 images per category). To reduce this set, a group 
of MTurkers followed the same norming procedure as for the videos. Each viewed a 
random selection of 60 images, and provided a verbal label that best described each 
action depicted (total 16 labels per image, sd 1.6, range 11-20). Based on these labels, we 
eliminated images that did not have high name agreement with the target verbal label or 
close synonym. Synonyms included: for biting: gnawing, tasting, eating; for brushing: 
combing; for kicking: kickboxing; for massaging: rubbing, back-rubbing; for pulling: 
yanking, tugging, grabbing, grasping, dragging; for shoving: pushing; for slapping: 
hitting, smacking, punching; for tapping: patting, poking, touching. Name agreement 
was at least 87% for each biting, brushing, kicking, and massaging image. For the other 
categories (pulling, shoving, slapping, and tapping), the name agreement criterion was 
relaxed to a minimum of 75%, 75%, 64%, and 53%, respectively, in order to retain at least 
16 images per category. This resulted in a set of 209 images (16-38 per category) with 
high name agreement. 
We then calculated three measures to assess low-level visual similarity among the 
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remaining images, with the aim of choosing a final image set with maximal visual 
dissimilarity within each category. The first measure was the Gist model (Oliva & 
Torralba, 2001), which is a set of image descriptors that represent the energy at different 
spatial frequencies and scales. Image similarity was calculated as the correlation of 
descriptor magnitudes between each pair of images. The other two measures were the 
average HSV hue channel values for each image and average HSV saturation channel 
values for each image. With these three measures in hand, we ran 10,000 permutations 
in which we randomly selected a subset of 16 images per category and calculated, for 
each category, the average distance in Gist space between all 16 images, and the variance 
across images in the hue and saturation channels. Of these permutations, we selected the 
one with the greatest average within-category Gist distance and greatest with-category 
variance across images for hue and saturation. Across the final set of 128 images, we 
luminance matched the HSV value channel using the Matlab SHINE toolbox 
(Willenbockel et al., 2010), and converted the images back to RGB space. Examples for 
each action category appear in Figure 3.1. 
2.3. MRI acquisition 
Scanning was performed at the Center for Functional Imaging at the University of 
Pennsylvania on a 3T Siemens Prisma scanner equipped with a 64-channel head coil. 
High-resolution T1-weighted images for anatomical localization were acquired using a 
three-dimensional magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo pulse 
sequence [repetition time (TR), 1620 ms; echo time (TE), 3.09 ms; inversion time, 950 
ms; voxel size, 1 × 1 × 1 mm; matrix size, 192 × 256 × 160 mm]. T2*-weighted images 
sensitive to blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrasts were acquired using a 
gradient echo echoplanar pulse sequence (TR, 3000 ms; TE, 30 ms; flip angle, 90°; voxel 
size, 3 × 3 × 3 mm; field of view, 192 mm; matrix size, 64 × 64 × 44). Visual stimuli were 
displayed at the rear bore face on an InVivo SensaVue Flat Panel Screen at 1920 × 1080 
pixel resolution (diag = 80.0 cm, w × h = 69.7 × 39.2 cm). Participants viewed the 
stimuli through a mirror attached to the head coil. Images subtended a visual angle of 
~11.7 × 11.7°, and videos subtended a visual angle of ~18.9 × 10.7°. Responses were 
collected using a fiber-optic button box.  
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2.4. Design and task 
2.4.1. Main experiment 
To determine BOLD response to action categories in different visual formats, 
participants were scanned with fMRI while viewing the still images and videos. Images 
and videos were presented in separate scan runs, with four runs per format (eight total), 
alternating in sets of two (e.g. image run 1, image run 2, video run 1, video run 2, image 
run 3, etc.). The format that appeared first was counterbalanced across participants. 
Within format, stimuli were identical within odd-numbered and within even-numbered 
runs (e.g., stimuli in video runs 1 and 3 were identical, stimuli in image runs 2 and 4 
were identical, etc.). Thus, except for repetition trials (see next paragraph), each stimulus 
was shown a total of twice over the course of the experiment, in separate runs. 
To ensure attention to the stimuli, participants were instructed to press a button 
whenever the stimulus on the current trial was exactly the same as the stimulus on the 
immediately-preceding trial (repetition trials). Importantly, this task could not be 
performed by attention to the action category alone. Trials occurred every three seconds 
in a rapid event-related design. Videos were displayed for 2500 ms, followed by a 500 ms 
inter-trial interval (ITI) with a white fixation cross centered on a gray background. 
Images were displayed for 1200 ms, followed by an 1800 ms ITI. Each scan run included 
64 trials in which unique stimuli were shown (8 for each category), 8 repetition trials, 
and 12 null trials, in which participants viewed a blank screen with a fixation crosshair 
for 3 s (total duration 4 min 33 s per scan run). A unique pseudo-randomized sequence 
of stimuli was generated for each scan run using optseq2 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq; RRID:SCR_014363) with the following 
parameters: psdwin 0 to 21, nkeep 10000, focb 100, nsearch 200000. Five extra null 
trials were added at the end of each scan run to ensure we captured the hemodynamic 
response to the last stimulus in each run.  
Video stimuli were divided such that odd video runs contained the videos with two of 
the four backgrounds and even video runs contained the videos with the remaining two 
backgrounds. Thus, each video run included two stimuli for each combination of action 
category, actor roles, and action direction (8 stimuli per action category in each video 
run). The combinations of background splits were cycled through for each subject (e.g., 
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subject 1 had backgrounds 1 and 2 in odd runs and backgrounds 3 and 4 in even runs, 
subject 2 had backgrounds 1 and 3 in odd runs and backgrounds 2 and 4 in even runs, 
etc.). Image stimuli were assigned to odd and even runs with a unique split for each 
subject (8 images per category for the odd runs, and 8 per category for the even runs). 
Stimuli were displayed using a Macbook Pro laptop with Matlab version 2013b 
(MathWorks, Natick, MA; RRID:SCR_001622) and the Matlab Psychophysics Toolbox 
version 3.0.11 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; RRID:SCR_002881). 
2.4.2. Functional localizers 
In order to determine the information content for action categories in functionally 
selective brain regions, all subjects completed three functional localizer scans in the 
middle of each scan session. The first localizer featured static image stimuli to identify 
regions responsive to different stimulus categories. This run consisted of 25 blocks (15 s 
long each; run duration 6 min 15 s) of static images of faces, objects, scrambled objects, 
bodies, and scenes. Blocks 1, 7, 13, 19, and 25 were null blocks with a blank gray screen 
and white crosshair. Images were presented for 800 ms followed each, with a 200 ms 
inter-stimulus interval. Subjects performed a one-back repetition detection task (two 
repetitions per block). 
The second localizer featured dynamic stimuli to identify regions responsive to 
biological motion and basic motion (E. Grossman et al., 2000; E. D. Grossman & Blake, 
2002; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, & Belliveau, 2001). This run consisted of 25 
blocks (18 s long each; run duration 7 min 30 s) of intact point-light displays of single-
person actions (e.g., waving, jumping), scrambled versions of these stimuli (in which 
motion patterns were preserved but starting position of points was randomized), and 
static point-light still frames randomly selected from the scrambled point-light videos. 
Blocks 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 21, and 25 were null blocks with a blank gray screen and centered 
red fixation point. Stimuli were presented for 1500 ms each, with a 300 ms inter-
stimulus interval. Subjects performed a one-back repetition detection task (one 
repetition per block). To create these stimuli, motion capture data were taken from the 
Carnegie Mellon Motion Capture Database (http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu) and animated 
using the Biomotion Toolbox (van Boxtel & Lu, 2013). 
The third localizer featured linguistic stimuli to identify regions responsive to 
linguistic depictions of actions (design based on Bedny et al., 2008). This run consisted 
60 
 
 
of 20 blocks (18 s long each; run duration 6 min 36 s), in which verbs and nouns were 
presented visually to participants in separate alternating blocks. On each trial (2.5 s 
each), participants had to rate the similarity in meaning of two words presented 
sequentially (1 s each) by performing a button press indicating their response on a scale 
of 1 to 4. Words were a set of 50 motion verbs (e.g., to stumble, to prance) and 50 animal 
nouns (e.g., the gorilla, the falcon), approximately equated for similarity and difficulty 
(available in supplementary material in Bedny, Dravida, & Saxe, 2014). Words were 
randomly paired within block. 
2.5. fMRI data analysis 
2.5.1. Overview 
Our primary goal was to identify representations of action categories that generalized 
across dynamic videos and static images. To identify brain regions supporting such 
representations, we implemented a whole-brain searchlight analysis of multivoxel 
responses to action categories shown in both movie and image format. Once these 
regions were identified, we performed several further analyses to determine the 
properties of the encoded action categories. First, we compared the cross-format 
searchlight results to results from within-format searchlight analyses to observe the 
degree of overlap of within- and cross-format decoding. Second, with the regions 
identified by the cross-format searchlights, we performed a more fine-grained analysis of 
the responses to the video stimuli, to test whether category representation elicited by 
videos generalized across actor role and direction of action. Third, we performed a 
representational similarity analysis within these regions to determine if their category 
spaces within each region were similar across subjects. Finally, to determine the 
relationship between functional selectivity and coding of action category, we tested for 
cross-format and within-format category decoding in a number of functional regions of 
interest defined based on univariate responses in localizer scans. 
2.5.2. Data preprocessing 
Functional images were corrected for differences in slice timing by resampling slices 
in time to match the first slice of each volume. Images were then realigned to the first 
volume of the scan, and subsequent analyses were performed in the subject’s own space. 
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Motion correction was performed using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & 
Smith, 2002). Data from the functional localizer scans were smoothed with a 5 mm full-
width at half-maximum Gaussian filter; data from the main experimental runs were not 
smoothed. 
2.5.3. Whole-brain analysis of cross- and within-format action category 
decoding 
To search for action category information across the brain, we implemented a 
searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006) of multivoxel patterns 
elicited by the 8 action categories in video and static image format. We centered a small 
spherical ROI (radius 5 mm, 19 voxels) around every voxel of the brain, separately for 
each participant, and then calculated a discrimination index within each sphere. This 
index was defined as the difference between the Pearson correlation across scan runs for 
patterns corresponding to the same action category in different formats (e.g., kicking in 
the video format with kicking in the image format) and the Pearson correlation across 
scan runs for patterns corresponding to different action categories in different formats 
(e.g., kicking in the video format with brushing in the image format). If this index is 
positive, this indicates that the searchlight sphere contains information about action 
category (e.g., Haxby, Gobbini, Furey, & Ishai, 2001). We then assigned the resulting 
value to the central voxel of the sphere. 
To define the activity patterns, we used general linear models (GLMs), implemented 
in FSL (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki; RRID:SCR_002823), to estimate the 
response of each voxel to each action category in each scan run. Each runwise GLM 
included one regressor for each action category (8 total), one regressor for repetition 
trials, regressors for six motion parameters, and nuisance regressors to exclude outlier 
volumes discovered using the Artifact Detection Toolbox (http:// 
www.nitrc.org/projects/artifact_detect; RRID:SCR_005994). A high-pass filter (100 
Hz) was used to remove low temporal frequencies before fitting the GLM, and the first 
two volumes of each run (always extra null trials) were discarded to ensure data quality. 
Individual patterns for each run were normalized before cross-run comparison by 
calculating the z-score for each voxel, across conditions. Z-scored patterns were averaged 
within odd and within even runs of the same format (e.g., image runs 1 and 3 were 
averaged; video runs 2 and 4 were averaged) and discrimination index scores were 
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calculated based on correlations between even and odd sets of runs.  
In order to produce optimal alignment of searchlight maps across subjects, we first 
reconstructed anatomical pial surface and gray-white matter boundaries for each subject 
using FreeSurfer v5.3.0 (http://surfer.nmr.mgh. harvard.edu; RRID:SCR_001847). 
These were aligned to a FreeSurfer standard template using a spherical transformation 
(Fischl, Sereno, Tootell, & Dale, 1999), and based on this alignment, the mri_vol2vol 
tool was used to calculate registrations from subject functional space to FreeSurfer 
standard. These standard-space subject maps were submitted to a second-level random-
effects analysis in FSL. To correct for multiple comparisons, the group-level t-map was 
submitted to threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE; Smith & Nichols, 2009), an 
algorithm designed to offer the sensitivity benefits of cluster-based thresholding without 
the need for an arbitrarily chosen threshold. The TFCE statistic represents the cluster-
like local support for each voxel using empirically and theoretically derived height and 
extent parameters. This TFCE map was then whole-brain corrected (p < 0.05) for the 
family-wise error rate using standard permutation tests implemented in FSL with the 
randomise function (10,000 permutations) and spatial 5-mm FWHM variance 
smoothing, which is recommended for df < 20 because it reduces noise from poorly 
estimated standard deviations in the permutation test procedure (Nichols & Holmes, 
2002). 
Searchlight analyses were also conducted within visual format (one for Image 
Format, one for Video Format). The same analyses as above were implemented, except 
for the following. For Image Format, patterns were compared between image runs only 
(e.g., kicking in the odd image runs with kicking in the even video runs); for Video 
Format, between video runs only (e.g., kicking in the odd video runs with kicking in the 
even image runs). To qualitatively compare the overlap of within- and cross-format 
decoding regions, we overlaid whole-brain searchlight maps for the different format 
comparisons to examine regions of conjunction. Here the maximum p-value (TFCE, 
whole-brain corrected) is the valid value for conjunction inference in each voxel (the 
Minimum Statistic compared to the Conjunction Null, MS/CN; Nichols, Brett, 
Andersson, Poline, & Wager, 2005). 
2.5.4. Cross-Format ROI definition 
We used the results of the cross-format searchlight analysis to define regions of 
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interest (ROIs) for three subsequent analyses, described below. ROIs were constructed 
by taking the intersection of the cross-format decoding map (whole-brain corrected) and 
spheres centered on the cluster peaks (Table 3.1) from this map (Fairhall & Caramazza, 
2013), and transforming the defined region back into the native functional space for each 
subject. Since spheres with a given radius may yield different ROI sizes after intersection 
with the whole-brain map, the radius of these spheres was adjusted separately for each 
region so that approximately 100 voxels were contained within each ROI after 
transformation to subject space (mean 108 voxels, sd 15, range 81 to 156). 
2.5.5. Invariance to controlled factors in the video stimuli 
The first follow-up analysis tested whether the patterns elicited by the movies 
showed invariance to incidental properties of the actions, such as the action direction 
(leftward vs. rightward) and actor roles (actor A as Agent or actor B as Agent). To test 
whether this was the case, we implemented additional GLMs that included one regressor 
for each action category × action direction × actor role combination within each video 
run (32 regressors total per run, with 2 video stimuli contributing to each estimate). 
Multivoxel patterns within run were z-scored across the 32 conditions, and these 
patterns were averaged within odd and within even runs. For each cross-format ROI, 
pairwise Pearson correlations were calculated for patterns between all 32 conditions 
across odd and even runs, and correlation coefficients were averaged for all 
combinations of same vs. different action category, same vs. different action direction, 
and same vs. different actor roles, yielding eight mean correlations values per subject 
and ROI. These pattern similarity values were then entered into 2 × 2 × 2 repeated 
measures ANOVAs (one for each ROI), with action category, action direction, and actor 
roles as factors. Early visual cortex (EVC, defined in a separate functional localizer 
described below) was also included in this analysis for comparison with the cross-format 
ROIs. P values for F statistics were corrected for multiple comparisons across the nine 
ROIs using the Bonferroni-Holm method, separately for each set of F statistics yielded by 
the ANOVA. The Bonferroni-Holm method is uniformly more powerful than standard 
Bonferroni while still controlling for the family-wise error rate (Holm, 1979). Note that 
although the same Video Format data was used for cross-format ROI definition and for 
this follow-up analysis, this analysis is unlikely to be affected by circular analysis 
problems (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009), because the cross-format 
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ROI definition procedure used GLMs that collapsed across actor role and action 
direction for each action category. Thus, the Video patterns used in the cross-format ROI 
definition procedure did not contain information about actor role or action direction. 
2.5.6. Representational Similarity Analysis 
The second follow-up analysis tested whether the patterns that allow for action 
discrimination within individual reflect a common representational space across 
individuals, i.e., whether actions are represented in a similar way from person to person. 
To examine this issue, we used representational similarity analysis  (Kriegeskorte & 
Kievit, 2013; RSA; Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008). Within each cross-format 
ROI, representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) were constructed using the 
pairwise Pearson correlation distances (1 - r) between multivoxel patterns for each action 
category to every other. Three separate RDMs were constructed for every subject and 
ROI: a video format RDM (even to odd video run correlations), an image format RDM 
(even to odd image run correlations), and a cross-format RDM (all video to all image run 
correlations). Cross-subject consistency in representational space was then assesses by 
calculating Spearman correlation between each subject’s RDM and every other subject’s 
RDM, separately for video, image, and cross-format RDMs. Because we were interested 
in similarities and differences between categories, rather than reliability within 
categories, only off-diagonal elements of the RDMs were included in the calculation. 
These inter-subject correlations represent the similarity in representational space from 
each subject to every other, abstracted away from the underlying units of representation 
(voxels). If the mean inter-subject correlation is significantly above zero, it indicates that 
the relationship among representational spaces is reliable.  
Because the inter-subject RDM correlation values were not independent (i.e., RDMs 
from each subject were used more than once in the inter-subject RDM comparisons, e.g. 
subject 1 to subject 2, subject 1 to subject 3, etc.), permutation tests were used to 
determine chance levels. In these tests, for each comparison type (video, image, cross), 
the condition labels of the subject RDMs were shuffled before calculating the inter-
subject correlations. The mean inter-subject correlation was calculated across all 
pairwise subject comparisons, 10,000 times for each comparison type and cross-format 
ROI. The p value was simply the proportion of times the true mean inter-subject 
correlation was lower than a permuted inter-subject correlation. These p values were 
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then corrected for multiple comparisons across the eight ROIs using the Bonferroni-
Holm method, separately for each comparison type. The mean chance inter-subject 
correlation from permutation testing was approximately zero in all cases (mean 7.77×10-
5, range -1.50×10-3 to 1.50×10-3, across all ROIs and comparison types).  
Note that although the same data was used for cross-format ROI definition and for 
this follow-up analysis, the results of these analyses do not follow trivially from the 
finding of cross-format action category representations in these regions. In particular, 
since the action category discrimination index was quantified separately for each subject 
(using each subject’s own representational space), reliable action category decoding 
across subjects does not logically entail that their representational spaces will be related 
to one another. To confirm this point, we ran a simulation using randomly constructed 
RDMs. We observed no correlation between the magnitude of the discrimination indices 
and the Spearman correlation of the off-diagonal values across RDMs (mean -6.48×10-4, 
sd 0.03, across 1,000 simulations). 
2.5.7. Functionally localized regions of interest 
We also examined action decoding in several functional ROIs that previous work 
suggests might play a role in processing actions, or perceptual constituents of actions. 
These ROIs were defined based on fMRI responses during three functional localizer 
scans (described above). 
 Data from the first localizer scan were used to define ROIs related to the viewing of 
specific stimulus categories, using a group-constrained subject-specific (GSS) ROI 
definition method (Julian, Fedorenko, Webster, & Kanwisher, 2012). This approach 
yields similar individual subject functional ROIs to the traditional hand-drawn ROI 
pipeline, but using an objective and automatic method. Each ROI was initially defined in 
each subject as the top 100 voxels in each hemisphere that responded more to the 
contrast of interest and fell within the group-parcel mask for the given ROI. Parcel 
masks were derived from a large number of separate subjects undergoing similar 
localizers using this method (parcels available at 
http://web.mit.edu/bcs/nklab/GSS.shtml). Using this method, we identified the 
following ROIs, each using the contrast listed in parentheses: early visual cortex (EVC; 
scrambled objects > objects); lateral occipital (LO) and posterior fusiform (pFs; objects > 
scrambled objects); occipital face area (OFA), anterior fusiform face area (FFA), and 
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right posterior FFA (faces > objects); extrastriate body area (EBA) and right fusiform 
body area (FBA; bodies > objects); and occipital place area (OPA), parahippocampal 
place area (PPA), and retrosplenial complex (RSC; scenes > objects). 
Data from the second localizer scan (dynamic stimuli) were used to define two 
motion-sensitive functional ROIs. GSS parcels were not available for these stimulus 
contrasts, so these ROIs were hand-drawn. Human middle temporal complex (hMT+) 
was defined as the set of contiguous voxels responding more to scrambled than static 
point-light displays in the vicinity of the posterior inferior temporal sulcus, separately in 
both hemispheres. Thresholds were determined separately for each subject to be 
consistent with ROIs found in previous studies (mean t > 5.3, range 3 to 8). The 
biological-motion selective posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS-bio) was defined as 
the set of contiguous voxels responding more to intact than scrambled point-light 
displays in the vicinity of the posterior superior temporal sulcus in the right hemisphere. 
Thresholds were determined separately for each subject to be consistent with ROIs 
found in previous studies (mean t > 2.9, range 2.0 to 4.7, identified in 11 of 15 
participants). 
Data from the third localizer scan (linguistic stimuli) were used to define the verb-
selective left pMTG (pMTG-verb) as the set of contiguous voxels responding more to 
verbs than nouns in the vicinity of the left posterior middle temporal gyrus. Thresholds 
were determined separately for each subject to be consistent with ROIs found in previous 
studies (mean t > 3.7, range 2.4 to 4.5, identified in 11 of 15 participants). 
Because these functional ROIs often partially overlapped in individual subjects, we 
excluded voxels falling into more than one ROI (Schwarzlose, Swisher, Dang, & 
Kanwisher, 2008; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 2013). This allowed us to isolate the specific 
contribution of voxels with certain functional profiles (e.g., body-selective or motion-
selective), without contamination from nearby regions with different functional profiles. 
After these exclusions, the mean size of the ROIs was as follows: EVC: 186 voxels (sd 15, 
range 150 to 200); hMT+: 146 voxels (sd 30, range 98 to 220); pSTS-bio: 51 voxels (sd 
22, range 16 to 93); LO: 155 voxels (sd 15, range 134 to 172); pFs: 142 voxels (sd 21, range 
86 to 163); anterior FFA: 150 voxels (sd 17, range 122 to 178); right posterior FFA: 200 
voxels (no overlap); OFA: 165 voxels (sd 23, range 114 to 193); EBA: 116 voxels (sd 24, 
range 87 to 160); right FBA: 65 voxels (sd 13, range 43 to 92); OPA: 195 voxels (sd 3, 
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range 190 to 200); PPA: 181 voxels (sd 14, range 147 to 197); RSC: 200 voxels (no 
overlap); pMTG-verb: 94 voxels (sd 60, range 35 to 211). Analyses using ROIs in which 
overlapping voxels were not excluded yielded qualitatively similar results. 
Action category discrimination indices for the video, image, and cross-format 
comparisons were calculated separately within each ROI for each subject, and were 
submitted to two-tailed one-sample t tests against chance (zero). P values were corrected 
for multiple comparisons across functional ROIs separately within comparison type 
using the Bonferroni-Holm method (14 tests for each comparison type). 
2.6. Eyetracking control task 
To ensure that action category decoding could not be attributed to differences in 
spatial attentional allocation, we ran a control study in which a separate group of 
participants underwent the identical procedure as in the main fMRI experiment, but 
outside the scanner, and while their gaze location was recorded by a remote binocular 
eyetracker situated within the visual display monitor (Tobii T120 eyetracker sampling at 
60 Hz). 
Two-dimensional gaze maps were created for each combination of subject, format 
(Image or Video), run (4 per format), and action category (8) by binning gaze locations 
on the screen into 70 horizontal × 56 vertical bins. In other words, gaze maps akin to a 
two-dimensional histogram were formed by dividing the screen extent into 70 × 56 bins, 
and each eyetracking sample was placed into its corresponding location in this set of bins 
(ignoring the time dimension). As with the fMRI voxel patterns, these gaze maps were z-
scored across action category (for each subject, format, and run), and even and odd run 
maps were averaged together. We then attempted to decode action category both within- 
and across-format using the two-dimensional gaze maps. Pearson correlations were 
calculated between even- and odd-run gaze maps corresponding to each action category 
(for each subject and analysis type separately). The discrimination index was the average 
within-category correlation minus the average between-category correlation. We tested 
the significance of this discrimination index across subjects, separately for Image 
Format, Video Format, and Cross Format. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral performance 
One participant reported that she misunderstood the instructions for her first video 
run, so data for this run (behavioral and imaging) were excluded. For the remaining 
data, behavioral performance on the one-back repetition detection task was good, 
indicating that participants were playing close attention to the stimuli. For image runs, 
the mean accuracy on repetition trials was 0.91 (sd 0.08), the mean false alarm rate was 
0.002 (sd 0.002), and average RT on correct trials was 694 ms (sd 82 ms). For video 
runs, mean accuracy was 0.89 (sd 0.10), the mean false alarm rate was 0.014 (sd 0.015), 
and average RT on correct trials was 1,117 ms (sd 157 ms). 
3.2. Cross-format action category decoding across the brain 
Our primary goal was to identify representations of action categories that were 
invariant to incidental visual elements, such as actors, objects, scene context, and the 
presence or absence of dynamic motion information. To this end, we scanned 
participants while they viewed videos and still images of eight categories of interactions. 
We then used a searchlight analysis to identify brain regions where action category 
representations could be decoded across the video and image formats. This analysis 
revealed seven contiguous clusters in the cross-format searchlight volume, which were 
located in left and right inferior parietal lobule (IPL), left and right lateral 
occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC), left and right ventral occipitotemporal cortex (VOTC), 
and left middle frontal gyrus (mFG; see Figure 3.2A, and see Table 3.1 for list of these 
clusters). These regions largely overlap with the previously identified Action Observation 
Network (AON; Caspers et al., 2010; Kilner, 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Urgesi et 
al., 2014). These results suggest that AON regions encode categories of actions in a 
consistent way across highly varied perceptual input. For subsequent analyses, ROIs 
corresponding to these clusters (approximately 100 voxels each) were defined 
individually in each subject. (For discussion of the relationship of the cross-format OTC 
regions to functionally defined OTC regions based on previous literature, see below, 
Cross-format decoding in functionally selective regions.)  
The largest cluster, left IPL, had several local maxima (Table 3.1). The cluster peak 
was in left ventral IPL in the supramarginal gyrus (xyzmni = -58, -37, 28), and this was 
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used as the left IPL ROI for further analyses. An additional local maximum was located 
in left premotor cortex (xyzmni = -55, -4, 40; Figure 3.2A). Though this area was 
contiguous with the left IPL cluster in the volume, it is anatomically separated by several 
sulci and gyri from the other local maxima, and prior literature suggests a possible 
functionally distinct role for left premotor cortex in recognition of actions (Caramazza et 
al., 2014; Kilner, 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; M. F. Wurm & Lingnau, 2015). 
Thus, we defined an additional ROI around this local maximum for further 
interrogation. With this additional ROI, we had eight ROIs for subsequent analyses: left 
and right IPL, left and right LOTC, left and right VOTC, left premotor, and left mFG. 
Table 3.1 
MNI locations, extent, mean cross-format discrimination index, significance, and peak statistics for the 
clusters identified in the cross-format action category searchlight, ordered by cluster extent (number of 
voxels). Indented are MNI locations and statistics for peaks of additional local maxima within these clusters 
that were separated by at least 15 mm in the volume. The ROIs used in subsequent analyses were composed 
of approximately 100 voxels centered on the cross-format cluster peaks (marked with † symbol), with the 
addition of the local maximum for left premotor (ventral only, marked with †† symbol). Abbreviations: cor, 
corrected; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; LOTC, lateral occipitotemporal cortex; mFG, middle frontal gyrus; unc, 
uncorrected; VOTC, ventral occipitotemporal cortex. 
Cluster    Peak 
Region Extent 
Cross-
format 
discrim. 
index 
x, y, z (Center of 
Gravity) 
p(FWE-
cor) 
Pseudo-
t 
p(unc) x, y, z 
Left IPL 
(ventral) † 
605 0.045 -49.2 -26.7 38.7 0.002 5.07 1E-04 -58 -37 28 
Left 
Premotor 
(ventral) †† 
     0.003 3.85 9E-04 -55 -4 40 
Left IPL 
(dorsal) 
     0.02 5.73 3E-04 -40 -43 49 
Left Post-
Central 
     0.003 5.03 3E-04 -58 -22 37 
Left 
Premotor 
(dorsal) 
     0.031 3.56 5E-04 -31 -4 43 
Right LOTC † 96 0.049 48.9 -61.5 6.1 0.004 6.11 2E-04 44 -61 4 
Right IPL † 64 0.045 56.3 -27.9 37.3 0.016 4.91 3E-04 53 -28 37 
Left LOTC † 28 0.050 -42.9 -80.6 -0.1 0.026 4.54 1E-03 -43 -82 -2 
Left VOTC † 25 0.043 -32.8 -44.8 -12.6 0.019 5.09 5E-04 -28 -40 -11 
Right VOTC † 17 0.053 44.4 -52.0 -12.9 0.029 4.88 9E-04 44 -52 -11 
Left mFG † 11 0.033 -45.5 20.8 30.2 0.036 3.85 2E-04 -46 23 28 
70 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. 
A, Whole brain searchlight for Cross-Format action category decoding. Black arrows and text indicate the 
anatomical locations of the cross-format clusters identified in this analysis, as well as the location of the ROI 
for left premotor cortex. Corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05, using threshold-free cluster 
enhancement (TFCE) and permutation testing. For subsequent analyses, ROIs corresponding to these 
clusters were defined individually in each subject. B, Whole brain searchlight for Image Format action 
category decoding (corrected as in A). C, Whole brain searchlight for Video Format action category decoding 
(corrected as in A). D, Conjunction overlap map of the searchlight analyses, with colors indicating which of 
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the three searchlight maps overlap in each area (black outline indicates overlap of all three). Video Format 
decoding was widespread across the brain, while Image Format decoding was mostly restricted to similar 
regions as were found in the Cross-Format searchlight. 
Prior work has shown coding of specific limb and effector information in some of the 
regions reported here (Bracci & Peelen, 2013; J. P. Gallivan, McLean, Smith, & Culham, 
2011; Jason P. Gallivan, Adam McLean, Valyear, & Culham, 2013; IPL and LOTC; Mahon 
et al., 2007; Orlov, Makin, & Zohary, 2010; Orlov, Porat, Makin, & Zohary, 2014; R. 
Peeters et al., 2009; R. R. Peeters, Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2013). To ensure that the present 
cross-decoding results were not driven solely by an effector-based distinction between 
action categories, we examined cross-format decoding separately for two sets of our 
action categories: those that involved hand/arm effectors (massaging, pulling, shoving, 
slapping, tapping), vs. those that involved other, more varied, effectors (biting, 
brushing, kicking). If an effector-based distinction between hand/arm and non-
hand/arm actions were driving our results, we should observe cross-format decoding 
within the varied effector set and not the hand/arm effector set. However, despite the 
reduced data available in each subset, we still observed cross-decoding in half or more of 
the cross-format ROIs in both subsets: Six of eight ROIs showed significant decoding 
within the varied effector set (left mFG, left VOTC, left and right LOTC, left and right 
IPL; t values > 2.75, pcorrected values < 0.046), and four of eight showed significant 
decoding within the hand/arm effector set (right VOTC, right LOTC, left and right IPL; t 
values > 3.02, pcorrected values < 0.046). This suggests that, in these regions at least, cross-
format decoding is unlikely to be driven solely by a coarse distinction between actions 
performed with the hand/arm vs. other effectors. 
3.3. Within-format action category decoding across the brain 
To determine whether action category information tied to the particular visual 
format was present in other brain regions, we conducted whole-brain searchlights for 
action category decoding, separately for the video format and image format. Within the 
video format, we found widespread action category decoding across the brain in both 
hemispheres (Figure 3.2B). These results are not surprising, given the consistency in 
visual motion energy across the video clips within action category (see above, Methods: 
Video stimuli). In contrast, action category decoding within the image format was 
restricted largely to the regions identified in cross-format decoding (Figure 3.2A vs. 
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Figure 3.2C), with an additional left orbitofrontal cluster. This was confirmed in a 
conjunction overlap map of the three searchlight maps (Figure 3.2D; Nichols et al., 
2005): The within-format searchlights overlapped one another in or adjacent to areas 
observed in the cross-format searchlight. Interestingly, the degree of overlap of the maps 
in the different regions suggests a possible difference in the degree of format dependence 
of action coding between left IPL and the other regions. In the former, there is a large 
area of cross-decoding, and the within-format territory (both image and video) overlaps 
with this. In the other regions, particularly left LOTC, there is only a small area of cross-
decoding, but large (and overlapping) areas of within-format decoding. This might 
suggest that action representations are less format-dependent in left IPL than in other 
regions. 
3.4. Can the cross-format results be driven by similarities in spatial 
location of attention? 
The cross-format results might have been trivially obtained if participants attended 
to similar spatial locations for each action category, even across the two visual formats 
(image and video). For example, it is reasonable to hypothesize that for kicking, 
participants might have attended to the lower portion of the visual display, whereas for 
slapping, they attended to the higher portion. Such consistency in location of spatial 
attention has been shown to drive multivoxel responses in visual regions, including 
hMT+ (Bressler & Silver, 2010; Connor et al., 2002). In order to rule out this possibility, 
we conducted a control study, in which a separate group of 16 participants performed the 
same task as the fMRI participants while their gaze was tracked with a remote 
eyetracker. These gaze data were analyzed similarly to how the fMRI data were analyzed, 
i.e. multivariate patterns (here, two-dimensional maps of gaze location) were 
constructed for each subject, format, and run, and discrimination indices were calculated 
from the correlation of the 2-D gaze maps across action categories for each subject and 
format. If participants looked to consistent spatial locations for each action category, 
these gaze map discrimination indices would be reliably above zero. 
Action category could indeed be decoded based on gaze location for both the Image 
Format, t(15) = 2.60, p = 0.02, and the Video format, t(15) = 7.91, p < 0.001. However, 
across the visual formats, discrimination indices based on gaze locations were reliably 
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below zero, t(15) = -4.26, p < 0.001. These results indicate that gaze locations for action 
categories were consistent within format, but were systematically different across 
formats (e.g., looking at the top half of the screen for kicking in the Image Format, but 
the lower half for kicking in the Video Format). Thus, absolute location of spatial 
attention is unlikely to explain the cross-format decoding results from fMRI data in the 
main experiment. 
3.5. Invariance to systematically manipulated properties of the 
video stimuli 
Abstract action category representations should show generalization not only across 
formats, but also across variations in incidental properties within format, such as actors 
or viewpoint/action direction. Some evidence that this may be the case comes from the 
fact that we were able to decode action category using only patterns elicited by the 
images, even though the image stimuli were chosen to maximize within-category visual 
dissimilarity. However, to formally test generalization across incidental properties, we 
leveraged the fact that actor roles and action direction were systematically manipulated 
in the video clips. We extracted activity patterns within each ROI for each specific 
condition (i.e., each action category × action direction × actor role combination, 32 
patterns in total). The correlation values between these conditions were then calculated 
and entered into repeated measures ANOVAs (one for each ROI), with action category 
(same vs. different), action direction (same vs. different), and actor roles (same vs. 
different) as factors. We also included early visual cortex (EVC) in the analysis (defined 
in a separate functional localizer as responses to scrambled objects > intact objects) as an 
indicator of whether it was possible to detect differences in action decoding across 
incidental low-level visual properties in our data. 
Finding action category decoding was expected in this analysis, as the ROIs were 
selected based on the presence of consistent action category patterns across format, 
which entails that the patterns within the Video Format should also be consistent. 
Somewhat surprisingly, action category decoding was robust in some but not all regions 
(Figure 3.3A). This might be attributable to more variability in the estimates of activity 
patterns (there were two trials per beta estimate in the GLM used here, as opposed to 
eight trials per beta estimate in the previous analysis). Nevertheless, the estimates were 
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consistent enough that seven of the eight cross-format ROIs, plus EVC, showed either a 
main effect of action category or a trend in this direction. These effects were marginal in 
left mFG, left premotor, and right VOTC (F(1,14) values of 4.66, 5.91, and 5.63, pcorrected 
values = 0.12, puncorrected values < 0.05), and significant in all other regions (F(1,14) values > 
21.9, pcorrected values < 0.002, puncorrected values < 0.001) except left VOTC (F(1,14) = 0.75, 
pcorrected = 0.40, puncorrected = 0.40). For action direction, a subset of regions showed main 
effects (EVC and left LOTC significant, right LOTC marginal), with greater pattern 
similarity for the same action direction than different action direction (EVC: F(1,14) = 17.3, 
pcorrected = 0.009, puncorrected = 0.001; Left LOTC: F(1,14) = 10.3, pcorrected = 0.05, puncorrected = 
0.006; Right LOTC: F(1,14) = 4.40, pcorrected = 0.38, puncorrected = 0.055; all other F(1,14) values 
< 3.03, pcorrected values > 0.62, puncorrected values > 0.10; Figure 3.3A). This suggests that 
these regions are sensitive to the direction of motion in the videos, which is not 
surprising, given the presence of motion-selective regions (hMT+) in LOTC, and EVC’s 
role in coding low-level visual features. No ROI showed a main effect of actor roles (all 
F(1,14) values < 2.53, pcorrected values > 0.99, puncorrected values > 0.13; Figure 3.3A), 
indicating that no region distinguished videos with Actor A as the agent from videos with 
Actor B as the agent. 
Crucially, in terms of action category invariance, no cross-format ROI showed an 
interaction of action category with actor role and/or action direction; if anything, in left 
premotor cortex, action decoding was marginally better for different action direction vs. 
same (F(1,14) = 4.07, pcorrected = 0.51, puncorrected = 0.06; all other cross-format ROI F(1,14) 
values < 2.91, pcorrected values > 0.99, puncorrected values > 0.11; see Figure 3.3B). While the 
lack of significant interactions is a null result and should be interpreted with caution, it is 
worthwhile to note that this modulation was detectable in our data: in EVC, action 
categories could be better decoded when action directions were the same than when they 
were different (action category × action direction interaction: F(1,14) = 12.4, pcorrected = 
0.03, puncorrected = 0.003; Figure 3.3B). Thus, in regions showing cross-decoding of action 
category across videos and images, the ability to distinguish action categories was no 
greater when comparing across patterns elicited by videos in which actor role or action 
direction were the same than when comparing across videos in which actor role or action 
direction were different. Although we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that 
action representations in these cross-format regions are modulated by visual properties 
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of the video stimuli, this finding is at least consistent with abstract action category codes. 
 
Figure 3.3 
Analyses for action category specificity and generalization for the Video Format stimuli in cross-format 
ROIs. Early Visual Cortex (EVC, defined by a functional localizer as scrambled objects > intact objects) was 
also included for comparison with cross-format ROIs. A, Decoding for action category, action direction, and 
actor roles. Discrimination index values shown here are average same minus average different correlation 
values for action category, action direction, and actor roles, respectively, collapsed over the other factors. 
Action direction could be decoded in left and right LOTC and EVC, while actor role code not be decoded in 
any regions. Action category could be decoded in most regions, though we note that this is necessitated by 
our ROI selection procedure, which was based on cross-format action category decoding using the same 
data. B, Action category discrimination indices for the cross-format ROIs, for each combination of action 
direction (same or different) and actor roles (same or different), i.e., the orange Action Category bars in A 
split by the other factors. Only significant differences between action category decoding are indicated. Action 
category representations were largely invariant to the systematically manipulated properties of the video 
stimuli in cross-format ROIs, while in EVC, action category decoding was significantly better when action 
direction was the same vs. different. † p < 0.055, uncorrected; * p < 0.05; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons across the nine ROIs. Error bars represent SEMs. 
3.6. Representational Similarity Analysis 
Although recognizing actions as distinct from one another is a crucial first step 
towards action understanding, reasoning and communicating about actions requires 
more graded appreciation of similarities and differences between action categories. For 
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example, two people may readily distinguish slapping from shoving, corresponding to 
successful action recognition for each individual. But if two people’s representational 
spaces further indicate that slapping is very similar to shoving, mutual understanding 
and communication about these actions will be facilitated. To determine the extent to 
which representational spaces for action categories were consistent across individuals, 
we calculated the Spearman correlation between off-diagonal values of representational 
dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) for each subject to every other subject, separately for each 
cross-format ROI and comparison type (image format, video format, and cross-format). 
The mean inter-subject correlation is the average consistency in representational spaces 
across individuals, where chance is zero. 
For the image format comparisons, no ROI showed significant consistency in 
representational space across subjects (pcorrected range 0.07 to 0.49), although four of the 
eight showed consistency uncorrected for multiple comparisons (left and right VOTC, 
right LOTC, and right IPL, puncorrected < 0.05; other puncorrected values > 0.10). In contrast, 
for the video format, six of eight ROIs showed consistency across subjects (left premotor, 
right VOTC, left and right LOTC, and left and right IPL, pcorrected values < 0.05, puncorrected 
values < 0.005; other pcorrected values > 0.18, puncorrected values > 0.09). Similar findings to 
the video format were obtained for cross-format consistency: the same six ROIs showed 
consistency across subjects (pcorrected values < 0.03, puncorrected values < 0.009; other 
pcorrected values > 0.82, puncorrected values > 0.41). (Inter-subject correlation values are 
depicted in Figure 3.4A; see Figure 3.4B for a visualization of the clustering of action 
categories across regions.) 
It is at first glance puzzling that the cross-format consistency was reliable in most 
regions, despite the lower image format consistency. One account of these contrasting 
results appeals to the difference in reliability of the “action category signal” between the 
image and video formats, which should be greater for the video format (as indicated by 
the higher norming label agreement in this format). For cross-format consistency, the 
robust video format action category signal may “pull out” the weaker image format 
signal, even when the comparison is made across subjects. The plausibility of this 
account was confirmed by simulations. We generated sets of action category signals with 
different levels of signal-to-noise (SNR), and compared the resulting inter-subject 
consistencies. Specifically, we generated one “true” activity pattern for each of eight 
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action categories made up of 100 voxel responses randomly drawn from a Gaussian 
distribution N(0,1). Varying degrees of noise were added to these “true” underlying 
action category patterns, separately for 8 runs (4 for each visual format) for each of 15 
simulated subjects. This noise was systematically varied for each format by choosing 
standard deviations from the set (0.01, 0.10, 0.50, 1, 3), separately for the video and 
image formats (i.e., the video format standard deviation might be 0.10 while the image 
format standard deviation might be 3). The same RSA as described above was then 
conducted using these simulated activity patterns. These simulations revealed that 
comparisons of RDMs built from two sets of low-SNR action category patterns 
(equivalent to the image-format comparison, in this account) show a much less 
consistent relationship than comparisons of RDMs built from one high- and one low-
SNR set of action category patterns (the cross-format comparison, in this account). 
Together, these analyses suggest that most regions we have identified contain a 
representational space that generalizes from person to person, even when this space is 
built from two different visual formats. 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
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Figure 3.4 
Cross-subject Representational Similarity Analysis. RDMs (representational dissimilarity matrices) for each 
subject were constructed from the multivoxel patterns for each action category and were compared across 
subjects. A, Mean inter-subject RDM correlation across all pairwise comparisons of the 15 subjects, 
separately for the image RDMs, video RDMs, and cross-format RDMs. Representational spaces for action 
categories were consistent across both subjects and formats in bilateral LOTC, bilateral IPL, right VOTC, and 
left premotor. † p < 0.05, uncorrected; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, corrected for multiple 
comparisons across the eight ROIs (separately for each comparison type). Permutation tests were used to 
determine significance, based on a null distribution of the correlation statistic generated from 10,000 
random permutations in which action category labels were shuffled before calculation of the RDM 
correlations. P values are the proportion of permutation correlation statistics that were greater than the true 
statistic. Error bars here indicate the spread of the null distribution (95% of the null distribution width), 
centered at the mean inter-subject RDM correlation value. B, Dendrograms depicting the hierarchical 
clustering of action categories in each cross-format ROI that showed significant cross-format and cross-
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subject consistency, based on mean cross-format RDMs across subjects. Neural dissimilarity is displayed in 
Pearson correlation distance (1 - r). Distances between clusters were computed using the Matlab linkage 
function with the average distance algorithm. 
3.7. Action category decoding in functionally selective regions 
Although we focus above on regions identified in a hypothesis-free searchlight 
analysis, there are several well-studied functional regions (fROIs) in or near to 
occipitotemporal cortex that one might postulate a priori should have a role in action 
perception. These include motion-selective hMT+, body-selective EBA and FBA, object-
selective LO and pFs, and biological motion-selective pSTS (Grill-Spector & Weiner, 
2014; E. D. Grossman & Blake, 2002; Kanwisher, 2010; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; 
Peelen, Wiggett, & Downing, 2006; Tootell et al., 1995). Additionally, a region in LOTC 
just anterior to hMT+, the left posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG), has been found 
to respond to linguistic descriptions of actions (Bedny et al., 2008; Bedny, Caramazza, 
Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2012; Bedny et al., 2014; Peelen, Romagno, & Caramazza, 2012) 
and to respond in action tasks involving both words and static images (C. Watson, 
Cardillo, Ianni, & Chatterjee, 2013). To test the possibility that some of these regions 
might support abstract action representations, we performed the cross-format decoding 
analysis in these fROIs (see also Jason P. Gallivan, Chapman, Mclean, Flanagan, & 
Culham, 2013; Jason P Gallivan & Culham, 2015). As a control, we also examined other 
fROIs that we did not expect to be involved in abstract action category representations 
(Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher, 2010; face- and scene-selective regions, and 
early visual cortex; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). 
The only fROIs tested in which significant cross-format decoding was found were 
EBA, LO, and hMT+ (t(14) values > 5.20, pcorrected values < 0.002, puncorrected values < 0.001; 
Figure 3.5A and 3.5B). We did not find evidence for reliable cross-format decoding in 
other regions, though FBA, pFs, and PPA showed cross-format decoding at an 
uncorrected level (t values of 2.98, 2.78, and 3.02, pcorrected values < 0.13, puncorrected values 
< 0.02; all other t values < 2.13, pcorrected values > 0.41, puncorrected values > 0.052). 
Notably, we did not find clear evidence for cross-format action category decoding in two 
regions known to code for action-relevant stimuli: the biological motion-selective right 
pSTS (t(10) = 1.92, pcorrected = 0.59, puncorrected = 0.08) and the verb-selective left pMTG (t(10) 
= 1.66, pcorrected = 0.59, puncorrected = 0.13). Taken together, these results suggest that the 
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EBA, LO, and hMT+ are not only involved in representing bodies, objects, and motion, 
but also contribute to analysis of visual action scenes at an abstract level. (For a 
qualitative sense of the spatial relationship of fROIs and cross-format searchlight 
decoding, see Figure 3.5C.) 
Besides the cross-format results in EBA, hMT+, and LO, several fROIs were sensitive 
to the action category information depicted within only the video format or image format 
(Figure 3.5A and 3.5B). However, the fact that these fROIs did not demonstrate cross-
format decoding suggests that their role in representing actions at an abstract level is 
limited. Additionally, the absence of within-image format decoding in early visual cortex 
suggests that we adequately varied low-level image properties within action category. 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
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Figure 3.5 
Action category discrimination indices for functionally defined regions (fROIs), for each comparison type 
(within-image format, within-video format, and cross-format). The only fROIs tested in which significant 
cross-format decoding was found were EBA, LO, and hMT+. A, Functional regions predicted to be sensitive 
to action category across format. B, Functional regions predicted to show minimal sensitivity to action 
category across format. Listed below each fROI is the localizer contrast used to define the region (e.g., bodies 
> objects). † p < 0.05, uncorrected; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons 
across the 14 fROIs (separately for each comparison type). Error bars represent SEMs. C, Visualization of the 
locations of fROIs relative to brain regions in which cross-format action category decoding was found. Cross-
decoding searchlight map is identical to that in Figure 3.2A (i.e., corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 
0.05). Outlines of fROIs were created by transforming individual subjects’ fROIs to standard space and 
computing a group t statistic. Group fROIs were thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) except for the 
following fROIs, for which lower thresholds were needed for visualization: Left OPA, Right OFA, and pMTG-
verb (p < 0.01); Left EBA (p < 0.05); and Left ant. FFA, Right FBA, and Right post. FFA (p < 0.33). RSC is 
not shown because no significant cross-decoding appeared on medial surfaces. Abbreviations: ant., anterior; 
EBA, extrastriate body area; EVC, early visual cortex; FBA, fusiform body area; FFA, fusiform face area 
(aFFA and pFFA: anterior and posterior FFA, respectively); hMT+, human middle temporal complex; LO, 
lateral occipital; OPA, occipital place area; pFs, posterior fusiform; PL, point-light; pMTG-verb, verb-
selective posterior middle temporal gyrus (left only); post., posterior; PPA, parahippocampal place area; 
pSTS-bio, biological motion-selective posterior superior temporal sulcus (right only); (R), right; RSC, 
retrosplenial complex; scramb., scrambled. 
4. Discussion 
The goal of this study was to identify brain regions that mediate visual recognition of 
actions. We posited that these regions should display three key properties. First, they 
should support representations that discriminate between action categories, but are at 
least partially invariant to incidental features such as actor role, scene background, or 
viewpoint. Second, these action representations should be elicitable by both dynamic and 
static perceptual input. Third, these regions should not only discriminate hand-object 
interactions, but whole-body interactions with different effectors. By utilizing cross-
format decoding methods, we identified several regions with these properties: bilateral 
OTC (lateral and ventral), bilateral IPL, left premotor cortex, and left mFG. The subset of 
these regions previously identified as the AON (LOTC, IPL, and left premotor; Caspers et 
al., 2010; Kilner, 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Urgesi et al., 2014) also exhibited 
consistency in representational space across subjects, a property that can facilitate a 
common understanding of actions among individuals. 
Our findings add to the growing evidence that LOTC is involved in the coding of 
action categories (Oosterhof et al., 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Gallivan et al., 2013b; Watson et 
al., 2013; Gallivan and Culham, 2015; Tarhan et al., 2015; Tucciarelli et al., 2015; Wurm 
and Lingnau, 2015; Wurm et al., 2015; for review, see Lingnau and Downing, 2015). In 
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particular, our analyses of functional ROIs indicated that areas in LOTC selective for 
bodies, objects, and motion are also involved in visual action recognition from varied 
perceptual input: cross-format action category decoding was observed in EBA, LO, and 
hMT+ (see above, Action category decoding in functionally selective regions; Downing et 
al., 2001; S Ferri, Kolster, Jastorff, & Orban, 2013; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; for 
review, see Lingnau & Downing, 2015; Peelen et al., 2006; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 
2013). In contrast, we failed to observe cross-format decoding in several functionally 
defined regions known to be responsive to action-relevant stimuli: verb-selective left 
pMTG (Bedny et al., 2008, 2012, 2014; Peelen et al., 2012; C. Watson et al., 2013) and 
the biological motion-selective region of pSTS (Deen, Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 
2015; Gao, Scholl, & McCarthy, 2012; E. D. Grossman & Blake, 2002; Peuskens, Vanrie, 
Verfaillie, & Orban, 2005; pSTS-bio; Vaina et al., 2001). Although this latter set of null 
results should be interpreted with caution, it suggests that these regions might be 
involved in processing the lexical semantics of actions (pMTG-verb) or the motion of 
animate entities (pSTS-bio) rather than being involved in recognition of visual action 
categories per se. 
Our results also accord with work suggesting that IPL is involved in abstract coding 
of actions. IPL has been implicated in the representation of dynamic upper-limb actions 
(Abdollahi, Jastorff, & Orban, 2013; e.g., Bach, Peelen, & Tipper, 2010; Cattaneo, 
Sandrini, & Schwarzbach, 2010; Stefania Ferri, Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2015) and tool-
related actions (Mahon et al., 2007; Peeters et al., 2009, 2013; Gallivan et al., 2011; 
Tarhan et al., 2015; for review, see Orban and Caruana, 2014; Gallivan and Culham, 
2015). Other work suggests that IPL, particularly in the left hemisphere, may represent 
the abstract causal outcomes or relationships between entities. For example, Oosterhof 
et al. (2012b) found cross-modal action-specific codes across execution and mental 
imagery in left IPL, but not in premotor cortex or LOTC. Left IPL exhibits adaptation 
when viewing reaching actions toward the same goal object, even when the hand follows 
a very different spatial trajectory (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006). Moreover, activation 
patterns in left IPL have been found to distinguish between motor acts (e.g. pushing, 
grasping) but generalize across acts performed with different body parts (Jastorff et al., 
2010a), and recent work from Leshinskaya and Caramazza (2015) suggests that a dorsal 
portion of left IPL represents common outcomes associated with different objects even 
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when those outcomes are defined at a highly abstract level (e.g., a wind chime for 
decorating a house and perfume for decorating oneself). In our study, the spatial extent 
of cross-decoding was greater in the left hemisphere than the right (Table 3.1 and Figure 
3.2). Taken together, previous work and the current study suggest a role for IPL 
(particularly on the left) in representation of actions at an abstract level. 
We also observed action decoding in premotor cortex. Like LOTC and IPL, premotor 
cortex has been consistently implicated in action observation (e.g., Buccino et al., 2004; 
Gazzola et al., 2007; Saygin, 2007; Etzel et al., 2008; Majdandžić et al., 2009; Ogawa 
and Inui, 2011 for a meta-analysis, see Caspers et al., 2010), a finding that has been 
taken to support motor theories of action understanding (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). In contrast, cognitive theories maintain that action 
understanding is achieved via higher-level, amodal representations (Caramazza et al., 
2014; e.g., Hickok, 2009). Since our study only examines action observation, not action 
execution, we cannot address the cross-modal (observe/execute) aspects of this debate 
(Caspers et al., 2010; Chong et al., 2008; Dinstein et al., 2008; Kilner et al., 2009; 
Oosterhof et al., 2012a, 2010; Tarhan et al., 2015). Nevertheless, we did find that along 
with LOTC and IPL, representations of observed actions in premotor cortex were 
invariant to incidental perceptual features and the dynamicity of visual input. Although 
this results might seem superficially at odds with Wurm and Lingnau’s (2015) finding 
that representations of open and close abstracted across the acted-upon object and the 
associated action kinematics in IPL and LOTC but not in premotor cortex, we believe 
that our result is not necessarily inconsistent. Whereas Wurm and Lingnau (2015) 
defined their actions by object state changes (open vs. close), we defined our actions by 
the physical manner of interaction (e.g., kick vs. massage). These components are 
logically dissociable (e.g., one can kick a door open or closed). Thus, AON regions may 
differ in which components of actions they represent, with premotor coding for the 
physical manner of action but not state-change, and LOTC and IPL coding for both. In 
any case, our results support the idea that there is abstraction across some features of 
perceptual input in all AON regions, including premotor cortex. 
An open question is how the AON can extract common action codes from both static 
and dynamic displays. Given that in naturalistic action observation, all body parts of 
actors are generally visible, simple presence/absence of specific effectors in the visual 
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field cannot be sufficient for recognition. Instead, we hypothesize that the spatial 
configuration of entities (actor/effector and acted-upon entity) is crucial for determining 
the action category, and that parts of the AON process this configural information. Such 
information would be observable in both images and videos. Supporting this view, there 
is behavioral and neuroimaging evidence that the visual system codes the elements of 
actions as a perceptual unit, possibly including information about their spatial 
configuration, rather than simply coding them as separate, distinct items. First, briefly 
observed snapshots of actions are sufficient for recognition, but only when the 
configuration of scene entities is consistent with the given action (Dobel, Gumnior, Bölte, 
& Zwitserlood, 2007; Hafri et al., 2013). Second, multivoxel patterns in LOTC elicited by 
images of interacting humans and objects are not linearly decodable from the patterns 
elicited by the same actors and objects shown in isolation, yet such linear decoding is 
successful if the actor and objects are superimposed in a non-interacting manner 
(Baldassano, Beck, & Fei-Fei, 2016). This suggests that neural representations of human-
object interactions (at least in LOTC) may incorporate configuration information that 
makes them more than the sum of their visual parts.  
Another possible explanation for common static/dynamic action codes, not mutually 
exclusive to the above, is that through experience, static snapshots of actions become 
associated with full action sequences and thus elicit those sequences (Giese & Poggio, 
2003; Jastorff, Kourtzi, & Giese, 2009; Singer & Sheinberg, 2010; Vangeneugden et al., 
2011). This association may account for the implicit/implied motion effects observed in 
both behavioral and neuroimaging studies (Freyd, 1983; Gervais et al., 2010; Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2000; Senior et al., 2000; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1993; Winawer, Huk, & 
Boroditsky, 2008, 2010), and may be what allows the action recognition system to be 
robust to missing or ambiguous perceptual input. Supporting this idea, behavioral work 
has shown that causal representations are engaged for both simple and naturalistic 
launching events despite temporary occlusion or absence of the causal moment from the 
stimulus display (Strickland & Keil, 2011; Yeul Bae & Flombaum, 2011).  
To summarize, we uncovered abstract neural codes for action categories in bilateral 
OTC and IPL, left premotor cortex, and left mFG, including regions of LOTC that have 
been previously implicated in body-, object-, and motion- processing. These codes were 
invariant to differences in actors, objects, scene context, or viewpoint, and could be 
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evoked by both dynamic and static stimuli. Moreover, most of these regions showed 
consistent representational spaces across subjects and formats, which is a feature of an 
action recognition system that can facilitate a common understanding of actions across 
individuals. Taken together, our findings suggest that these regions mediate abstract 
representations of actions that may provide a link between visual systems that support 
perceptual recognition of actions and conceptual systems that support flexible, complex 
thought about physically interacting entities. 
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IV. EVENT-STRUCTURE SEMANTICS PREDICT CORTICAL 
RESPONSES TO NATURALISTIC LANGUAGE 
1. Introduction 
How the brain supports human understanding of language is a core goal of the 
neurobiological study of semantics. To answer this question, researchers must develop 
theories of how semantic information may be organized and represented, build models 
implementing these theories, and identify such representations in the brain by 
predicting brain activity elicited by semantic content. A wealth of previous work has 
identified areas of the brain that are candidates for semantic representation in frontal, 
parietal and temporal cortex, as these areas show responses selective for high-level 
language processing (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Fedorenko et al., 2016; 
Kocagoncu, Clarke, Devereux, & Tyler, 2017). Additionally, recently researchers have 
also made remarkable progress towards testing several classes of semantic models in the 
brain, suggesting that how these models represent the meanings of words may reflect or 
approximate how semantic information is represented in the human brain. These 
include “distributional semantic” (DS) models that characterize word meanings as 
vectors embedded in a low-dimensional space based on co-occurrence statistics (Fyshe, 
Talukdar, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2014; Huth et al., 2016; Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 
2013; Wehbe et al., 2014), as well as models that characterize word meanings as a 
collection of sensorimotor and cognitive attributes (Anderson et al., 2017, 2018; Binder 
et al., 2016). However, thus far approaches in modeling brain responses to natural 
language have made little contact with theories in linguistics and lexical semantics. 
Without doing so, there is risk that a full account of human semantic organization will 
not be fully understood. 
Lexical semantic theories address the precise ways that the structure of a linguistic 
utterance – how and where its parts go together – predicts its meaning, also known as 
semantic compositionality (Gleitman, 1990; Goldberg, 1999; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 
2005; Pinker, 1989; Williams, 2015). The problems they address are crucial for a full, 
interpretable understanding of human semantic organization: After all, we do not have 
single isolated thoughts, such as drop, Jimmy, ice cream cone. We know that it is Jimmy 
who dropped his cone (not the other way around), and this is why he is so sad – and we 
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can understand as such if recounted to us by an upset Jimmy. Although there has been 
much work attempting to identify anatomical loci of linguistic and combinatorial 
operations in their own right, e.g. syntactic processing (Blank, Balewski, Mahowald, & 
Fedorenko, 2016; J. Brennan et al., 2012; Fedorenko, Nieto-castañón, & Kanwisher, 
2013), there has been minimal work using these theories to predict how the brain 
responds to semantic information in a wide range of naturally occurring sentences. 
In the current study, we test the hypothesis that the human linguistic system 
constructs a semantic representation of a verb (in part) by the semantic structure 
referred to by that verb.  Semantic structure specifies the way that entities relate to each 
other and change in space and time (Jackendoff, 1990; Pinker, 1989). The semantic 
structure of Jimmy dropped ice cream can loosely be described as an event in which an 
Agent (Jimmy) caused the motion of a Theme (the ice cream), where the elements of this 
event’s semantic structure are underlined. If event structure is a central component of 
how we represent the meaning of verbs, then event structure should be measurable in 
the brain while participants listen to naturalistic speech. 
To test this hypothesis, we leverage previous observations in the literature that there 
is a strong correspondence between semantic structure and linguistic structure.11 
Linguistic structure or the syntactic frame of a verb specifies where nouns, prepositions, 
and other elements are situated with respect to the verb: in Jimmy dropped ice cream, 
one noun phrase (Jimmy) appears before the verb and one (ice cream) after. We test 
several predictions, detailed below, of what we call the Semantic Structure Consistency 
Hypothesis: that the semantic structure of an event referred to by a verb constrains the 
set of syntactic frames that a verb can (and cannot) appear in (Gleitman, 1990; Kipper, 
Korhonen, Ryant, & Palmer, 2008; Levin, 1993; Pinker, 1989). For example, in the 
sentences Jimmy cried, Jimmy pounded the table, The father gave Jimmy another ice 
cream, the number of noun phrases before/after the verb (underlined) is dictated by the 
nature of the events referred to: crying requires one entity, pounding two, and giving 
three. Furthermore, the elements that correspond between linguistic and semantic 
structure appear to generalize over a remarkably wide range of content differences 
                                                        
 
11 Although other grammatical categories like nouns can refer to events (e.g. party) and even in some cases 
have semantic structure of their own (e.g., destruction of the city), verbs highlight the linguistic structure / 
semantic structure correspondence. 
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(Fisher et al., 1991; Jackendoff, 1990; Talmy, 2000). For example, although The sun 
melted the ice cream and The Death Star vaporized the planet vary widely in content, 
they both involve a common (and general) meaning: a caused change of state. The 
implication of the semantic structure consistency hypothesis is that verbs that share the 
same set of syntactic frames (such as melt and vaporize) are semantically identical, in 
terms of their event structure.12  
To achieve the goal of identifying event structure representations in the brain, we 
implement several models based on lexical semantic theory. If the Semantic Structure 
Consistency hypothesis is correct, it predicts that (1) a model based on semantic 
structure should explain a significant portion of fMRI response variance to verbs 
embedded in natural language; (2) most of the response variance predicted by a 
semantic structure model should also be predicted by a model based on sets of syntactic 
frames; and (3) the response variance explained by the semantic structure model should 
not be fully explained by a simpler model that represents the single syntactic frame in 
which a verb is embedded in any given context. The latter two predictions hold for the 
following reason: any one syntactic frame on its own generally does not reveal 
commonalities of semantic structure, because frames can be shared by a remarkably 
wide set of verbs (Fisher et al., 1991; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005). For example, the 
transitive frame (noun-verb-noun) is very common; the verb drop can take it, as in 
Jimmy dropped the ice cream, but so can the verb recount, as in Jimmy recounted his 
sad story. But the sets of frames reveal systematic differences: Jimmy dropped that he 
was sad (strange/ungrammatical) vs. Jimmy recounted that he was sad (perfectly fine, 
though still tragic). This difference turns out to correspond to the semantic structure 
difference of Cause and Motion (drop) vs. Cause and Information Transfer (recount). 
(See Figure 4.3 in Methods and Results for details of these models.) 
A secondary goal of this study is to bridge the gap between lexical semantic theory 
and current leading models of semantics by investigating the extent to which they predict 
                                                        
 
12 To be clear, although there is hypothesized to be a correspondence between linguistic and semantic 
structure, they are not considered identical. Linguistic structure has its own set of operations and 
transformations (Jackendoff, 2002). Although research into semantic structure is relatively new compared to 
that of linguistic structure, the larger goal of research in semantics is to find elements that link the semantics 
specified by language with semantics in non-linguistic human cognition, such as reasoning, memory, or high-
level vision. 
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similar variance in brain response. A schematic of the three semantic models 
investigated is depicted in Figure 4.1, with the Semantic Structure model depicted in 
Figure 4.1A. The first of these is an implementation of the distributional semantics 
approach called word2vec, depicted in Figure 4.1B (Mandera, Keuleers, & Brysbaert, 
2017; Mikolov et al., 2013). The underlying assumption of such models is that the 
semantic content of a word can be inferred “from the company it keeps” (from words it 
co-occurs with), regardless of type (e.g., noun, verb, etc.). Ice cream and cone (two 
nouns) are related because these words often occur nearby the same words (e.g. vanilla), 
just as ice cream and eat (noun, verb) may too. By reducing the dimensionality of such 
co-occurrence information gleaned from billions of words of text, words become 
embedded in a dense, low-dimensional space in which neighbors in the space are 
assumed to be semantic neighbors. The second model comes from Binder and colleagues 
(Binder et al., 2016) and is based on the assumption that word meanings are a collection 
of sensorimotor and cognitive attributes, such as vision, audition, and cognition. A 
schematic of this model is depicted in Figure 4.1C. This model has been implemented via 
average human ratings of words along the relevant dimensions. Both models have been 
remarkably successful at predicting fMRI responses to naturalistic language (Anderson 
et al., 2017, 2018; de Heer, Huth, Griffiths, Gallant, & Theunissen, 2017; Huth et al., 
2016; Jain & Huth, 2018). Nevertheless, it is unknown how well these models predict 
responses to different types (verbs vs. nouns vs. others). Indeed, for verbs in particular, 
distributional semantic models generally perform worse on evaluation benchmarks in 
NLP (e.g. analogy tasks), as compared to nouns and adjectives (Gerz, Vulić, Hill, 
Reichart, & Korhonen, 2016). Likewise, the dataset of Binder and colleagues is composed 
principally of nouns or adjectives (out of 535 words, only 62 are verbs), so verb-specific 
semantics are at best only partially addressed thus far in this model. Testing the 
word2vec and Binder models will answer the extent to which these other model types 
implicitly predict similar information as semantic structure does, despite their different 
representational format and assumptions. 
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Figure 4.1 
Schematic of each semantic model’s representation for two example verbs: drop as in Jimmy dropped his ice 
cream, and run as in Jimmy ran away. A. The Semantic Structure model represents each verb with a set of 
semantic structure features such as Cause, Motion, and Path, as well as a set of event role features such as 
Agent, Theme, and Location. The full set of features used in this (and the other lexical semantic models 
used) can be found in Supplementary methods. B. The word2vec model represents each word as a 
continuous vector in a low-dimensional space in which neighbors in the space share similar linguistic 
contexts. Verbs are embedded in the same space as nouns, adjectives, and other grammatical types. Only 
three dimensions are shown here, but the dimensionality of the model used here is 300. C. The 
sensorimotor/cognitive model of Binder and colleagues (2016) represents each word as embedded in a 
continuous space of sensorimotor and cognitive attributes, such as vision, audition, and cognition. In the 
figure, the darkness of the feature image/text indicates the magnitude of that feature for the displayed word. 
As in the word2vec model, verbs are embedded in the same space as nouns and adjectives. Only eight 
features are shown here, but the full set of 23 features we used can be found in Supplementary Methods (we 
used a reduced set of all 65 features from the original Binder model). 
The core of our approach to modeling fMRI responses to natural language is the 
construction and evaluation of voxelwise encoding models. Encoding models were first 
implemented in fMRI to study low- and high-level vision (Kay et al., 2008; Naselaris et 
al., 2009; Nishimoto et al., 2011) and were then extended to test models of semantics in 
natural language (Huth et al., 2016). Using this approach allows us to place all models 
“on the same footing”. To objectively compare models, it is not sufficient to show that 
model features can be decoded in a given region, which can be possible with a high 
degree of accuracy even if a model explains very little variance in the fMRI response 
compared to others (Naselaris & Kay, 2015). Instead, we wish to directly compare how 
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much fMRI response variance each model explains, and the degree to which the models 
capture the same variance. We focus in particular on a set of language-selective regions 
across frontal and temporal cortex. These regions are of primary interest given they have 
been strongly implicated in supporting the human capacity for language (J. Brennan et 
al., 2012; J. R. Brennan, Stabler, Van Wagenen, Luh, & Hale, 2016; Fedorenko, Hsieh, 
Nieto-Castañón, Whitfield-Gabrieli, & Kanwisher, 2010; Hickok & Poeppel, 2007). 
To anticipate our results, we find significant prediction accuracy in the fMRI 
response to verbs in naturally occurring sentences for all lexical-semantic theoretical 
models, relating to both syntactic and semantic information. These effects were present 
throughout language-selective cortex, with the strongest results in posterior temporal 
cortex, consistent with prior reports of this region’s responsivity to verb and event 
information (Bedny et al., 2008; Hafri et al., 2017; Lingnau & Downing, 2015; Peelen et 
al., 2012). A comparison across these models confirmed the above predictions of the 
Semantic Structure Consistency Hypothesis, providing support for the semantic 
structure approach to meaning in the brain. Additionally, we find that a majority of fMRI 
response variance predicted by the semantic structure model was shared with the other 
semantic models (word2vec and Binder). This suggests that most neural information 
about semantic structure is implicit in the other model representations. 
2. Methods and Results 
The main goal of the study was to examine the degree to which semantic structure 
predicts responses to natural language. We also sought to determine the information 
shared between the semantic structure approach and other leading approaches to 
semantics in the brain: word2vec (a distributional semantic model) and Binder (the 
sensorimotor/cognitive model of Binder and colleagues). To these ends, we recorded 
fMRI responses as participants listened to three hours of audiobook excerpts. We then fit 
encoding models in an estimation set and tested how well each predicted fMRI responses 
in held-out validation data. We present our results in several sections. First, we describe 
in detail the feature spaces used to implement the models based on lexical semantics 
(verb class, semantic structure, and syntactic frame models). Second, we directly 
compare the lexical semantic models to one another, testing the predictions of semantic 
structure theory. Third, we describe the other two leading models of semantics 
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(word2vec and Binder) and compare the representational similarity of model feature 
spaces to determine potential for overlap in model predictions. Finally, we directly 
compare the variance explained by the semantic models of interest by conducting a 
variance partitioning analysis. An overview of the approach and procedures used appears 
in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 
Overview of encoding model approach. The blue boxes represent steps involving model estimation data and 
features, the yellow boxes represent steps validation data and features, and the green boxes represent steps 
involving both estimation and validation data and/or features. A. The model estimation stimuli were 9 
audiobook excerpts from different genres, each presented in a different scan run. B. Six subjects listened to 
these audiobooks as they were scanned with fMRI. C. The features of the stimuli were computed for each 
verb present in the datasets, separately for each model. Features were downsampled to the fMRI acquisition 
rate (2 sec per TR) and included at 4 FIR delays (2, 4, 6, and 8 seconds). D. Then for model fitting, the best 
ridge parameter was computed per voxel (for each model), by selecting the ridge parameter that yielded the 
highest prediction accuracy in the estimation set (via leave-one-run-out cross-validation). E. The full 
estimation set was then used to estimate the beta weights for each feature (separately for each model, and 
voxel). F. The model validation set consisted of 5 audiobook excerpts, each repeated once. G. The model 
validation data were the fMRI responses recorded as the same subjects listened to these audiobooks, 
averaged over the repeat scan runs. H. The features from the validation set (step C) and the estimated beta 
weights from step E were used to compute predicted voxel responses to the validation stimulus set. I. To 
assess model performance, the Pearson correlation between the predicted (step H) and actual (step G) fMRI 
responses were calculated (per voxel, per model). J. In subsequent analyses, to assess shared and unique 
variance attributable to each model, joint models were also fit, and variance partitioning analyses were 
conducted. 
2.1. Description of models based on lexical semantics 
To test the hypothesis that language-sensitive cortical areas encode semantic 
structure information present in language, we first operationalize different aspects of 
94 
 
 
linguistic and semantic structure in a set of models. To instantiate each model, we must 
construct feature spaces that correspond to how each model is hypothesized to represent 
information about linguistic stimuli. To construct these feature spaces, we utilize a 
database called VerbNet built by experts in linguistics (Kipper et al., 2008; Schuler, 
2005). VerbNet is a database that aims to implement the hypothesis of semantic 
structure consistency discussed above: that there is a high correlation between the sets of 
syntactic frames a verb takes and its semantic structure. To this end, verbs in VerbNet 
are first grouped into Verb Classes based on the sets of frames each verb does or does not 
canonically take (Levin, 1993). For example, it is acceptable to say Jimmy hit his father 
and Jimmy broke his ice cream cone and The cone broke. It is also acceptable to say 
Jimmy hit his father, but not *Jimmy hit. Thus, break and hit are grouped into different 
verb classes. 
Each verb class in turn is fully described by a set of possible syntactic frames and 
corresponding semantic structure elements. Examples of syntactic frames might be 
Noun Phrase + Verb + Noun Phrase (NP V NP, or transitive), Noun Phrase + Verb (NP 
V, or intransitive), and Noun Phrase + Verb + Prepositional Phase (NP V PP). Examples 
of semantic elements are Boolean values such as Cause, Motion, and Contact, as well as 
event roles such as Agent and Patient. The VerbNet database allows us, for a given verb 
and its associated class and frame, to automatically extract feature values at these 
different layers. Figure 4.3 depicts how verbs and their features are assigned in VerbNet, 
described in more detail below. 
To assign features to each verb in our audiobook stimulus set requires first 
identifying its specific Class and Frame based on its usage in context. Some verbs (e.g. 
run) have multiple senses, including a manner of motion (e.g. Jimmy is running on a 
track) and functioning (e.g. the dishwasher is running). These senses roughly 
correspond to different Classes. Sentential context matters even for verbs within the 
same class, as they can be instantiated in different syntactic frames (e.g. Jimmy is 
running vs. Jimmy is running away from his father). Since automated methods of 
identifying this information are not yet reliable (Abend, Reichart, & Rappoport, 2008; L. 
Chen & Eugenio, 2010; Windisch-Brown, Dligach, & Palmer, 2011), labeling each verb 
instance’s particular Class and Frame was performed manually by the first author (A.H.). 
After automatic part-of-speech tagging, every verb that appeared in the VerbNet 
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database was manually labeled with Class and Frame. The semantic structure 
information (e.g., Cause, Motion, Contact) was not visible during the labeling so could 
not be used to bias the annotation process. (Verb-like elements such as the copula (be), 
modals (e.g. should, must), and auxiliary verbs (do, have, will) were excluded. Automatic 
part-of-speech tagging was verified and errors were corrected before annotation.) 
 
Figure 4.3 
Table illustrating how different verbs in sentential contexts are coded in each of the models based on lexical 
semantic theory. In the example sentences, the verb of interest is bolded, and each segment of underlined 
text indicate a phrase (e.g., the ice cream in example 1 is a Noun Phrase). Each verb or phrase in the example 
sentence corresponds to a syntactic element in the Frame column. In example 4, that he was sad is a 
sentence complement (subordinate clause) of the verb recount; the verb of the sentence complement is not 
coded here. Notice several properties of the feature coding. First, the Verb Class and Average Frame models 
are constant for each verb no matter the specific frame the verb is embedded in. In contrast, both the Single 
Frame and Semantic Structure model coding of each verb example vary slightly depending on sentential 
context. Example 2 (with the verb drop) has similar coding to example 1 but it has no NP post-verb feature in 
the Single Frame model, and no Agent or Cause features in the Semantic Structure model. Such differences 
can also be observed in examples 3 and 4, and 5-7. Also note that the presence of the same syntactic frame 
element (e.g. PP post-verb) corresponds to different features in the Semantic Structure model, depending on 
the Verb Class: in example 4, it corresponds with Recipient, while in example 7, it corresponds with 
Location. Notice also that different verbs can have identical class, frame, and semantic structure features, as 
in examples 5 and 6 (run and walk): as far as these models are concerned, these examples have identical 
representations. Finally, notice that despite some semantic structure features being present or absent 
depending on the sentential context, some remain as “core” semantic structure features for that class. For 
example, for examples 1 and 2, as well as 5-7, it is Motion; for examples 3 and 4, it is Transfer_Information. 
Together these examples illustrate that there is a strong relationship between Average Frames and Semantic 
Structure, although the mapping between Syntactic Frame features and Semantic Predicate features is 
many-to-many. Abbreviations: NP, Noun Phrase; PP, Prepositional Phrase; V, verb; S, sentence 
complement. 
The first linguistic model is a Verb Class model. This model instantiates the 
groupings of verbs based on their shared sets of syntactic frames, but without additional 
information about the precise content of those syntactic frames or the associated 
semantic structure predicates. In other words, verbs that are grouped into the same class 
Verb Class Single Frame Average Frame Semantic Structure
Model Features
Example 
Number
Verb
(in sentence)
Frame
roll-
51.3.1
say-
37.7
run-
51.3.2
NP
pre-V
NP(1)
post-V
NP(2)
post-V
PP
post-V
S
post-V
NP
pre-V
NP(1)
post-V
NP(2)
post-V
PP
post-V
S
post-V
Agent Theme Topic
Recip-
ient
Loca-
tion
Cause Motion
Trans-
fer Info
1 Jimmy dropped the ice cream. NP V NP 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
2 The ice cream dropped. NP V 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
…
3 Jimmy recounted the story. NP V NP 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
4
Jimmy recounted to his friend 
that he was sad.
NP V PP S 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
…
5 Jimmy ran. NP V 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
6 Jimmy walked. NP V 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
7 Jimmy walked to the store. NP V PP 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1
0
F
e
a
tu
re
 v
a
lu
e
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based on their shared frames, such as the verbs run, walk, limp, will each have an 
identical Class feature assigned (in VerbNet, run-51.3.2). However, information about 
their frames (e.g. NP V, NP V PP) and semantic predicates (Motion) – information that 
cuts across verb classes – are not explicit features in this model. Given the lack of latent 
structure between classes, this model is not expected to do as well as the other models 
below. Examples of Verb Class assignment appear in Figure 4.3. 
The second model is a Single Frame model. This model instantiates the surface 
syntactic frame of a verb as it appears in a particular sentential context.13 For example, in 
a sentence such as Jimmy dropped the ice cream, the frame coding is NP V NP. In 
contrast, in a sentence such as The ice cream dropped, the frame coding is NP V. 
Examples of feature assignment for this model appear in Figure 4.3. Note, as was 
delineated previously, that it is hypothesized that the set of syntactic frames a verb takes 
that corresponds to its underlying semantic structure, rather than any single instance. 
Thus, this model is hypothesized not to perform as well as a model based on the sets of 
syntactic frames a verb takes – the Average Frame model, described below.  
The third model is an Average Frame model, which is also a syntactic model. The 
features in this model are the average of the set of surface syntactic frames for a verb 
given its class. For example, at an instance of the verb drop, its class will be looked up, 
and an average over all frames for that class computed (in this case, NP V, NP VP NP, NP 
V PP, among others). Although in principle certain frames may be more important for 
the representation of a verb than others (and may be based on the frequency of such 
frames), here we make a simplifying assumption that they all receive equal weight. 
Examples of feature assignment for this model appear in Figure 4.3. 
The exact features in both syntactic models (Single and Average) were the syntactic 
elements in the frame, dependent on its position in relation to the verb and how many of 
that type appeared pre- vs. post-verb. This can be considered a proxy for its syntactic 
structure. In the case of NP V NP, the verb would get the features NP_pre-verb_1, 
                                                        
 
13 By surface syntax, we mean the “core elements” of a verb’s frame, apart from syntactic transformations 
(like the passive) and additional non-essential elements (i.e. adjuncts). For example, the surface structure of 
a frame (e.g. noun-verb-noun) may be transformed by syntactic operations: Jimmy dropped ice cream can be 
transformed to a passive expression, Ice cream was dropped by Jimmy. Additionally, there is a lot of 
information that can be included in an utterance that is non-essential to the interpretation of the main verb, 
e.g. the underlined text in Jimmy, who cries all the time, dropped his melting ice cream. 
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NP_post-verb_1; for NP V NP NP, it would get the same features plus NP_post-verb_2; 
NP V NP PP would get a PP_post-verb_1 feature. Implementing the model in this way 
captures any shared information across frames that could be due to the elements of the 
syntactic frame itself (for example, a PP post-verb may indicate a change of location 
across multiple verb classes). Otherwise, if we just use the full frame without 
decomposing it into elements (e.g. “NP V NP” could be considered Frame 1, “NP V NP 
PP” Frame 2, with no relation between them), this might fail to capture shared elements 
of meaning contributed by particular frame elements. See Figure 4.3 for examples of how 
feature assignment proceeds in these models. 
Finally, the fourth model is a Semantic Structure model. The experts who created the 
VerbNet database examined the sets of verbs in each class and determined from these 
the semantic structure elements for each, based on commonalities of meaning from 
previous lexical semantic literature. For example, verbs like melt or redden involve a 
change of State; verbs like hit and touch involve Contact. Note here that the elements at 
this layer will only be as good as the labels provided by the expert annotators; some 
elements (like Motion, State, or Contact) are more clearly identifiable and easily labeled 
than others (Fisher et al., 1991; Hartshorne, Bonial, & Palmer, 2014). Despite this 
drawback, we can still extract the elements at this layer. This model instantiates 
semantic structure in the following way. Based on the Class of a given verb in context, 
the semantic predicates for that class and frame are extracted. For example, in Jimmy 
dropped the ice cream, predicates Cause, Motion, and semantic roles Agent (the one 
acting) and Theme (the one undergoing change/motion) are extracted. In The ice cream 
dropped, only the Motion and Theme elements are explicit. As can be observed, the full 
set of semantic elements will vary depending on the frame, even within class; however, 
some elements will nearly always be present (such as Motion and Theme here). 
Examples of feature assignment for this model appear in Figure 4.3. 
Before continuing, it is worth briefly expounding on the relationship between 
syntactic frame elements and semantic structure elements: although related (Goldberg, 
1999), they are in a many-to-many relationship (i.e. they are not exact supersets or 
subsets of one another). First, the same frame elements can correspond to different 
semantic elements, depending on the verb class. For example, verbs that can take 
identical syntactic frames (e.g. NP V NP) such as Jimmy dropped the ice cream and 
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Jimmy recounted the story, will have a different set of semantic elements depending on 
their class: for drop, Cause, Motion, Agent, and Theme; for recount, Cause, 
Transfer_Information, Agent, and Topic. Likewise, different frame elements can 
correspond to the same semantic elements. For example, in Jimmy dropped the ice 
cream (NP V NP syntactic frame), the post-verb NP is the Theme; but in The ice cream 
dropped (NP V frame), the pre-verb NP is the Theme. Thus, although frame elements 
and their positions are correlated with semantic predicates (e.g., a Theme will most often 
be a pre- or post-verb NP, not a PP), they capture divergent sets of information. See 
Figure 4.3 for a visualization of this. 
2.2. Evaluation and comparison of the models based on lexical 
semantic theory 
After creation of the feature spaces, we used ridge regression to fit all models to the 
estimation data set (9 of the 14 audiobook scan runs), separately for each voxel. The best 
ridge parameter was selected per voxel per subject via leave-one-run-out cross-validation 
across scan runs. Subsequently, we used the fit models to predict the fMRI response in 
each voxel for the held-out validation set (5 audiobook runs). We then compared the 
predicted fMRI response to the actual fMRI response in each voxel (the 5 runs, averaged 
across 2 repetitions) by calculating the Pearson correlation (r) between the predicted and 
actual responses in the validation data. The mean correlation across voxels in each ROI 
for each model was the measure of interest. 
We focused our analyses on ROIs defined in an independent functional localizer 
contrasting intact spoken language with closely matched uninterpretable speech 
(Fedorenko et al., 2010; Scott, Gallée, & Fedorenko, 2016). This localizer identifies a set 
of language-selective regions in prefrontal, temporal, and parietal cortices: inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior frontal gyrus orbital (IFGOrb), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), 
anterior temporal (AntTemp), middle anterior temporal (MidAntTemp), middle 
posterior temporal (MidPostTemp), posterior temporal (PostTemp), and angular gyrus 
(AngG). We evaluated each model for its consistency with predictions made by lexical 
semantic theory, as described below. 
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Figure 4.4 
Prediction accuracy by ROI for the four models based on lexical semantic theory. Bars show the mean 
Pearson r value across subjects for each ROI. Brain maps below ROI labels indicate the parcels used to make 
subject-specific language-selective ROIs, based on selectivity from an independent functional localizer. Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean across subjects. The Average Frame model showed greater 
prediction accuracy than the Single Frame model in all ROIs. Both the Average Frame and Semantic 
Structure models showed greater prediction accuracy than the Verb Class model in all ROIs except AngG 
(and for Semantic Structure model, AntTemp and PostTemp as well). The Average Frame model showed 
greater prediction accuracy than the Semantic Structure model across ROIs. Abbreviations: inferior frontal 
gyrus orbital (IFGOrb), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior temporal 
(AntTemp), middle anterior temporal (MidAntTemp), middle posterior temporal (MidPostTemp), posterior 
temporal (PostTemp), and angular gyrus (AngG). 
Figure 4.4 shows average prediction accuracy across subjects, for each ROI and each 
model. All models make significantly accurate predictions in all ROIs (p’s < .05, 
confirmed by repeated-measures ANOVA with ROI as a factor, followed by post-hoc 
paired t-tests in each ROI), except AngG for both the Single Frame model (p = .11) and 
Average Frame model (marginal at p = .06). The middle anterior and posterior temporal 
cortex ROIs (MidAntTemp and MidPostTemp) showed especially strong predictions. 
This is expected, as this set of regions has previously been observed to show robust 
encoding of semantic information elicited by linguistic input (Bedny et al., 2008, 2014; 
Binder et al., 2009; Huth et al., 2016). These results thus far suggest that information 
related to lexical semantics is encoded in these regions. 
To understand the precise information content of these regions in relation to lexical 
semantics, we conducted several additional analyses. First, if the set of syntactic frames 
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is what is crucial for predicting semantic information elicited by verbs in the brain, then 
we should find that the Average Frame model performs better than the Single Frame 
model. This was indeed the case. In all ROIs, the Average Frame model showed higher 
prediction accuracy than the Single Frame model, nearly significant at the .05 level 
(repeated-measures ANOVA with ROI and Model Type as factors, main effect of Model 
Type: F(1,5) = 6.12, p = 0.056), as can be observed in Figure 4.4. This may be somewhat 
surprising, given that we might expect such language-sensitive regions to be sensitive to 
the particular syntactic context in which a verb is embedded a sentence (for evidence 
that these regions show differential responses to syntactic manipulations, see J. Brennan 
et al., 2012; J. R. Brennan et al., 2016). Instead, at least as can be observed in the current 
data, this result suggests that the set of frames permissible for a verb is key for predicting 
responses to verbs compared to a model based on the particular syntactic frame of a verb 
in context. 
Second, if the shared semantic or syntactic elements of verb classes is what is 
predictive of fMRI response, rather than the mere grouping per se, then the models with 
semantic and syntactic elements – the Semantic Structure and Average Frame models – 
should show higher prediction accuracy than a model based only on Verb Class 
assignments, which contains no information about shared elements across classes, 
whether linguistic or semantic. This result was confirmed. As can be observed in Figure 
4.4, the Average Frame model showed higher prediction accuracy than the Verb Class 
model, in the majority of ROIs (confirmed by a repeated-measures ANOVA, interaction 
of ROI and Model Type: F(7,35) = 7.35, p < .001). Post-hoc paired t-tests in each ROI 
showed that all ROIs showed such an effect (p’s < .05) except AngG (p = .62). Similar 
results were observed for the Semantic Structure model (interaction of ROI and Model 
Type: F(7,35) = 5.51, p < .001). Post-hoc paired t-tests in each ROI showed that the 
majority of ROIs showed such an effect (p’s < .05), except for AntTemp (p = .07), 
PostTemp (p = .10), and AngG (p = .25). Thus, the grouping of verbs into classes based 
on shared syntactic and semantic structure does not alone predict fMRI responses at the 
level of models incorporating the content (whether syntactic or semantic) of what 
membership in a class entails. 
The next question we sought to address is the relationship between syntactic frame 
models and semantic structure model. The predictions of the Semantic Structure 
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Consistency Hypothesis are that the sets of syntactic frames a verb takes together predict 
semantic structure of the verb, not just the single frame of the verb in context. In other 
words, despite the fact that the models traffic in qualitatively different feature types 
(elements of syntactic frames, e.g. NP, PP, vs. elements of syntactic structure, e.g., Agent, 
Theme, Cause), they should explain similar (or the same) variance. This is not a given; 
due to their different feature types, it is certainly possible that the two model types 
explain different variance in the fMRI response. Perhaps the frame models are actually 
explaining only syntactic information, while the semantic structure model is explaining 
semantic information, and thus they are explaining two different aspects of the fMRI 
response. 
To formalize whether the Frame and Semantic Structure models are explaining the 
same or different variance of the fMRI response, we conducted two variance partitioning 
analyses within each ROI. Variance partitioning allows one to determine whether sets of 
models predict unique or shared variance by attributing variance to each model 
according to whether a joint model leads to a gain in variance explained or not (de Heer 
et al., 2017; Lescroart & Gallant, 2018). The logic is, if one or both models explain 
independent variance in the fMRI response, then when their feature spaces are 
combined together in the joint model, this model should show a gain in explained 
variance. In contrast, if they explain the same variance, then the joint model should show 
no gain in variance explained. We performed a variance partitioning analysis for Single 
Frame and Semantic Structure models, as well as Average Frame and Semantic Structure 
models. 
The variance partitioning analyses revealed several insights. First, for both variance 
partitioning analyses (Single Frame with Semantic Structure, and Average Frame with 
Semantic Structure), a majority of the variance predicted by either frame model and the 
Semantic Structure model was shared, as can be observed in Figure 4.5. Second, and 
crucially, there was a tradeoff between unique variance for the Semantic Structure model 
and its shared variance with two frame models: when average frames were used instead 
of single frames, some of the unique variance attributed to the Semantic Structure model 
was “soaked up” by both the shared variance between the frame and semantic structure 
models, and the frame model itself. This was confirmed in a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the factors ROI, frame model type (Single vs. Average), and the particular variance 
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partition (Shared, Unique to frame model, or Unique to Semantic Structure model): the 
ANOVA revealed an interaction between the model type and variance partition (F(2,10) 
= 5.66, p = .02) with a marginal triple interaction with ROI (F(14,70) = 1.71, p = .074). 
Three post-hoc ANOVAs comparing the pairwise variance partitions (collapsing across 
ROIs) revealed that the differences were attributable to an increase in both the shared 
variance and unique variance of the frame model, along with reduced unique variance 
for the Semantic Structure model: the interaction of frame model type and partition was 
significant when comparing Shared variance and Semantic Structure unique variance 
(F(1,5) = 6.56, p = .05) and Frame model and Semantic structure unique variances 
(F(1,5) = 6.27, p = .05) but not Shared variance and Frame model unique variance (F(1,5) 
= 0.77, p = .42). In other words, there was more in common between a Semantic 
Structure model and a syntactic frame model once sets of frames were taken into account 
(i.e. the Average Frame model) rather than the particular frame in context (i.e. the Single 
Frame model). This confirms the predictions of the Semantic Structure Consistency 
Hypothesis. 
 
Figure 4.5 
Variance partitioning analyses between the Semantic Structure model and two different syntactic frame 
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models. One variance partitioning analysis was with the Single Frame model (left) and the other variance 
partitioning analysis was with the Average Frame model (right). Joint models between pairs of models were 
run, and variance was partitioned using set theory to each single model (unique variance) or pair of models 
(shared variance), accordingly. Bars show the mean proportion of variance explained across subjects for each 
variance partition. Error bars are the standard error of the mean across subjects. Results are averaged across 
ROIs because there was only a marginal interaction of partition and frame model type with ROI (p = .074) 
and interaction between partition and frame type is more easily observable averaged across ROIs. This 
interaction can be observed as the trade-off between the unique variance attributable to the Semantic 
Structure model (dark green bars) on the one hand, and the Frame model (light green bars) and Shared 
variance (white bars), on the other, dependent on whether the frame model is the Single (left) vs. Average 
(right). The Average Frame model absorb variance initially attributable to the Semantic Structure model (in 
its analysis with the Single Frame model): the unique variance for the Semantic Structure model decreased 
while the shared variance and unique variance attributable to the frame model increased when the Average 
rather than Single frames were used. 
One final aspect of the data needs to be addressed here. We find that the Average 
Frame model performed better than the Semantic Structure model across all ROIs, as 
can be observed in Figure 4.4. This was confirmed in a repeated measures ANOVA as a 
main effect of Model Type, F(1,5) = 6.16, p = .056. (There was a trend towards an 
interaction of ROI and Model Type as well, F(7,35) = 2.10, p =.07). Thus, the model with 
sets of syntactic frames predicts fMRI responses better than a modeling incorporating 
elements of semantic structure. We suspect that this may relate to deficiencies with 
identifying and labeling the elements of semantic structure: such a process can be 
challenging even for experts, as discussed further in the General Discussion (Fisher et al., 
1991; Hartshorne et al., 2014). In contrast, labeling the elements of syntactic structure is 
trivial and can be automated; it simply involves labeling words in a frame with their 
syntactic class (noun phrase, prepositional phrase, etc.). Although the Average Frame 
model performs significantly better than the Semantic Structure model, both models 
show significant prediction accuracy, and the Semantic Structure model has the 
advantage of interpretability of its semantic content. Thus, in the next section, we use the 
Semantic Structure model rather than the Average Frame model for further comparison 
to other leading semantic models. Results are qualitatively similar whether we use the 
Semantic Structure model, or the Average Frame model as a proxy for semantic 
structure. We return to these issues in the General Discussion. 
2.3. Description of feature spaces for other semantic models 
Our analyses thus far support the conclusion that semantic structure is a valid 
characterization of the representations elicited by verbs in naturalistic linguistic input. 
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We next sought to characterize the semantic structure model’s relation to two other 
leading semantic models (depicted in Figure 4.1). In this section, we describe the feature 
spaces of the comparison models, we relate the feature spaces across the three models, 
we test the prediction accuracy of each model, and we determine the degree to which 
each model explains unique variance in the fMRI response to linguistic input. 
The first model is a distributional semantic model (word2vec, 300 features; Mikolov 
et al., 2013). The underlying assumption of this and related models is that the lexical 
neighborhood of a word reveals the semantics of the word. For word2vec, dense vectors 
for each word are learned by a neural network trained to predict the neighboring words 
of a given target word in a large corpus of over 100 billion words of text. After training, 
each word is represented as a vector in a relatively low-dimensional continuous space, 
where neighboring words in the space are assumed to share a semantic representation. 
Each feature is constrained to have a value between -1 and 1. This and similar 
distributional models have been found to predict human performance on semantic tasks 
(Mandera et al., 2017), and to predict fMRI responses to naturalistic speech (Huth et al., 
2016; Jain & Huth, 2018; Pereira et al., 2018). Details on this model have been described 
elsewhere and so will not be described further here. 
The second model is a theoretical semantic model based on sensorimotor and 
cognitive domains known to be relevant to human cognition (e.g., motion, sensation, 
audition, communication), developed by Binder and colleagues (2016). The model was 
operationalized based on average human ratings for individual words (434 nouns, 62 
verbs, 39 adjectives) along 65 features of interest; for example, the degree to which the 
word swatted involves seeing something (vision), on a scale from 0 to 6. This model has 
been previously shown to predict fMRI responses to language stimuli (Anderson et al., 
2017, 2018), and it is a leading model in the field of neurobiology of semantics. In our 
implementation, we obtained new average ratings for our set of verbs (675) along a 
reduced set of 23 features, chosen based on a factor analysis in Binder et al. (2016) where 
such features maximized variance in the feature set. Our ratings conform well to Binder’s 
original ratings (across 47 verbs common to Binder’s ratings and the current study, 
ratings correlated on average r = 0.89). This model has already been described in detail 
in previous work, so will not be described further here. 
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2.4. Examination of feature spaces of semantic structure model and 
other models 
Before examining the relationship between the Semantic Structure model and the 
other two semantic models (word2vec and Binder), we wished to quantify their potential 
to explain common variance in the fMRI response to our language stimuli. Since the 
features in each model are not directly comparable on their own, our general approach to 
this is RSA, an analysis technique for comparing representational spaces that differ in 
number and kind of feature (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008). By using an abstract 
representational space in which similarities of stimuli or categories are represented 
(instead of similarities of features themselves), models can be compared in terms of 
second-order similarity, without a need to assume a precise mapping between features in 
one space (e.g. behavior) and another (e.g. model). 
Three representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) were constructed, in the 
following way. For each model, we extracted the feature channel timecourses after pre-
processing (4,318 total timepoints). Each RDM was computed by constructing the 
pairwise similarity matrix of each timepoint to every other timepoint based on squared 
Euclidean distances of each observation’s set of features. Thus, the RDM for each model 
was a timepoint x timepoint dissimilarity matrix, representing how similar or different 
the model “considered” each timepoint. The lower the distance, the more similarly the 
timepoints are represented in the model. 
To determine the similarity across models, we next computed the pairwise RDM 
correlations across models (using the lower off-diagonal values of their RDMs). This 
analysis revealed that the Binder and word2vec models were correlated at r = 0.56, the 
Binder and Semantic Structure models at r = 0.25, and the word2vec and Semantic 
Structure models at r = 0.47. This analysis suggests the possibility of substantial overlap 
in variance explained between these models. Similar correlation values were found when 
comparing RDMs constructed from the feature values for each instance of a verb 
independent of its temporal placement in each scan run (3,146 verb instances total). This 
suggests that the observed correlations were not simply due to an artifact of 
downsampling the feature channels to the acquisition rate of fMRI. 
Despite the similarities between models, it is important to note that finding these 
correlations does not necessitate that the correlated information between the model 
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feature spaces is the same as that which predicts fMRI responses to language. In other 
words, imagine that the information not correlated between the models (i.e. the unique 
aspects of word2vec and Semantic Structure models) is what predicts fMRI responses to 
language separately. In that case, these models would predict little of the same variance. 
Conversely, if the aspects of the models that predict fMRI activity are the same as those 
which result in the correlation between model RDMs, then the models have the potential 
to explain the same variance in fMRI response. To examine this, we turn to the 
performance of each model at predicting fMRI response, and then conduct a variance 
partitioning analysis among the three models to determine the unique vs. shared 
contribution of each to predicting fMRI response. 
2.5. Evaluation of semantic structure model and other models 
Next, we evaluate the predictive power of each model type. We fit each model to the 
estimation data set using ridge regression and calculated the Pearson correlation 
between the predicted and observed fMRI responses in the validation data set. 
Predictions for the Semantic Structure model are the same as in the previous section and 
are recapitulated in Figure 4.6, along with predictions for the other two models. The 
word2vec model resulted in significant prediction accuracy across all ROIs (all p’s < .01), 
replicating previous work using word embeddings (Huth et al., 2016). Notably, this 
prediction accuracy was quite high despite the fact that unlike in these previous studies, 
only verb timepoints contributed features for prediction; all other words did not 
contribute features for modeling. The Binder model also showed significant prediction 
across ROIs (all p’s < .05). A repeated-measures ANOVA comparing mean prediction 
accuracy across ROIs between the models found a main effect of Model Type (F(2,10) = 
8.10, p = .008), with no interaction across ROIs (F(14,70) = 0.92, p = .55). Post-hoc 
paired t-tests between each pair of the three models showed that word2vec performance 
was significantly higher than both Binder (t(5) = 3.94, p = .01) and Semantic Structure 
(t(5) = 3.08, p = .03); there was no significant difference between Binder and Semantic 
Structure (t(5) = 1.72, p = .15). These results suggest that the three models provide a 
good description of the representation elicited by verbs in naturalistic language. 
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Figure 4.6 
Prediction accuracy for the three semantic models of interest. A. Bars show the mean Pearson r value across 
subjects for each ROI. Brain maps below ROI labels indicate the parcels used to make subject-specific 
language-selective ROIs, based on selectivity from an independent functional localizer. Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean across subjects. Across all ROIs, word2vec showed significantly greater 
prediction accuracy than the other two models (p < .05). B. Whole-brain maps of prediction accuracy for one 
subject, plotted on the inflated cortical MNI surface. Prediction accuracy is the Pearson correlation between 
predicted and actual fMRI responses to the validation stimulus set. Significant predictions for the three 
models were observed in similar areas, including outside of language-selective regions, such as medial 
parietal areas and some ventral regions. Abbreviations: inferior frontal gyrus orbital (IFGOrb), inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior temporal (AntTemp), middle anterior temporal 
(MidAntTemp), middle posterior temporal (MidPostTemp), posterior temporal (PostTemp), and angular 
gyrus (AngG). 
2.6. Comparison of semantic structure model and other models 
Even though the models each make significant predictions across ROIs (albeit at 
slightly different levels), prediction accuracy alone does not reveal the degree to which 
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the models explain independent variance. That is, it is possible that all three models 
quantify the same amount of variation in the linguistic input. But in different ways; for 
example, perhaps the Semantic Structure model quantifies variance due solely to 
properties of events such as Cause and State Change, while the Binder model explains 
variance based on representations not related to event structure, such as the particular 
sensory system involved (indeed Semantic Structure considers verbs of perception such 
as see and hear to be identical, while in the Binder model there is a set of features along 
which these differ: vision vs. audition). To address the degree to which the models 
explain shared or unique variance, we conducted a variance partitioning analysis, as in 
the previous section on lexical semantic models (de Heer et al., 2017; Lescroart & 
Gallant, 2018). This analysis involves fitting joint models (e.g., a model with both 
Semantic Structure and Binder feature sets), and then using set theory to allocate 
variance between models depending on the degree to which the joint model results in a 
gain in variance explained. 
Results of the variance partitioning analysis appear in Figure 4.7. The analysis 
revealed several key properties of the explained variance of the models. The main finding 
was that the greatest variance partition was the shared variance of all three semantic 
models (Semantic Structure, Binder, and word2vec; pairwise paired t-test comparisons 
among all seven partitions, all p’s < .006 uncorrected, all ps < .09 Holm-Bonferroni 
corrected). This result suggests that these semantic models in large part capture similar 
aspects of the representation of verbs present in natural language. It also confirms our 
previous representational similarity analysis of the feature spaces of each model, where 
we found the feature spaces themselves were correlated across verb instances in our 
stimuli with r values between 0.25 and 0.56. We think it is likely that by the nature of its 
training, word2vec has likely implicitly learned information related to semantic 
structure. Likewise, since Binder also shares a substantial amount variance with the 
other two models, this suggests that when people give judgments about properties of 
verbs (the input to the Binder model), they have implicit access to event structure for 
making such judgments. We return to these issues in the General Discussion. 
Second, we tested for evidence of significant explained variance by each shared and 
unique model partition. One important note of caution here: because variance partition 
estimates were computed as variance explained in the held-out validation set, and such 
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estimates will necessarily contain sampling noise, using the set theory approach for 
variance partitioning has the potential to result in mathematically impossible results, i.e. 
a variance partition estimate below zero. Although this results in some impossible values 
(e.g., the shared variance of Binder and Semantic Structure being significantly negative), 
adjusting for this by estimating a bias term (for each voxel), as in (de Heer et al., 2017), 
has its own issues, i.e. it may inflate significance of results across subjects (because no 
value can be below zero). Thus, we chose instead not to adjust the partition estimates. 
These results provide a lower bound on the possible unique variance attributable to each 
semantic model or sets of models. If a region shows variance explained significantly 
greater than zero, we can be confident this is indeed the case, but a null result here 
would be inconclusive. 
To determine the significance of explained variance for each partition, we conducted 
individual ANOVAs for each partition comparing variance explained across ROIs, 
followed by post-hoc t-tests for each ROI if an interaction of ROI was significant; one 
individual t-test across all ROIs otherwise (this was the case for the unique variance of 
the Binder model, and the shared variance of Semantic Structure and word2vec models). 
T-tests were one-sided, testing whether explained variance was significantly greater than 
zero. First, the shared variance among all models was significant in each ROI (all p’s < 
.02; white bar in Figure 4.7). Second, we found evidence that individual models, and 
pairs of models, capture significant explained variance not attributable to the others. 
Shared variance between Binder and Semantic Structure was not significantly greater 
than zero in any ROI (p’s > .86, orange bar in Figure 4.7). Shared variance between 
Binder and word2vec was significant in the majority of ROIs (p’s < .05, purple bar in 
Figure 4.7) except in IFG, where it was marginal (p = .07). There was no significant 
shared variance between Semantic Structure and word2vec (no difference among ROIs, 
test on mean across all ROIs p = .95, light green bar in Figure 4.7). Unique variance 
attributable to Semantic Structure was significant in all ROIs (p < .05, dark green bar in 
Figure 4.7) except MFG, AntTemp, and AngG (ps > .16). Additional unique variance 
attributable to word2vec was significant (p < .05) in all ROIs (red bar in Figure 4.7), 
marginal in AntTemp (p = .08), and not significant in MFG or AngG (p’s > .28). Finally, 
Binder showed no unique variance in any ROI (no difference among ROIs, test on mean 
across all ROIs p = .57, blue bar in Figure 4.7). Whole-brain maps of the variance 
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partitioning analyses are shown in Figure 4.8 for one example subject. 
Together, this variance partitioning analysis shows that the greatest partition of 
variance explained was shared variance attributable to all three models; in other words, 
their feature sets shared relationships (at least in our data set) such that they explained 
the fMRI response to verbs equally well. For additional variance attributable to 
individual or pairs of models, strongest results were found in the anterior/middle 
temporal regions (AntTemp, MidAntTemp, and MidPostTemp) and IFG regions (IFG, 
IFGOrb). For these, there was significant variance that could be attributable jointly to 
Binder and word2vec, as well as additional unique variance attributable solely to the 
word2vec model or the Semantic Structure model that could not be accounted for by the 
other models. Although we cannot conclusively rule out unique variance attributable 
only to the Binder model due to the bias downward of variance partitioning conducted 
on the validation set (discussed above), we did not find evidence for additional 
significant variance solely due to the Binder model. 
 
Figure 4.7 
Variance partitioning analyses between the Semantic Structure, word2vec, and Binder models. Bars show 
the mean proportion of variance explained across subjects for each variance partition, in each ROI. Joint 
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models between pairs of models and the combination of all three models were run, and variance was 
partitioned using set theory to each single model, pair of models, or the combination of all models, 
accordingly. Brain maps below ROI labels indicate the parcels used to make subject-specific language-
selective ROIs, based on selectivity from an independent functional localizer. Error bars are the standard 
error of the mean across subjects. The partition with the greatest variance explained was attributable to the 
shared variance of all three models (white bar). Some individual models or model pairs also showed 
significant explained variance that could not be accounted for by the other models, including shared Binder 
and word2vec variance (purple bar), as well as additional unique variance attributable solely to the word2vec 
model (blue bar) and the Semantic Structure model (dark green). We cannot rule out variance uniquely 
attributable to the Binder model, as these estimates are not adjusted for downward bias of performing 
variance partitioning analysis on the held-out validation set. Thus, they are a lower bound on the possible 
explained variance attributable to each partition, sometimes resulting in impossible values (e.g., the shared 
variance of Binder and Semantic Structure, orange bar, being negative). Abbreviations: inferior frontal gyrus 
orbital (IFGOrb), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior temporal (AntTemp), 
middle anterior temporal (MidAntTemp), middle posterior temporal (MidPostTemp), posterior temporal 
(PostTemp), and angular gyrus (AngG). 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
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Figure 4.8 
Whole-brain maps for variance partitioning analyses between the Semantic Structure, word2vec, and Binder 
models, for one example subject. Maps are plotted on the inflated cortical MNI surface. The partial 
correlation is the signed square root of the partial variance explained (r2) for each of the seven partitions. 
These maps confirm the ROI analyses presented in Figure 4.7: The majority of variance explained was 
shared between all three semantic models. Some individual models or model pairs also showed significant 
explained variance that could not be accounted for by the other models, including Semantic Structure (dark 
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green) word2vec (blue), and the joint word2vec and Binder models (purple). Note that we cannot rule out 
variance uniquely attributable to the Binder model alone, as these partition estimates are not adjusted for 
downward bias of performing variance partitioning analysis on the held-out validation set. 
3. General Discussion 
The main goal of the current study was to test the degree to which a model of 
semantic structure based in lexical semantic theory can serve as a candidate model for 
how the brain represents the meaning of verbs. We also aimed to compare this model to 
other current leading models of semantics. We accomplished this by using a voxel-wise 
encoding model approach, in which we predicted fMRI responses to verbs in naturalistic 
language (audiobooks) in the brain. First, we found that a model based on semantic 
structure (with features for e.g. Cause, Motion, Contact) showed significant prediction 
accuracy in language-selective ROIs. We also compared this model with other lexical 
semantic models and found that the semantic structure model shared substantial 
explained variance with a model based on sets of syntactic frames, over and above a 
model based on only the single frame of the verb in context. This confirmed a core 
prediction of the relationship between linguistic and semantic structure: that the sets of 
frames a verb does or does not take predicts its event structure. We next compared a 
semantic structure model with two other leading models: a distributional semantics 
model (word2vec), and a sensorimotor/cognitive semantic model based on word ratings 
(Binder). We found that all models resulted in significant prediction accuracy across 
language-selective cortex, and further, that all three models shared most of their 
explained fMRI response variance. Nevertheless, there was significant variance 
attributable uniquely to single or joint sets of models, suggesting these models may 
capture at least partially non-overlapping semantic information. Together, our findings 
suggest that a model of semantics based on semantic structure is a plausible model for 
how the human brain represents the semantics of events, on par with other leading 
models of semantics. 
Our results quantify for the first time the degree to which the predictions of 
linguistic/semantic structure correspondence from lexical semantic theory are borne out 
in how the brain responds to verbs in natural language. Additionally, our work is the first 
to objectively compare the degree to which the semantic structure model compares to 
other leading models of semantics: distributional semantics (word2vec) and a leading 
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sensorimotor/cognitive semantic model (Binder). A central finding from this analysis is 
that information about semantic structure is implicitly present in other previously 
established model types in semantics (based on the representational similarity analysis 
of feature spaces) and substantial variance in fMRI responses is shared between the 
spaces. 
3.1. Differences in representations across regions 
We found that across all analyses, posterior temporal language-selective regions 
showed the greatest prediction accuracy, overall. This is consistent with prior literature 
that suggests that posterior middle temporal cortex may play an especially important 
role in representing abstract information about events. This region has been shown to 
respond to event words (both as verbs and nouns) more than other words (Bedny et al., 
2008, 2014; Hernández, Fairhall, Lenci, Baroni, & Caramazza, 2014; Peelen et al., 2012; 
Romagno, Rota, Ricciardi, & Pietrini, 2012). It also appears to represent action 
categories invariant to incidental visual properties (Hafri et al., 2017; M. Wurm, 
Caramazza, & Lingnau, 2017; M. F. Wurm & Lingnau, 2015), and across visual and 
linguistic stimuli (M. F. Wurm & Caramazza, 2018). Although we did not explicitly test 
for cross-modal information in the current study, an intriguing possibility is that 
posterior middle temporal cortex represents event semantics across modality. Beyond 
language-selective areas, our results also revealed other regions with significant 
prediction accuracy, such as medial parietal areas that have been implicated in memory 
representations (Binder et al., 2009). Future work should investigate the 
representational content of regions outside of language-selective areas that represent 
semantic information. 
Somewhat surprisingly, none of the language-selective regions that we investigated 
showed a benefit for specific syntactic context in which a verb was embedded (the Single 
Frame model) over the sets of frames the verb takes (the Average Frame model). One of 
several possibilities may explain such a result. It is possible that models based on explicit 
syntactic transformations and structure-building must be tested (J. Brennan et al., 2012; 
J. R. Brennan et al., 2016), rather than the simplified surface frames we implemented 
here. It is also possible that neural implementation of syntactic context distinctions is 
not observable in voxelwise fMRI patterns (Blank et al., 2016). Perhaps such differences 
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could be observable using finer-grained methods (e.g. fMRI adaptation, or recordings at 
the single unit level). Further experimental work and methodological advances will need 
to be developed to make progress on this issue. 
3.2. Limitations of the current work 
Despite the success of the semantic structure approach in the current study, there is 
room for improvement in its implementation. The database we used to formalize 
semantic structure, VerbNet, is the most comprehensive dataset available that attempts 
to operationalize the Semantic Structure Consistency hypothesis (Kipper et al., 2008; 
Levin, 1993). Its main limitation has to do with the difficulty of identifying the elements 
of semantic structure: While identifying the sets of frames a verb takes and shares with 
other verbs is somewhat trivial (as in the Average Frame model), placing a meaningful 
label on what generalizations the shared frames cognitively correspond to can be 
challenging, even for seasoned semantic veterans (Fisher et al., 1991). Indeed, we found 
that a model built from average frames performed better than one with explicit labels of 
semantic structure features (Figure 4.4), suggesting that the semantic structure labels 
were imprecise, possibly collapsing over relevant distinctions (e.g., manner and path, 
Talmy, 2000), or overly differentiating others, such as event roles (Dowty, 1991; White et 
al., 2017). Nevertheless, some elements of semantic structure for which there is some 
agreement are Cause (in some form), Motion, State Change, Contact, and 
Physical/Mental Transfer (Jackendoff, 1990; Pinker, 1989).14 Furthermore, Hartshorne 
and colleagues (2014) are beginning to make advances in obtaining psychological 
judgments of naïve subjects on the classes, frames, and features of large sets of verbs; 
thus, we can expect improvement here in the near future. 
We also ignored effects of sentence processing and narrative construction in 
modeling the measured fMRI responses. A large literature on sentence processing using 
behavioral techniques has shown that semantic and syntactic representations are 
                                                        
 
14 A question which we do not resolve here is the debate over why such a correspondence may existence 
between linguistic and these particular elements of meaning (semantic structure) in the first place. Perhaps 
the linguistic/semantic relationship is transparent precisely because such general semantic notions are 
available conceptually early in development (Strickland, 2016) yet are often opaque to observation alone (e.g. 
the meaning of a word that refers to an internal mental state, such as to think, may be impossible without 
observation of the sets of syntactic frames such a word appears in (Landau & Gleitman, 1985)). 
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continuously updated and revised as people comprehend language (e.g., J. C. Trueswell 
& Kim, 1998). The effects of this on-line linguistic interpretation on when event 
representations are active, and how these are maintained over time, are unknown. 
Additionally, how semantic information is maintained and updated over longer periods 
of time and over longer narratives (e.g. when characters or settings change) is an active 
field of research not addressed here (Baldassano et al., 2017; J. Chen et al., 2016); our 
focus was on the individual event representations activated by verbs in natural language. 
To fully account for semantic representations in the brain, theories and models of 
sentence processing and narrative structure will ultimately need to be incorporated.  
Part of the limitations of this study are of course the measurement limitations which 
can be considered noise intrinsic to the methodology. A number of known factors 
contribute to this noise, including the spatial and temporal resolution of fMRI, the 
intrinsic temporal smoothness of the hemodynamic response, but many unknowns exist 
as well, such as the exact mapping between neural activity and the fMRI response. 
Improvements in technology and methods of measurement can reduce the contribution 
of these factors.   
3.3. Implications for semantic compositionality 
In the current study, we confined our investigation to the realm of verbs for the 
purpose of comparing models of their meaning. Thus, we did not test models of semantic 
composition per se, but rather we use the insight that such composition involves 
structured representations. However, future work should explicitly address the 
compositional nature of event representations in the brain. The advantage of semantic 
structure for investigating compositionality is that it explicitly commits to the existence 
of different categories with different combinatorial properties: events (one category) are 
about specific kinds of relations between entities (another category; Williams, 2015). 
This view is in line with researchers in computational linguistics who have argued that 
the algorithmic operations of semantic composition should be categorically different 
depending on the grammatical category of a particular word, and thus that such 
categories should be explicitly specified before compositional operations take place 
(Baroni & Zamparelli, 2010; see Kartsaklis, 2014 for review; Mitchell & Lapata, 2010). In 
contrast, many models (including distributional models and the Binder model) treat all 
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ontological types the same: objects, events, and attributes are embedded in the same 
representational space. Thus, the advantage of the semantic structure approach is that it 
points out interpretable elements of meaning (e.g. Cause), while at the same time 
differentiating by category. Nevertheless, semantic structure does not have much to say 
about the semantic representation of the entities involved in events, apart from general 
attributes (like whether it is a mass/count concept, e.g. water vs. bottles; singular vs. 
plural, e.g. bottle vs. bottles; or animacy, e.g. animal vs. vehicle; Talmy, 2000a; 
Jackendoff, 2002). Thus, in future work, models of the semantic representation of 
entities, whatever they might be, can be integrated with a semantic structure model such 
as ours for comparison against other semantic models that do not explicitly differentiate 
entities from events. 
3.4. Similarities of semantic models 
One of our main findings was that the semantic structure model shared the majority 
of its explained variance with the other two models of semantics. The first was word2vec 
(our distributional semantics model). We suspect that this model ends up sharing this 
variance because its large-scale semi-supervised training is sufficient to approximate 
structured regularities in syntax made explicit by lexical semantic theories. For example, 
verbs like walk and run have a set of canonically permitted syntactic frames, some of 
which include appearances with prepositional phrases (e.g. I walk to the park) and are 
almost never followed by words like that (e.g. *I walk that the park [ungrammatical]). 
This is in line with recent work that has found that syntactic frame information can be 
classified using word vector representations (Kann, Warstadt, Williams, & Bowman, 
2019). The other semantic model of interest was Binder and colleagues’ 
sensorimotor/cognitive model. We suspect that this model shares variance with the 
semantic structure model because some of the features are related (albeit indirectly) to 
aspects of semantic structure: Cause (semantic structure) is related to Binder’s Cause 
feature; Motion (semantic structure) is related to Binder’s Motion feature (showing a lot 
of visually observable movement); and so on. Indeed, Binder and colleagues added such 
features to their previous iterations of a sensorimotor model (L. Fernandino, 
Humphries, Conant, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2016; Leonardo Fernandino et al., 2015), in 
part to capture aspects of abstract words that the sensorimotor model alone did not 
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capture. With these added features, the Binder model moves closer to an account of 
semantics that incorporates semantic-structurally relevant features, albeit indirectly. 
3.5. The virtue of interpretable models 
When several models end up explaining the same variance in fMRI responses to a 
large degree, as we observed, how is one to choose the “best” model? If the goal is to 
provide an explanatory model of human cognition, we see a benefit in pursuing models 
with greater interpretability and plausibility, all else being equal (although of course the 
line for when to consider models as approximately equal in performance can be 
debated). The utility of interpretability is that it allows researchers to make contact 
between linguistic semantics and other conceptual and perceptual systems involved in 
building an explanatory model of the world, such as high-level vision, memory, or 
reasoning. In this, the semantic structure approach excels: its elements such as Cause, 
Motion, State Change are core concepts that are available early in development, before 9 
months of age (Kominsky et al., 2017; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Muentener & Carey, 2010), 
and are hypothesized to act as the foundation for further conceptual development 
(Carey, 2009; Strickland, 2016). Further, some of these high-level representations are 
available as part of perceptual processing itself (Hafri, Trueswell, & Strickland, 2018; e.g. 
causality and agency; Rolfs et al., 2013). Another criterion is plausibility: the models we 
investigated make different assumptions about how the relevant semantic information is 
learned and organized. Distributional semantic models achieve their unparalleled 
performance via training on large text-based datasets, often with hundreds of millions of 
examples or more. However, by age 4 children know thousands of verbs and their 
meanings, yet they do not get exposed to near the amount of linguistic input that appears 
to be necessary for word2vec models to succeed: Hart & Risley (1995) estimate that 
children hear only 13-45 million words by age 4 years. Indeed, the evidence in the 
psycholinguistics community suggests that humans do not engage in a pure associative 
learning procedure for learning the meanings of words. Instead evidence points to a 
highly inferential process based on few instances (J. C. J. C. Trueswell, Medina, Hafri, & 
Gleitman, 2013; Woodard, Gleitman, & Trueswell, 2016). This includes the semantic 
structure of verbs, as observed in studies of verb-learning based on linguistic and 
perceptual input (Gleitman, 1990; Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Yuan & Fisher, 2009). 
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Thus, even if distributional semantic models end up at an approximately similar 
semantic state as humans, the learning processes are likely qualitatively different. 
This is not to discard entirely the utility of distributional semantic models such as 
word2vec for offering insights into the learning and organization of human semantic 
knowledge. Indeed, the fact that they perform so well at approximating human 
performance in semantic tasks (Mandera et al., 2017) and predict a large amount of 
brain response variance to language (Huth et al., 2016; Pereira et al., 2018) suggests that 
their representational space may offer insights into the kinds of information latent in 
word distributions in language. Additionally, comparison of model architectures (such as 
semi-supervised models like word2vec vs. LSTM models) and their relationship to 
human language processing or representation can also offer insight (Linzen, Dupoux, & 
Goldberg, 2016). Such work has also gained traction in the vision community using deep 
convolutional neural networks (Bonner & Epstein, 2018). Other approaches involve a 
“hybrid” approach, attempting to take insights from both distributional semantics and 
compositionality (Fyshe et al., 2014; Fyshe, Wehbe, Talukdar, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2015; 
Lenci, 2018). We note, however, that investigating how such models might inform our 
understanding of human cognition requires understanding the computational problem 
at hand (semantic understanding), the kinds of representations that are likely to exist 
(e.g. in this case, semantic structural representation), and the feasibility of the models as 
candidates for human learning and representation (Marr, 1982). To gain any high-level 
interpretation from it requires knowing what one is looking for (Krakauer, Ghazanfar, 
Gomez-Marin, Maciver, & Poeppel, 2017). In contrast, both Binder and the Semantic 
Structure model make explicit different aspects of meaning: event structure in the 
former, and sensorimotor and cognitive associations in the latter. 
3.6. The importance of model comparison 
Our results reveal the importance of explicit model testing and comparison. Notably, 
previous work using distributional semantic models (Huth et al., 2016; Pereira et al., 
2018) have not reported such explicit model comparison. Without this, it is difficult to 
make claims about the superiority of one model over another, and to identify the precise 
sharing of information between them (both in information shared among features, and 
in explained variance in the brain). In future work, we can also use explicit model 
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comparison to infer exactly how the models capture similar variance, and what features 
map across models, e.g. by performing canonical correlation analysis (finding the 
mapping between two feature sets maximizing their correlations). By identifying the 
commonalities across these models, and improving each, we will make progress toward a 
full explanation of semantic representation in the human brain (e.g., Lescroart & Gallant, 
2018). Of course, this does not discount the usefulness of carefully controlled 
experiments. We believe our approach is important and complementary to the precise 
experimental control afforded by single sentence stimulus manipulations (e.g. for 
investigating syntactic alternations). However, to distinguish between high-performing 
models of how the brain responds to language may ultimately require this careful control 
to test a critical condition by which to distinguish candidate models. 
3.7. Conclusions 
The central contribution of our work is that properties of event structure (e.g. Cause, 
Contact) are encoded spontaneously by people listening to naturalistic speech. Further, it 
is proof of concept that we can make contact between theories of lexical semantics and 
data-driven statistical approaches to language. Our findings support the theory that an 
important – but not the only – aspect of how the brain represents semantics is via 
semantic structure: that is, the nature of relations between entities. More broadly, our 
findings suggest that progress can be made in modeling brain responses to language 
using interpretable, theoretically meaningful semantic properties. Although just in its 
beginnings, the semantic structure approach is a step towards a core component of the 
human semantic capacity: to build meaning through composition. 
4. Supplementary Methods 
4.1. Participants 
Six adults were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania community (4 female, 
2 male; ages 20, 25, 26, 28, 31, 33). All participants were healthy, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing, and provided written informed consent 
in compliance with procedures approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional 
Review Board. Four were right-handed and two were ambidextrous. All were native 
English speakers, and one was also fluent in Arabic. Data from an additional participant 
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(male, 22 y.o.) was discarded before analysis for an inability to complete the entire 
experiment due to constant drowsiness. Scanning took place over the span of three to 
four days, with scan sessions lasting 1.5-2 hours for each visit. Note that our goal was to 
collect a large and reliable set of data for each subject, rather than a small set of data for 
many subjects, as is standard for the voxelwise encoding model approach (Huth et al., 
2016; Lescroart & Gallant, 2018; Nishimoto et al., 2011). The pattern of results was 
nevertheless consistent across subjects. Subjects underwent additional scans of six 10-
minute silent film clips and additional functional localizer scans that will not be reported 
in this manuscript. 
4.2. fMRI data collection 
Scanning was performed at the Center for Functional Imaging at the University of 
Pennsylvania on a 3T Siemens Prisma scanner equipped with a 64-channel head coil. 
High-resolution T1-weighted images for anatomical localization were acquired using a 
3D magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo pulse sequence (MPRAGE, 
repetition time [TR], 2200 ms; echo time [TE], 4.67 ms; flip angle, 8°; voxel size, 0.94 × 
0.94 × 1 mm; matrix size, 192 × 256 × 160 mm]. T2*-weighted images sensitive to blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrasts were acquired using a multiband 
gradient echo echoplanar pulse sequence (TR, 2000 ms; TE, 25 ms; flip angle, 70°; voxel 
size, 2 × 2 × 2 mm; multiband factor, 3; matrix size, 96 × 96 × 81). Field mapping was 
performed at the end of each scan session with a dual‐echo (echo time (TE) = 4.06, 6.52 
ms) gradient echo sequence with pulse repetition time (TR) = 1200 ms, flip angle (FA) = 
60°, pixel bandwidth = 260, voxel size, 3.4 × 3.4 × 4.0 mm; matrix size, 22o × 22o × 208 
mm. Phase difference and magnitude data were saved from each channel. 
Visual stimuli for non-audiobook runs were displayed at the rear bore face on an 
InVivo SensaVue Flat Panel Screen at 1920 × 1080 pixel resolution (diagonal = 80.0 cm, 
width × height = 69.7 × 39.2 cm). Participants viewed visual stimuli through a mirror 
attached to the head coil. Responses for functional localizer scans were collected using a 
fiber-optic button box. Sounds were presented through MRI-compatible earbuds 
(Sensimetrics S14) in-ear piezo-electric headphones (Sensimetrics S14). These 
headphones provide high-quality audio and attenuation of scanner noise. Audio stimuli 
were pre-processed to account for the resonance properties of the earbuds and were 
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presented at comfortable levels. 
4.3. Stimuli & Task 
Fiction book excerpts (both text and audio) were selected from freely available online 
databases: gutenberg.org (free eBooks) for text, and archive.org for audio. Audiobooks 
were generally recorded by amateur speakers. We extracted book content from the start 
of each book until a natural stopping point (most often chapter end) such that we had 
between 5-15 minutes of content for each. Book choice was based on the following 
criteria. First, only books with high audio quality and speaker engagement were selected. 
We also used several objective criteria: minimize amount of dialogue (number of verbs 
like say, tell); maximize concreteness of verbs and other words (based on ratings in 
Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014); minimize mean length of utterance, a proxy 
for sentence complexity. We chose books that we expected would be unfamiliar to 
participants (this was confirmed; on average, only 3 books were very familiar to each 
subject). Final choices were made from books that met the above criteria by maximizing 
the variety in book genre/content (e.g. science-fiction, fantasy, fairy tale) and speaker 
accent/gender. The final set featured 8 American English speakers (4 male), 1 Australian 
(male), and 5 British (3 male). Final book choices were: Armageddon—2419 A.D. (Philip 
Francis Nolan); Into the Wild (Jon Krakauer); Black Beauty (Anna Sewell); The 
Awakening (Kate Chopin); The Jungle Book (Rudyard Kipling); The Tale of Peter Rabbit 
(Beatrix Potter); The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe (C.S. Lewis); The Monster 
(Stephen Crane); The Cosmic Computer (H. Beam Piper); The Invisible Man (H.G. 
Wells); The Wind in the Willows (Kenneth Grahame); The Fish and the Ring (Joseph 
Jacobs); Jack and Jill (Louisa May Alcott); The Golden Bird (Brothers Grimm). For these 
final books, audio quality was further improved using filtering and equalization tools 
(e.g. noise cancellation) in Audacity software (www.audacityteam.org). All audio was 
sampled at 44.1 kHz. Five of these books were selected as the validation stimulus set and 
were repeated once (the first five in the list above); the other nine were used as the 
estimation stimulus set and were only played once. Ten seconds (5 TRs) of silence were 
added to the end of each stimulus account for the delay in hemodynamic response to the 
end of the auditory stimulus. In the scanner, participants were instructed to attend to the 
narrative of the audiobook. A light-gray screen with centered crosshair was visible 
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throughout all scans. 
4.4. Construction of feature spaces 
To construct feature spaces, it was first necessary to identify the precising timing of 
each word onset/offset. To do this, we aligned the audio with the text for each book. 
First, text was corrected to conform to the exact words used in the audio. Then the text 
and audio were aligned at millisecond precision using the Penn Phonetics Lab Forced 
Aligner software (http://fave.ling.upenn.edu). The software is an automatic phonetic 
alignment tool that uses hidden Markov models to identify the start and end of 
phonemes and words. After alignment, the timings were verified in the phonetics 
software Praat (www.praat.org). 
For each feature space, we modeled features of each instance of each verb in the 
stimulus set. To do this, we first used automatic part-of-speech (POS) tagging as 
implemented by the Stanford POS tagger 
(https://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tagger.shtml). The bidirectional version of the tagger 
is about 97% accurate, and subsequent to tagging, we verified and corrected POS tags to 
ensure we identified all verbs. We excluded the following categories of verb types: 
auxiliaries (e.g., will/shall, have, and do as in I will go, I have seen it, or Did you 
know?); modals (can, may, must, should, etc.); and the copula (be, as in I am fine). 
Present and past participles were included in the analysis (e.g. The man running on the 
track was happy; The snow, melted by the sun, was cold.). Only verbs that appeared in 
both word2vec and VerbNet (see below) were included (for Binder, we collected our own 
ratings on the verb set). After pre-processing, verbs made up approximately 15% of all 
words in the stimulus set. Verbs were then lowercased and lemmatized (i.e. converted to 
word roots, e.g. gave → give, giving → give). 
4.4.1. Word2vec features 
Word2vec is an implementation of the distributional semantic approach that has 
achieved remarkable success at semantic tasks (Mikolov et al., 2013) and at accounting 
for semantic priming (Mandera et al., 2017); similar models have also predicted cortical 
responses to language (Huth et al., 2016). In this model, each word is represented as a 
vector embedded in a multidimensional space (in this case, 300 dimensions). Vectors for 
each word are learned via a shallow neural network that are trained to predict a word’s 
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context (neighboring words) given an input word (the skip-gram architecture) or vice 
versa (continuous bag-of-words, or CBOW). After training, the embedding for each word 
is its corresponding weights to the hidden layer of the neural network (ranging from -1 to 
1). Words that share similar contexts share similar word vectors. Note that precise order 
of words in the context is not given special status, although in skip-gram, closer words 
are weighted more heavily. We used Google’s pre-trained word2vec model, which was 
trained on a corpus from Google News of about 100 billion words, with a context window 
of size 10 and dimensionality of 300. See Mikolov et al. (2013) for more details on the 
model training and performance. The choice of this model was based on its high 
performance and the convenience of its availability, but other distributional semantic 
models would be expected to perform similarly. Indeed, work has shown that different 
distributional semantic approaches are highly dependent on the hyperparameters chosen 
and on amount/content of training data; despite differences in their training algorithms, 
other distributional semantic model types (e.g. Latent Semantic Analysis) can perform 
similarly given the right training (Levy, Goldberg, & Dagan, 2015). 
To extract features for each verb from word2vec, we simply extract the 300 feature 
values for each verb in the stimulus set. Note that these values will always be the same, 
no matter the context of the verb or its sense. 
4.4.2. Verb Class, Syntactic Frame, and Semantic Structure features 
To extract features of verbs relevant for lexical semantic theory, we used a database 
called VerbNet (https://verbs.colorado.edu/verb-index). VerbNet is a publicly available 
database in which verbs are organized into Verb Classes based on the sets of syntactic 
frames a verb canonically does or does not take (see Introduction for further explication 
of the basis for such an organization). The database is an extension of Levin’s (1993) 
work on verb classes by Kipper-Schuler and Palmer (Kipper et al., 2008) to include more 
verbs and refine the classes. VerbNet contains over 9,000 verb entries, and over 300 
Classes. Of the 744 unique verbs that appeared in our stories, 675 (90.7%) appear in 
VerbNet, resulting in 93% of verb tokens (instances) with existing values in VerbNet. 
In VerbNet, each verb class has a list of syntactic frames associated with it. Each 
frame is a possible syntactic frame that verbs in the class can take. The frame is a surface 
representation that includes the number of phrase types before and after the verb (e.g., 
Noun Phrase, Verb, Noun Phrase, Prepositional Phrase, i.e. NP V NP PP); common 
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syntactic transformations such as the passive (movement of object to subject position) 
are not separately described. Note that specific syntactic frames repeat across verb 
classes. For example, the NP V NP (transitive) frame is very common and appears across 
many verb classes. For each syntactic frame, a semantic structure description is given 
that includes semantic predicates: Boolean semantic elements that take aspects of the 
event as arguments, including thematic roles (e.g., Agent, Patient, Theme). As discussed 
above in Methods, the same syntactic frame (e.g. NP V NP) will be associated with 
different semantic structure elements; for example, for a verb like break, a semantic 
feature like Cause will be associated with NP V NP, while for a verb like see, a feature like 
Perceive will be associated with NP V NP. See Figure 4.3 for more concrete examples. A 
coarse temporal structure of the event is also specified (e.g., whether Motion or Contact 
occurred at the beginning of the event); however, we ignore this aspect of the semantic 
representation here. VerbNet is being continuously updated for more verb coverage. See 
above website and references for more information on VerbNet’s implementation of 
semantics and classes, as well as its current state. 
An example of a syntax/semantics entry for the verb hit is the following (E stands for 
an “event variable” that allows temporal order to be specified): 
• Verb Class: hit-18.1 
• Syntactic Frame: NP V NP (Noun Phrase, Verb, Noun Phrase) 
• Example Sentence: Jimmy hit the table. 
• Semantic Structure: Cause(Agent, E), Manner(during(E), directed-motion, 
Agent), NOT Contact(during(E), Agent, Patient), Manner(end(E), forceful, 
Agent), Contact(end(E), Agent, Patient) 
Figure 4.3 in main text gives a visual illustration of how features for each model 
correspond to example sentences in each context. For the Verb Class model, the features 
were simply the verb class as annotated in context (e.g. for the verb drop in Jimmy 
dropped his ice cream, roll-51.3.1). For the Single Frame model, the features were the 
phrase type pre- or post-verb (e.g., first noun phrase [NP] pre-verb, second NP pre-verb, 
first NP post-verb, first prepositional phrase post-verb, etc.). For the Average Frame 
model, the features were the same as for the Single Frame model, except the features 
were average over all frames within the verb’s annotated class. For example, if a post-
verb NP appears for the verb drop in its labeled class (e.g. roll-51.3.1) in 4 out of 8 
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frames, this feature would receive the value 0.5, regardless of the particular syntactic 
context of the instance of the verb. For the Semantic Structure model, the features were 
the semantic predicates for the particular frame (e.g., Cause, Motion, Contact, NOT 
Contact), as well as the event roles that were arguments of those predicates (e.g., Agent, 
Patient, Theme, Topic). If a feature appeared twice in this layer (e.g., Agent in Cause and 
Agent in Contact, as in the example above), it was only coded once. The temporal 
predicates (e.g., start, during, end) and predicate type features (e.g., forceful, directed-
motion), as in the above example, were not included in the model. 
We primarily used version 3.2 of VerbNet, as this was the version available at the 
time the project was initiated. Version 3.3 of VerbNet became available mid-way through 
the project, and although it had greater coverage, the system of semantic structure 
features was changed. However, to augment the verb coverage for this study, we used 
VerbNet 3.3 coding for any verb that did not appear in VerbNet 3.2. 
Each verb instance in the stimulus set needed to be labeled with its particular verb 
class and frame in context. However, there are not yet reliable methods to do so for this 
database. Thus, the first author annotated each verb instance by hand, using custom 
annotation software written in python with the nltk package. The software presented 
each verb one at a time in its sentential context, along with the possible frames for each 
verb class that the verb matched. Each frame also presented the associated example 
sentence in the VerbNet database. (The semantic predicates were not presented, so as 
not to bias choice based on these properties.) VerbNet contains entries for some verb-
particle constructions (e.g., look after meaning to care for), so these entries were 
displayed as possible choices as well. If an entry was a close but not exact match 
semantically and syntactically, the closest matching class/frame was chosen. If the usage 
of the verb in the particular context did not match syntactically or semantically, the verb 
was skipped and received no annotation (and was therefore excluded from modeling). 
This annotation procedure was performed for all verbs in the stimulus set, 3,146 in total. 
For modeling purposes, we only wanted to include features that appeared at some 
minimum frequency that we could reliably estimate its contribution to fMRI responses. 
To this end, we only included a feature if it appeared at least 3 times in the estimation 
stimulus set, and 2 times in the validation stimulus set (since these runs were repeated 
once). After this feature culling, the following is the number of features remaining for 
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modeling, for each model: Verb Class, 98 out of 356; Single and Average Frame, 18 out of 
37; Semantic Structure, 99 out of 232. Features and frequency for each model are listed 
below, in Figure 4.9. 
 
[Manuscript continues with figure on next page] 
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Figure 4.9 
Frequency of features for each model based on lexical semantic theory. Frequencies are listed separately for 
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both estimation and validation stimulus sets. Only features frequent enough to be included in modeling were 
used (minimum 3 in training set, 2 in validation set). Each feature set is ordered by estimation set frequency. 
A. Verb Class features (98 total). Details about each Verb Class (i.e. its members, frames, and semantic 
structure) can be found in the online VerbNet database. B. Single Frame features (18 total). The same set of 
features were also used for the Average Frame model, except features in that model were averaged across all 
frames within Verb Class. Uppercase letters represent phrase types or part of speech of single words (i.e., 
NP, Noun Phrase; PP, Prepositional Phrase; ADJ, adjective; ADV, adverb; S, sentence complement). 
Lowercase letters represent specific words (e.g., that, how). Pre-V indicates the word/type appears before 
the verb in the surface syntactic frame, post-V after. Number indicates whether it is the first or second of that 
type appearing before or after the verb (e.g., NP_post-V_2 indicates that the feature represents the second of 
two NPs post-verb in a frame). C. Semantic Structure features (99 total). The text “ROLE:” precedes 
semantic role features (e.g., Agent, Patient), and “PRED:” precedes semantic predicate features (e.g., Cause, 
Contact). 
4.4.3. Binder features 
As an alternative model to our Semantic Structure model based on VerbNet features, 
we also tested the sensorimotor/cognitive model of Binder et al. (Binder et al., 2016). 
The original version of this model includes 65 semantic features corresponding to 
different cognitive domains: for example, sensory (visual, auditory, etc.), motor, spatial, 
event, cognition, and emotion. It has been used successfully to account for fMRI 
responses to single sentence stimuli across the brain (Anderson et al., 2017, 2018). 
Binder et al.’s dataset includes average ratings for 535 English words: 434 nouns, 62 
verbs, and 39 adjectives. 
To use their model requires that we have data for all the verbs that appear in our 
dataset, only 47 of which appeared in Binder et al.’s set. Thus, we collected our own 
ratings on Amazon Mechanical Turk for our 675 verbs. We chose a subset of the full 
feature set for data collection, as Binder et al. found that not all features were needed to 
explain variance across their dataset: in a factor analysis (across the nouns and verbs), 
they found that 16 factors accounted for 81% of the variation across words/features. 
The subset of features used were chosen through several criteria, based on the results 
of factor analysis (described previously in Binder et al.). First, in order that the features 
chosen would reflect the underlying latent factor to a reasonable extent, only features 
with a unique loading of at least 0.50 on a factor were considered. Next, from this set, 
one feature was retained for each factor. This was either the feature with the top loading 
value, or a similarly high loading substitute that we believed would capture a more 
general theoretical property of the factor. For example, Factor 3 grouped together the 
features (in order) Sound, Audition, High sound, Loud, Low sound, and Music. Instead 
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of choosing Sound (“being associated with a characteristic or recognizable sound”), we 
chose the more general Audition (“being associated with hearing something”), and in all 
cases, the features that were substituted had similarly high loadings. Finally, we added 
additional factors for theoretical considerations: 
• To include features that queried use of additional sensory modalities beyond 
Audition and Smell, we included Vision and Touch; 
• To include an additional feature from the motor domain, we added LowerLimb; 
• To include visual features that likely corresponded to features in our Semantic 
Structure model, we added Motion; 
• To include cognitive features that likely corresponded to features in our Semantic 
Structure model, we added Cognition, Caused, and Social 
 
After this selection, we were left with 23 of the 65 features for rating, listed below in 
Table 4.1.  
Eight ratings were obtained for each verb for each query. MTurk participants were 
presented with past tense forms of six verbs from the list (no sentential context), one at a 
time, and rated each on a scale of 0 to 6 on each query. Data from participants whose 
correlation with the mean for other participants in their set of verbs was less than 0.5 
were discarded. To confirm that our rating procedure produced similar values as that of 
Binder et al., we checked the correlation between the shared set of words in their study 
and our study (47 verbs total). The average correlation for each word across the queries 
used in common was 0.88, indicating that our rating procedure was sufficient to produce 
similar results, despite the lower sample size (Binder and colleagues collected 30 ratings 
per word). 
Table 4.1 
Name Type Modality Submodality Query (To what degree do you think of this as…) 
Vision Sensory Vision General being an action or activity in which you see 
something 
Pattern Sensory Vision Surface being associated with a visual surface pattern or 
change in a visual surface 
Motion Sensory Vision Motion being associated with a specific type or a large 
amount of visible movement 
Slow Sensory Vision Motion being associated with slow visible movement 
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Face Sensory Vision Shape being associated with visible movements of the 
face 
Touch Sensory Somatic General being an action or activity in which you feel 
something by touch 
Audition Sensory Audition General being associated with hearing something 
Smell Sensory Olfaction Quality being associated with smelling something 
UpperLimb Motor Motor Motor being an action or activity in which you use the 
arm, hand, or fingers 
LowerLimb Motor Motor Motor being an action or activity in which you use the 
leg or foot 
Landmark Spatial Navigation Navigation being an action or activity in which you use a 
mental map of your environment 
Path Spatial Navigation Navigation being associated with someone or something 
moving from one location to another 
Number Number Number Number being associated with a specific number or 
amount 
Duration Event Temporal Duration being an action or activity that has a predictable 
duration, whether short or long 
Caused Event Causal Causal being associated with someone or something 
causing a change in something else 
Social Event Social Social being an action or activity that involves an 
interaction between people 
Communication Cognition Social Communication being an action or activity by which people 
communicate, or transmit or receive 
information 
Cognition Cognition Cognition Cognition being a mental activity or state of mind that 
involves thinking 
Benefit Evaluation Cognitive Positive being an action or activity that could help or 
benefit you or others 
Pleasant Evaluation Affective Positive being an action or activity that you find pleasant 
Unpleasant Evaluation Affective Negative being an action or activity that you find 
unpleasant 
Surprised Emotion Neutral High being associated with feeling surprised 
Needs Drive Basic Basic being an action or activity that provides things 
that would be difficult to live without 
4.5. Feature extraction and preprocessing 
Word features were sampled at 16 Hz. Feature values were initialized at zero, and 
verb features were inserted into the feature timecourse at the temporal mid-point of each 
word. To align each feature space with the timecourse of the fMRI data, each feature was 
downsampled to the fMRI acquisition rate (0.5 Hz) using Matlab’s decimate function 
132 
 
 
(first low-pass filtered with an 8th order Chebyshev Type I lowpass filter, and then 
resampled). To account for the delay and temporal smoothness of the hemodynamic 
response function, each feature space included finite impulse response (FIR) predictors 
for each downsampled feature at each of four delays: 2, 4, 6, and 8 seconds. To place all 
features of all models on similar scales for modeling purposes, feature timecourses were 
z-scored within run. 
4.6. fMRI data pre-processing 
After acquisition, data were organized according to the BIDS neuroimaging 
specification, designed to promote consistent description and organization for data 
sharing and collaboration (Gorgolewski et al., 2016). All data (audiobooks and localizers) 
were then preprocessed using FMRIPREP version 1.0.14 (Esteban et al., 2019), a robust 
and automated pre-processing pipeline for fMRI data. In this pipeline, each T1w (T1-
weighted) volume was corrected for INU (intensity non-uniformity) and skull-stripped 
using antsBrainExtraction.sh v2.1.0 (using the OASIS template). Brain surfaces were 
reconstructed using recon-all from FreeSurfer v6.0.1, and the brain mask estimated 
previously was refined with a custom variation of the method to reconcile ANTs-derived 
and FreeSurfer-derived segmentations of the cortical gray-matter. Spatial normalization 
to the ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical template version 2009c was performed 
through nonlinear registration with the antsRegistration tool of ANTs v2.1.0, using 
brain-extracted versions of both T1w volume and template. Brain tissue segmentation of 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was performed on 
the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL v5.0.9). 
Functional data was slice time corrected using 3dTshift from AFNI v16.2.07 and 
motion corrected using mcflirt (FSL v5.0.9). Distortion correction was performed using 
an implementation of the TOPUP technique using 3dQwarp (AFNI v16.2.07). This was 
followed by co-registration to the corresponding T1w using boundary-based registration 
with 9 degrees of freedom, using bbregister (FreeSurfer v6.0.1). Motion correcting 
transformations, field distortion correcting warp, BOLD-to-T1w transformation and 
T1w-to-template (MNI) warp were concatenated and applied in a single step using 
antsApplyTransforms (ANTs v2.1.0) using Lanczos interpolation. For more details of the 
pipeline see https://fmriprep.readthedocs.io/en/latest/workflows.html. After data were 
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pre-processed with FMRIPREP, they were high-pass filtered (100 sec) using FSL to 
remove low temporal frequencies due to scanner signal drift. They were then smoothed 
with a 3mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, separately within voxels of the same tissue type, 
using FSL’s SUSAN algorithm. 
All analyses in this manuscript were conducted in subject space, within a mask 
consisting of the union of gray matter masks of all subjects and the MNI template, 
dilated with a 3mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. Whole-brain maps for Figure 4.6B and 
Figure 4.8 were transformed from subject to MNI space using nonlinear registration 
warp matrices generated from FMRIPREP pre-processing, and then the maps were 
projected onto the MNI cortical surface using the Matlab mni2fs toolbox 
(https://github.com/dprice80/mni2fs). 
4.7. Functional localizers and definition of ROIs 
We constrained our main analyses to a set of regions in the brain that are known to 
selectively respond to language. Since the exact locations of these regions varies 
somewhat from individual to individual, we took the functional localization approach, 
first used for studies of high-level vision (Kanwisher, 2010), and subsequently brought 
into the domain of high-level functions of language (Fedorenko et al., 2010). The 
contrast used to identify language selectivity is written or spoken intact language 
(semantically and syntactically coherent sentences) compared to a perceptually matched 
input with degraded language (in the written domain, strings of nonsense words; in the 
spoken domain, filtered speech such that interpreting coherent words and syntactic 
structure is not possible). 
In the current study, we used the spoken language contrast (Scott et al., 2016). In two 
six-minute runs, subjects listened to 16 18-second blocks, half of intact and half of 
degraded speech (see Scott et al for details). We used general linear models (GLMs) 
implemented in FSL (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki) to estimate the response of 
each voxel to each speech condition in each scan run. To define ROIs in each subject, we 
used a group-constrained subject-specific (GSS) ROI definition method (Fedorenko et 
al., 2010; Julian et al., 2012). This approach yields similar individual subject functional 
ROIs to the traditional hand-drawn ROI pipeline but uses an objective and automatic 
method. Anatomical parcels were defined in a large group of subjects undergoing a 
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similar contrast using a watershed algorithm to identify areas where subjects shared 
selectivity. We defined each subject-specific ROI as the top 200 voxels in each 
hemisphere that responded more to the contrast of interest and fell within the group-
parcel mask for the given ROI. Although language function has been observed to be 
primarily left-lateralized in fMRI activation studies and patient studies (Blank & 
Fedorenko, 2017; Fedorenko & Varley, 2016), in other studies using the encoding model 
approach (Huth et al., 2016), similarity across hemispheres was observed. Thus, our 
ROIs were bilateral. 
4.8. Reliability of fMRI responses to audiobooks 
To determine response reliability across the brain and in ROIs, we calculated the 
Pearson correlation of voxel timecourses between the repeats of the audiobooks in the 
validation set (concatenated; 1686 timepoints total). This analysis will result in high 
correlations if the voxel responds consistently to any aspect of the stimulus (low or high 
level). Average reliability and proportion of significant voxels (q(FDR) < .05) for each 
ROI and the rest of cortex are reported in Table 4.2. These results demonstrate that a 
significant proportion of voxels in our ROIs demonstrated reliable signal. Thus, these 
data can be used for testing our voxelwise encoding models. 
Table 4.2. 
ROI Number of voxels Mean reliability Proportion 
significant 
IFGOrb 400 0.068 (0.013) 0.592 (0.114) 
IFG 400 0.083 (0.014) 0.670 (0.118) 
MFG 400 0.071 (0.010) 0.586 (0.093) 
AntTemp 400 0.091 (0.016) 0.716 (0.124) 
MidAntTemp 400 0.130 (0.018) 0.830 (0.091) 
MidPostTemp 400 0.168 (0.030) 0.876 (0.092) 
PostTemp 400 0.109 (0.024) 0.720 (0.146) 
AngG 400 0.086 (0.018) 0.660 (0.125) 
Non-ROI voxels (all) 149736 (5441) 0.028 (0.004) 0.273 (0.051) 
Non-ROI voxels (reliable 
only) 
40718 (7578) 0.081 (0.002) 1.00 
Reliability (Pearson r) of fMRI responses to repeats of validation stimulus set. Results listed for each ROI, 
for all non-ROI voxels, and for non-ROI voxels that were significantly reliable. Significant was set at q(FDR) 
< .05. Mean ± SE across subjects (no SE for number of voxels in ROIs, as ROIs contained the same number 
of voxels for all subjects). Abbreviations: inferior frontal gyrus orbital (IFGOrb), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), 
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middle frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior temporal (AntTemp), middle anterior temporal (MidAntTemp), middle 
posterior temporal (MidPostTemp), posterior temporal (PostTemp), and angular gyrus (AngG). 
4.9. Voxelwise modeling 
The main goal of this study was to test how well each model of interest could predict 
fMRI responses to language. To this end, we fit voxelwise encoding models to our 
estimation data set and tested their predictive accuracy on a held-out validation data set. 
Because of the large number of features relative to observations, we used ridge 
regression, which trades a small degree of bias in beta estimates for a large reduction in 
variance of the estimates, as has been used previously in the encoding model approach 
(Huth et al., 2016; Lescroart & Gallant, 2018; Nishimoto et al., 2011). First, to place all 
variables and fMRI responses on the same scale, each voxel timecourse and was z-scored 
within scan run (feature timecourses were already z-scored within run during feature 
pre-processing). Additionally, we included several nuisance regressors designed to 
capture low-level responses to the stories that were not relevant for high-level semantic 
encoding. These were included at model estimation but were not used to generate 
response predictions for the validation set. The nuisance regressors included were 
auditory envelope (A-weighting filter, available at 
https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/46819-a-weighting-filter-
with-matlab; 1 feature); word rate and phoneme rate (i.e., number of words and 
phonemes occurring within a timepoint); and part of speech for nouns and verbs (i.e., a 
binary coding at the midpoint of a noun or verb, only for verbs that were modeled; 2 
features). These regressors were pre-processed in the same way as the model features of 
interest. 
For each model tested, we first estimated model beta weights on the estimation set 
(nine audiobooks, 2,632 timepoints total). We performed leave-one-run-out cross-
validation within the estimation set to find the best ridge parameter for fitting to the 
validation set. On eight of nine runs, we tested a range of 20 ridge parameters (zero 
[standard least-squares regression] and 19 other values log-spaced between 100 and 104) 
for each voxel. The lambda that resulted in the highest mean prediction accuracy 
(Pearson r) across cross-validation iterations was chosen, separately for each voxel. 
To generate timecourse predictions on the validation set, the full estimation set was 
used to estimate beta weights for each feature, for each voxel. These weights were used to 
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generate predicted responses to the validation set data according to the stimulus features 
of the validation set. The validation stimulus set consisted of five audiobooks repeated 
once (1,686 timepoints total). fMRI data were averaged across repeats to improve 
reliability. The measure of prediction accuracy we used was the Pearson correlation 
between the predicted and actual response, per voxel. For ROI analyses, the mean 
prediction across voxels within each ROI was calculated (per subject). For whole-brain 
maps, FDR-correction was applied to correlation values across voxels, with the 
significance threshold set at q(FDR) < .05. 
For all models (including joint models for variance partitioning, below), we used a 
generalized form of ridge regression called Tikhonov regression (Tikhonov & Arsenin, 
1977). In our case, this was implemented like standard ridge regression, but instead of 
the same ridge parameter applied to all features (e.g., in a joint Binder + word2vec 
model, the same ridge parameter for Binder features and word2vec features), all models 
were permitted their own ridge parameter (e.g. Binder features would have one ridge 
parameter, and word2vec another). In recent work using voxelwise encoding models, 
this approach (“banded” ridge regression) improved prediction accuracy and variance 
partitioning for joint models (Nunez-Elizalde, Huth, & Gallant, 2018). Nuisance features 
were treated as one model here (i.e. they collectively received one ridge parameter of 
their own). For cross-validation, this “banded” ridge approach entailed searching for the 
best combination of ridge parameters (one for each model). However, for every 
additional feature space, the search space increases exponentially (2 models: 202 
possible ridge parameter combinations; 3 models: 203; etc.). We found in practice that 
we could achieve almost identical results to searching the full parameter space by picking 
the best lambda from each model combination. For example, for a joint model of feature 
spaces A, B, and C, we could choose the best parameter from pairwise combinations of 
models (best parameter for A from A+B and A+C combination; best for B from A+B and 
B+C combination; and best for C from A+C and B+C combination). This drastically 
decreased computation time from searching across 203 parameters to 23; and so on for 
different numbers of models. 
4.10. Representational Similarity Analysis across model feature 
spaces 
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To test the relationship between model feature spaces, we performed a 
representational similarity analysis of pairwise feature spaces (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008). 
For each model of interest (word2vec, Binder, and Semantic Structure), we constructed 
matrices of timepoints (4,318 in total) by features, after feature pre-processing 
(downsampling and z-scoring within run). We then we calculated the pairwise squared 
Euclidean distance of each observation to every other observation. This produced a 
timepoint by timepoint representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM), representing the 
pairwise dissimilarity of each timepoint to every other timepoint for each model. We 
compared each model to every other model by calculating the Pearson correlation of the 
lower off-diagonal values of their RDMs, which produced an estimate of how similarly 
each model represents our stimuli at the acquisition rate of fMRI. We also performed a 
similar analysis on matrices of verb instances by features (z-scoring across features and 
then instances), which yielded similar correlation values. 
4.11. Variance partitioning analyses 
To conduct variance partitioning analyses, we fit models with concatenated feature 
spaces (see main Methods for details on the models fit). Separate ridge parameters were 
found for each feature space via leave-one-run-out cross-validation within the estimation 
data set (see above). After models were fit and predictions made for each joint model, 
prediction accuracy was converted to variance explained by squaring the Pearson 
correlation value while retaining its sign. We then used set theory to find the shared and 
unique variance for each partition, according to the following equations, where each 
letter A through C corresponds to a different model (equations after de Heer et al., 2017; 
Lescroart & Gallant, 2018): 
 
For two feature spaces: 
 
1) r2AB_shared = r2A + r2B – r2A+B (variance shared by both models) 
2) r2A_unique = r2A+B – r2B (variance unique to model A) 
3) r2B_unique = r2A+B – r2A (variance unique to model B) 
 
For three feature spaces: 
4) r2ABC_shared = r2A+B+C + r2A + r2B + r2C – r2A+B – r2A+C – r2B+C (variance shared by all three 
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models) 
5) r2AB_shared_noC = r2A + r2B – r2A+B – r2ABC_shared (variance shared by models A and B, but not 
C) 
6) r2AC_shared_noB = r2A + r2C – r2A+C – r2ABC_shared (variance shared by models A and C, but not 
B) 
7) r2BC_shared_noA = r2B + r2C – r2B+C – r2ABC_shared (variance shared by models B and C, but not 
A) 
8) r2A_unique = r2A+B+C – r2B+C (variance unique to model A) 
9) r2B_unique = r2A+B+C – r2A+C (variance unique to model B) 
10) r2C_unique = r2A+B+C – r2A+B (variance unique to model C) 
 
r2A is the variance explained when model A alone is fit; r2A+B is the variance explained 
when features from models A and B are jointly fit; and r2A+B+C is the variance explained 
when features from models A, B, and C are jointly fit; and so on. 
Note that performing variance partitions using the held-out validation set can 
sometimes result in impossible partitions of variance (i.e. negative variance explained). 
This can result from joint models having a poorer fit relative to each individual model on 
its own. In previous work, such estimates were corrected by finding the minimum bias 
term for which adding this term to the partitions would result in sensible results (i.e. all 
variance partitions above zero; de Heer et al., 2017). However, an issue with that 
approach is that such an estimate may inflate the significance of results across subjects, 
since no mean variance value can be below zero after adjustment. Thus, we chose instead 
not to adjust the partition estimates. Although this results in some impossible values 
(e.g., the shared variance of Binder and Semantic Structure being significantly negative), 
these results provide a lower bound on the possible unique variance attributable to each 
semantic model or sets of models. Thus, if a region shows variance explained 
significantly greater than zero, we can be confident this is indeed the case, but a null 
result here would be inconclusive. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Recognizing events is crucial for guiding our social behavior. To return to the 
Introduction, in Figure 1.1, did you see kissing or biting? Was it the red player who acted 
on his blue opponent, or the other way around? Although it is conceivable that 
recognizing such structure in the world requires explicit reasoning about the physical 
and mental states of the entities involved, in the current thesis, we found evidence to the 
contrary. The data from our studies suggests instead that the mind automatically 
extracts structured event information from visual and linguistic input.   
In Chapter 2, we found behavioral evidence that one component of event structure – 
event roles – is extracted from visual scenes. Such extraction was spontaneous and 
occurred even when event information is irrelevant to the task. By the nature of the task 
we employed, we can conclude that the computation itself was rapid, occurring within a 
few hundred milliseconds. Furthermore, the representations of role that were extracted 
were at an event-general level: participants were not simply encoding actors in a scene as 
kicker/kickee, or kisser/kissee, but rather at the more abstract level of Agent-like and 
Patient-like. This is precisely what we would expect to observe if the visual system 
encodes the observed scene in terms of a structured interaction in which one entity, the 
Agent, performs some act on another, the Patient. 
In Chapter 3, we used fMRI to identify brain regions which house representations of 
action categories invariant to incidental visual properties. Since our hypothesis is that 
events are defined by relationships between entities, rather than by full dynamic 
sequences per se, we predicted that such representations should be identifiable even 
when we decode across multivoxel fMRI patterns elicited by static snapshots (e.g., a 
photograph of biting) and dynamic sequences. We identified representations with just 
such properties in brain areas previously observed to respond to action observation. 
Surprisingly, this included regions previously shown to support recognition motion 
patterns and groups of interacting objects (section 1.2 in the Introduction), including 
motion-selective hMT+ and object-selective LOC. This suggests that such regions may 
code for actions in a manner more abstract than previously thought, perhaps through an 
experience-driven association between static snapshots of actions and full action 
sequences. Overall the findings from this study suggest that the representations in these 
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regions may provide a link between systems which support perceptual recognition and 
conceptual systems which support complex thought about events. These conceptual 
systems have not yet been identified in the current studies (see section 5.1 below), but we 
envision here representations that are non-linguistic in nature and support 
combinatorial thought (Jackendoff, 2002). 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we returned to language, which was the initial inspiration for 
our investigation of event structure in vision. We sought to provide support for the 
hypothesis that the brain encodes the meanings of verbs in part by the structure of the 
event that they refer to. We used a voxel-wise encoding model approach to test several 
predictions of the relationship between linguistic and semantic structure. These 
predictions were confirmed. We also compared a model of event structure alongside 
other leading models in the field (a distributional semantic model and sensorimotor/ 
cognitive model), finding that all three models shared substantial explained variance in 
language-selective regions. The work in this chapter suggests that properties of an 
event’s semantic structure (e.g. Agent, Cause, State) are encoded spontaneously by 
people as they comprehend naturalistic speech, and that such properties are implicitly 
present in the representations of other semantic models. 
Together, these studies provide support for the hypothesis that perception itself 
traffics in event structure, of the kind predicted by patterns observed in the linguistic 
structures associated with verbs. These studies also identify candidates for areas of the 
brain that may support abstract representations of events, from both visual and 
linguistic input. More generally, our work demonstrates the utility of using language as a 
window into the high-level representations that may be afforded by the visual system. 
5.1. Limitations and Future Directions 
In Chapter 2, we constrained our investigation of the perception of event structure to 
a core distinction between Agent and Patient, which is consistent with theories that posit 
such a coarse distinction in language (Dowty, 1991). However, a stronger test of this 
coarse distinction would require investigation of a larger set of distinctions made in the 
theoretical domain of event roles in language. In particular, some theories posit 
additional roles to account for how we understand differences between elements that 
occupy the same syntactic position (Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005); for example, 
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between a Recipient and Destination in I gave the man [Recipient] a book, vs. I loaded 
the wagon [Destination] with hay. Conducting our task with additional roles would 
allow us to understand precisely what event role distinctions the mind makes. 
We also note that in Chapter 3, we did not identify neural representations of event 
role identity elicited by visual input (the entity bound to its corresponding role, i.e. 
whether actor A was the Agent and B the Patient or vice-versa, not simply the presence of 
an Agent or Patient alone). Given that we know these representations must exist 
(Chapter 2), there are several possibilities for this. One of course is that we might not 
have had sufficient power to detect these representations using fMRI. This is not 
surprising: previous work identifying such representations in the linguistic domain 
required several tens of subjects to observe such an effect (Frankland & Greene, 2015), 
while we only had 15. Additionally, the coding of role identity may simply be too sparse 
to be detectable using the multivariate fMRI techniques we employed. Indeed, decoding 
representations of person identity is notoriously fickle (Anzellotti & Caramazza, 2014). 
Techniques such as fMRI adaptation can assist in these cases. Identifying such 
representations could be a key element of understanding what brain regions are involved 
in building structured event representations from a visual scene (Chapter 2). 
In Chapter 3, we found evidence for neural representations of action categories that 
generalized across incidental perceptual properties. However, the data thus far does not 
speak to the organizational principles underlying representation of events in these 
regions. Does a model of event structure derived from the linguistic domain of the kind 
used in Chapter 4 predict the representation of events from visual input in these regions? 
We were limited by our relatively small set of categories here, so future work should 
widely sample the rich space of events to model such representations. 
Relatedly, an open question is how information about event structure in language 
and vision are integrated. There is good reason to suspect such common conceptual 
representations exist (see section 1.1 in Introduction). However, we have not yet 
identified a common locus for event structure across modalities, as our investigations in 
vision and language proceeded in parallel. Based on the results of Chapters 3 and 4, we 
speculate that the posterior middle temporal cortex (pMTC) may play a role in 
integrating event information from the two modalities (Lingnau & Downing, 2015). 
Despite anatomical differences across the two studies, they both showed strong results in 
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adjacent regions of pMTC, with language results anterior to the visual (Figures 3.2 and 
4.6). The view that pMTC may support such integration is bolstered by a recent study 
showing common representation of actions across language and vision (M. F. Wurm & 
Caramazza, 2018), although explicit models of event structure have not yet been tested 
here. In our approach (Chapter 4), this could be investigated by training encoding 
models of event structure on linguistic stimuli and testing them in a held-out validation 
set of visual events (e.g. in short films), or vice-versa. 
A still unresolved question is why there should be a correspondence between event 
structure and patterns of linguistic structure in the first place. Recall in the Introduction 
and in Chapter 4 that properties of event structure are predictive of the sets of linguistic 
structures a verb can appear in. For example, the number of noun phrases can be 
predicted by the nature of the event: sleep can appear in sentences like Jimmy sleeps, 
but sound odd or ungrammatical in sentences like Jimmy sleeps his ice cream, precisely 
because sleeping involves one entity performing the action. In Chapter 4, we 
demonstrated the presence of this mapping between linguistic structure and event 
structure in the fully linguistic adult brain, such that hearing a verb activates both its 
associated semantic structure and its associated syntactic frames. However, this does not 
explain how the association came to be, both in the brain, and in general through the 
evolutionary course of language. 
Several proposals have been proffered to explain this correspondence. Strickland 
(2016) proposes that “core” knowledge available to the infant early on – possibly in 
perception – makes certain grammatical distinctions more salient (e.g., syntactic 
structures correlated with Causation), such that elements not associated with core 
cognition (e.g., the distinction between tables and chairs) are less likely to get coded in 
human grammatical systems as languages evolve. This dovetails nicely with Pinker’s 
(1989) proposal of how children acquire the syntactic structures of their language, called 
semantic bootstrapping. Given that the space of possible grammars for language is 
immense, Pinker proposes that children use event structure gleaned from observation, 
along with unlearned mappings between semantics and syntax (e.g. objects map to 
nouns), to acquire their language’s grammar. Crucially, Pinker’s proposal requires that 
high-level representations of events are available from observation in the first place, 
before the child has access to the structural principles of their grammar. Our work in 
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Chapter 2 supports this proposal suggesting that at least in the adult visual system, 
aspects of event structure (here, roles) come “for free”, and our ongoing work suggests 
this is also the case in young preschool children (not published). An alternative theory is 
that an association between semantics and syntax is necessary for the child to learn the 
full range of meanings to which verbs and other words refer (Fisher et al., 1991; 
Gleitman, 1990; Gleitman, Cassidy, Nappa, Papafragou, & Trueswell, 2005). After all, 
what perceptual input would a child use to learn what thinking means, given that it has 
no overt perceptual correlates? Gleitman and colleagues argue for an inverse procedure 
to Pinker’s, whereby children use the syntactic frames of a verb to constrain and predict 
its meaning (what they call syntactic bootstrapping). Importantly, all of these proposals 
share the requirement that the mind have some kind of non-linguistic conceptual 
structure, capable of interfacing with both linguistic and perceptual systems (Jackendoff, 
2002). Thus, identifying such non-linguistic conceptual structure is an important target 
of future investigations. 
One important path for future work is identifying the computations that give rise to 
high-level event structure representations from visual input. We have identified the 
perceptual phenomenon of study (Chapter 2) and some of the cortical regions that house 
representations at least partially abstracted from the visual input (Chapter 3). However, 
we have little to say about how these representations “got there” in the first place, or 
about their role in other cognitive processes such as memory or language. A class of 
recent models known as hierarchical convolutional neural networks (HCNN) offers the 
potential for breakthroughs in the computational understanding of high-level visual 
abstraction for recognition. HCNNs have recently achieved remarkable performance at 
tasks like object, scene, and action recognition (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) and are 
the current leading computational models of information processing in the human visual 
system (Bonner & Epstein, 2018; Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte, 2014; Yamins et al., 
2014). They achieve this remarkable feat in part by capitalizing on statistical patterns in 
natural scene input. For example, the presence of a person and a hoagie in a scene may 
be a reliable heuristic for person eating sandwich. 
However, we suspect that to recognize situations as flexibly as the human mind does, 
such statistical heuristics alone cannot be used for event understanding, especially when 
novel entities are involved in novel situations. Consider the ease with which you 
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recognized the biting scene in Figure 1.1, despite never having observed such a scene 
before (Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2016). We hypothesize that since 
events capture not only atomic entities, but relationships between entities (as we 
demonstrated in Chapter 2), statistical patterns alone may not be sufficient. One 
important component that they may be missing is the principle of compositionality, akin 
to the similar principle in linguistics and semantics: that entities in an event 
representation go together in structured, lawful ways (George et al., 2017; Yuille & Liu, 
2018). In future work, we can combine current approaches in mathematical modeling of 
high-level visual tasks, representational similarity analyses between models and the 
brain (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008), and techniques to probe the internal representations of 
such models (Bonner & Epstein, 2018) to provide insights into the possible algorithms 
and computational architectures that may underlie the recognition of events. 
5.2. Conclusions 
In this thesis we have argued that the mind extracts an event structure from the 
observed world whose representational content can be predicted by patterns of linguistic 
structure (with elements such as Cause, Motion, State Change, and event roles). We have 
contributed to an understanding of how the mind works at several levels (Marr, 1982), 
by identifying a key computational-level problem to solve (understanding the structure 
of events), its domain (perception and language; Chapters 2 and 4), and candidate brain 
areas where the representations for event structure may be (Chapters 3 and 4). Thus, our 
studies lay the groundwork for future investigation of these issues. 
Taken together, the findings from this thesis suggest that a fundamental process of 
the mind is analyzing the structure of who is doing what to whom. We may literally 
perceive a red-shirted soccer player biting his opponent, even if we ultimately never 
learn why. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Examples of images used in Chapter 2 
An example image for each event category featured in the experiments (for 
Experiments 1a and 1b, Female Agent on the Left images; for Experiments 2 and 3, Blue 
Agent on the Left images). Agent and Patient poses were similar for the four versions of 
each event category. Although the images used in Experiments 2 and 3 were desaturated 
to a level of 3% to make the task (color search) more difficult, they are shown here in full 
color for illustrative purposes. See sections 2.1.2, 4.1.2, and 5.1.2 of Chapter 2 for details. 
 
Experiments 1a and 1b (Gender Search) 
 brush chase feed film kick 
     
 
 look at punch push scratch tap 
     
 
Experiment 2 (Color Search) 
 bandage kick kiss poke pull 
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 scratch slap stab strangle tickle 
     
 
Experiment 3 (Color Search, Mirror-Flipped) 
 bandage kick kiss poke pull 
     
 
 scratch slap stab strangle tickle 
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